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ABSTRACT 
The Coast Guard has had significant success conducting response operations 
during major contingencies.  And yet, mission execution has been buoyed and supported 
in an ad hoc fashion by the logistics and financial management structure of the 
organization.  Should ad hoc efforts fail in the future, the Coast Guard may find itself 
unprepared for managing the logistical and financial challenges of widespread 
contingencies.   Shortfalls in the existing approach to contingency preparedness include: 
a lack of contingency-based financial and logistics policies, unprepared contingency cost 
accounting mechanisms, a non-resilient financial management community, a lack of 
geographically focused logistics plans for a range of contingencies and, operational and 
logistical professionals are not adequately trained for contingency resource management. 
Qualitative research and reviews of after action reports indicate that there are 
solutions to these challenges.  Recommendations include establishing policy on cost 
tracking, pre-contracting and rapid procurement, modifying the financial systems 
readiness to track costs, developing an information sharing and collaborative construct 
with other units and agencies using a Contingency Logistics Planning Group (CLPG), 
building resilience in contingency procurement through Advanced Readiness Contracting 
and meeting the “human aspects” of business continuity planning and, reconfiguring the 
training for planners, logisticians and procurement personnel. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Coast Guard has had significant success conducting response operations 
during major contingencies.  And yet, mission execution has been buoyed and supported 
in an ad hoc fashion by the logistics and financial management structure of the 
organization.  Should ad hoc efforts fail in the future, the Coast Guard may find itself 
unprepared for managing the logistical and financial challenges of widespread 
contingencies.   Shortfalls in the existing approach to contingency preparedness include: 
a lack of contingency-based financial and logistics policies, unprepared financial 
management and cost accounting mechanisms, a non-resilient financial management 
community, a lack of geographically-focused and inter-agency logistics plans for a range 
of low-probability, high-consequence contingencies and, operational and logistical 
professionals are not adequately trained for contingency resource management. 
Qualitative research and reviews of after action reports indicate that there are 
solutions to these challenges.  Recommendations include establishing policy on cost 
tracking, pre-contracting and rapid procurement, modifying the financial systems 
readiness to track costs, developing an information sharing and collaborative construct 
with other units and agencies using a Contingency Logistics Planning Group (CLPG), 
building resilience in contingency procurement through Advanced Readiness 
Contracting, meeting the “human aspects” of business continuity planning and, 
reconfiguring the long-term training plan for planners, logisticians and procurement 
personnel. 
This thesis work concludes by studying the potential stakeholders involved in 
implementing the recommendations, as well as laying out the steps for change 
management. 
 xviii
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but 
planning is indispensable. 
                                  General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
A. THE COAST GUARD IN AN ERA OF CHALLENGES 
The Coast Guard has a history of exemplary operational performance in times of 
national crisis and catastrophe.  Organizational culture, built upon more than 218 years of 
experience serving and saving the public, has continued to foster a mindset of ‘others 
before self’ and ‘respond now, clean up later.’  This culture leads even the youngest and 
least experienced personnel in the Coast Guard to take action quickly and decisively to 
protect life and property, whether protecting from natural disaster, terrorism, Mother 
Nature, or to protect and rescue people from their own lapses in better judgment. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as the terrorism events of 9/11 and the build-
up and deployment of forces to support Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate nationally 
significant events in which the Coast Guard reacted quickly and decisively, contributing a 
prominent role and providing high-levels of service to the nation.  However, while 
operations such as search and rescue, disaster response/recovery and homeland security 
have been carried out with near flawless execution, the logistical and financial 
infrastructure upon which these operations rests has been ad hoc, inefficient and in 
danger of failing the operators at a crucial time.  At this critical period in the Coast Guard 
and the nation’s history, while in the midst of struggles against extremism and perceived 
government inefficiency, it is inappropriate to not better prepare the logistical and 
financial management community for regional and national events which can strain 
operations.  This thesis, and the accompanying research, shows that financial 
management and logistical preparedness challenges exist within the Coast Guard.  In 
order to provide the highest level of logistical and financial management support to those 
executing the Coast Guard’s mission in the field, the changes espoused by 
recommendations should be implemented. 
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Natural catastrophic events continue unabated in recent years.  Earthquakes, 
wildfires and possible tsunamis threaten the West Coast of the United States, hurricanes 
annually impact and destroy property along the Gulf of Mexico and the East Coast, and 
floods, winter storms and tornadoes cause havoc throughout the heartland.  As if Mother 
Nature were not enough to contend with, the evil threats and vast capabilities of terrorists 
and criminals lurk in the shadows of our country, most often in areas where they can 
wreak unfathomable damage to our infrastructure and cause thousands, if not millions, of 
deaths and injuries.  If catastrophic events such as terrorism or national disaster were to 
occur today, it is the immediate intent of Coast Guard commanders to surge operational 
forces to the affected area, learn more about the details as units are en route, fine-tune and 
execute operational plans, and then ensure delegation and enactment of budget and 
logistics plans to support operational forces.  While the response and support appears 
straight-forward, there is an inherent element of danger in our disaster response.  As is 
very often the case, logistics and finance plans are not developed in advance but are 
instead created ad hoc in the hours after an incident has occurred.  By then, it is likely 
that resources have not been optimized, cost tracking and accounting is scrambling to 
catch up and delays in providing additional services will be inevitable.  At the moment of 
crisis, it is understandably paramount to get forces moving and response operations 
underway – an issue which should never be in dispute.  However, today, while in a phase 
of preparedness, we can take many actions to ensure that when the call comes, the Coast 
Guard can provide the highest level of capability to our nation that they deserve.  This 
report will discuss financial and logistics challenges the Coast Guard faces in truly being 
ready to handle the dangerous and catastrophic contingencies that lay before our nation.  
More than anything, the development of advanced planning efforts, particularly in the 
areas of contingency planning, business continuity planning, disaster logistics and 
contingency training can increase the preparedness and resilience of the Coast Guard. 
B. COAST GUARD’S PATCHWORK HISTORY 
In an organizational sense, the Coast Guard has been the “hand-me-down” agency 
of many departments during its 218-year history.  From its establishment to enforce 
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customs laws in 1790, the Coast Guard has assumed many additional duties while 
consuming disparate agencies, each with their own financial and logistical histories and 
challenges, into a patchwork organization forced to make sense of potential chaos.  
Initially founded by Alexander Hamilton within the Treasury Department in 1790, the 
Coast Guard merged with components of the Department of Justice in 1838, the 
Department of Commerce in 1903, the Department of the Navy in 1917 and 1941, 
transferred back to Treasury Department in 1946, shifted over to the Department of 
Transportation in 1967 and then finally became a major component of the newly 
established Department of Homeland Security in 2003.1  With each shift in department 
and responsibility, the Coast Guard had to rewrite the policies and procedures for the 
organization, including reporting responsibilities, Congressional appropriations, financial 
accountability and responsibility, internal controls and cost management. 
Until the most recent transition, the Coast Guard was a relatively small-player in 
each department it was a component of, making up only a fraction of each department’s 
budget and appropriation and garnering little attention from auditors and critics.  The 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 changed that perspective.  
As the largest player in a contentiously debated new department, the Coast Guard is at the 
center of scrutiny, making progress but continuing a long struggle to receive its first 
unqualified opinion on financial statements.  Simultaneously, the service is daunted with 
contracting flaws and claims of ineptitude during the largest fleet modernization program 
in the Coast Guard’s history.  In addition, there is a major organizational structure change 
underway to remove vertical stovepipes and improve cross-operational collaboration.  
Homeland security, search and rescue, law enforcement and national defense operations 
also continue without pause in the midst of this change.  Hundreds of personnel and eight 
cutters are deployed overseas fighting the Global War on Terrorism, reservists are on 
active duty defending Guantanamo Bay and dozens of units continue to respond to the 
maritime challenge du jour (e.g., hurricanes, urban floods, migrant/drug interdiction, law 
enforcement and homeland security).  All this activity creates multiple, and often 
                                                 
1 U.S. Coast Guard, “Historian’s Office Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” U.S. Coast Guard 
Historian, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/faqs/when.html (accessed June 30, 2007). 
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divergent, priorities for strategic and operational planners, financial managers and the 
logisticians which must ensure the right equipment is available at the right time, in the 
right place, and of course, at the right price.  Decisions must often be made to either 
provide financial flexibility and responsiveness to field units or the sometimes converse 
effort to maintain stringent internal controls, thereby ensuring that spending is aligned 
with strategic plans and in accordance with federal law.  With a financial management 
community numbering only in the hundreds, the incidence of heavy workloads is 
rampant, and there is anecdotal evidence of burn-out and frustration.  Having the time 
and energy to plan the financial and logistical issues of events and contingencies that 
have not taken place is seemingly rare.  The operational and response planning of the 
Coast Guard does take place, with entire divisions of personnel focused on future 
operational planning and training, but it would appear widely assumed that the financial 
management and logistics systems will “catch up” when necessary.  History has proven 
this to be true – why not assume the same for the future?  The mindset that the logistical 
system will always adapt and accommodate without assertive efforts of pre-planning is 
dangerous and could lead to reduced capabilities of the Coast Guard to provide the 
services it is expected to deliver in times of crisis.  It also sets the Coast Guard up for 
further rigorous scrutiny from the Department of Homeland Security, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional oversight committees in a post-
catastrophe investigation and finger-pointing probe (e.g., FEMA’s post-Katrina 
investigations and lambasting). 
C. UNQUESTIONABLE MISSION SUCCESS – WHY NOT “UNQUALIFIED 
OPINION?” 
There have been two defining moments for the Coast Guard in the past few years 
which effortlessly demonstrate areas for concern and improvement.  These major events 
are indisputably viewed as operational successes for the nation’s smallest military 
service.  However, beneath the glossy photos, newspaper headlines and amazing rescue 
videos, there is a financial planner’s nightmare.  If you are a trained auditor, stop reading 
now! 
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On the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States woke to the horrors of 
terrorism.  The world-wide impact of the events were unforgettable and continue to stand 
as a stark test of our nation’s preparedness in times of crisis.  The planes diving from the 
sky, brutally attacking American citizens and infrastructure was a wake up call for a 
nation which had become comfortable with our standing in the world and complacent in 
our posture for security, preparedness and resilience.  Previous attacks on the World 
Trade Center, bombings in embassies overseas and even suicidal small-boat attacks 
against our warships in foreign ports were not the catalysts that would bring the horrors 
of terrorism into our streets, workplaces, and daily lives.  9/11 was different and remains 
as a day which changed the focus and future of our nation.  It was also a decisive turning 
point in Coast Guard history – hundreds of years of unflinching devotion to placing 
search-and-rescue as the pinnacle of operations were now taking a backseat to a new 
abundance of homeland security missions and requirements.  By the afternoon of 9/11, 
the major East Coast seaports of Boston and New York were shut down, thousands of 
Coast Guard reserve personnel were being called to active duty, cutters on both coasts 
were redirected to provide security to major ports and facilities, and deployable port 
security units were putting people and armed security boats on the roads bound for the 
nation’s critical seaports to provide additional water-borne security where needed.  In the 
hours, months and years that followed 9/11, as the nation steeled itself for an amorphous 
fight against terrorism, the Coast Guard revitalized the commitment to providing 
Americans a “maritime shield” from terrorism. 
1. Financial Management Response to 9/11 
While operational challenges, logistics and details were being carried out in New 
York, Boston, Long Beach and other major U.S. seaports, few people realize the 
difficulties and challenges faced on the morning of 9/11 by Coast Guard Headquarters 
and the two Maintenance & Logistics Commands (MLC Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia 
and MLC Pacific, located in Alameda, California).  These macro-level financial 
management, engineering support and logistics organizations had to rapidly devise and 
establish a system for providing financial support to the units and commands in the field 
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that were now carrying out a completely different mission on 9/11 than they had on 9/10.  
Cutters and boats that had been focused on conducting marine safety inspections were 
now searching inbound ships for bombs and stowaway terrorists.  Personnel that had been 
working in human resource jobs on 9/10 were shouldering weapons and standing guard 
duty near critical ports and facilities on 9/12.  Coast Guard stations that had only 
padlocked their gates at night before 9/11 now had 24-hour armed security guards.  
Cutters that just days before could pull into port for the night to take on additional fuel 
and supplies now could not leave designated security zones and required replenishment at 
sea.  These many changes in operational duties and missions required vast and immediate 
resources.  Everything from new security guard contracts, thousands of additional life 
jackets and hand-held radios, fuel barges for cutter support, and berthing/hotel/rental 
vehicle contracts for more than 5,000 recalled reserve personnel were needed 
immediately.  Our nation was under attack and no one was confident that the next attack 
would not take place in their port or along their waterway.  These fears seem unfounded 
today after the extended lull in significant attacks upon our homeland, especially after we 
have dissected the events and the terrorist planning of 9/11.  However, if you take 
yourself back to that morning of 9/11, imagine what you were doing and feeling, you can 
likely see the feasibility or even remember the dread of a continuing string of nation-wide 
terror attacks. 
The difficulty of responding to 9/11, in terms of a financial undertaking for the 
Coast Guard, was compounded by the timing of the event.  One can wonder if the 
terrorists specifically planned the attacks of 9/11 to intentionally coincide with the last 
several weeks of the fiscal year.  By this time, with just three weeks of funding 
remaining, nearly all Coast Guard units had already spent or obligated their entire fiscal 
year 2001 budgets.  In spite of the unprecedented attack upon our nation, procurement 
officials at the local units were hesitant to purchase additional equipment to support 
mission requirements for fear of spending into a deficit.  Budget and procurement 
personnel wanted to give operators in the field every advantage, but their contracting 
warrants and professional reputations were at risk creating a fear of deficit spending.  
Most procurement officials could not imagine that we would be, or even could be, 
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reimbursed by Congress at a later date, and there was no immediate indication that 
financial support would come from elsewhere.  To relieve the burden of making financial 
vs. operational decisions on the field-level operational units and support commands, and 
to gain visibility of the rapid-fire spending that was taking place at all units, the 
Maintenance & Logistics Commands (MLCs) in Alameda, California and Norfolk, 
Virginia made the rapid decision to open their lines of accounting Coast Guard-wide.  As 
the Budget Section Chief at MLC Atlantic on that day, I quickly saw that my 
responsibilities for the next several months were going to be significantly altered.  My 
boss, Mr. Frank Capitano, and I had consultations with Coast Guard Headquarters and the 
Atlantic Area Command and then got to the business of devising ways to fund, budget 
and track what we knew would be vast increases in spending at a time where our own 
funds were limited.  To understand the scope of the Area involved, imagine a line drawn 
North & South at the Colorado-Utah border.  Everything to the East, including the 
Caribbean, belonged to the Atlantic Area and would now be pounding on the door 
looking for financial and logistical support.  
By opening our lines of accounting, we had directed that any spending by field-
level units which was related to terrorism force protection, security upgrades and 
terrorism incident recovery (i.e., pollution cleanup in New York City) was approved and 
expenses could be charged to our centralized accounts.  In other words, units in the field 
now had an open checkbook to get what they needed to carry out their missions as long 
as they could verbalize that equipment was being used to support the missions.  
Information was transmitted electronically to local units to ensure that spending against 
these accounts followed newly established guidelines and criteria.  Overall, this was great 
news to the field-level operators and commanders and represented the best solution for 
units to quickly get what they needed to accomplish the new missions.  However, as we 
quickly learned, opening up spending to the field represented a hidden trap for those 
responsible for reporting the cost of the Coast Guard response as well as for ensuring 
internal controls over proper spending was in place. 
It is now evident that the guidelines and criteria sent to field units on how to 
spend against the central accounts was too brief, not clearly defined, or was blatantly 
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ignored by some.  In this time of urgency, people went to local vendors and bought what 
they felt was necessary, with little oversight or consequence and with an incomplete 
picture of the threat faced by the nation.  To facilitate rapid spending and flexibility, the 
units in the field were encouraged to recode their government purchase credit cards with 
the new accounting line (a 2-3 day process).  This further loosening of internal controls 
resulted in spending on a seemingly endless variety of items.  Reviews of the 9/11 
response and contingency accounts showed that units were purchasing not only clearly 
contingency-related items such as life jackets, radios, and meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) for 
deployed and activated personnel, but also extremely questionable items such as personal 
digital assistants, laptop computers, furniture, bicycles, even barbed-wire fences and 
medieval moats to establish around small boat stations.  It was suddenly Christmas 
morning and everyone wanted the new toys that they could not previously justify.  In 
some cases, there were obvious failures ensuring procurements were made in compliance 
with federal procurement law.  The assumption that procurement officials and decision-
makers at the lowest level understood financial management policies being formed at 
MLC and Coast Guard Headquarters was flawed.  Several units were thinking only of 
themselves, with a lack of strategic insight and perspective and with relatively little 
concern for internal controls or fiscal law.   
These failures were not for lack of professional competence, education, leadership 
or management ability on the part of financial management personnel in the Coast Guard.  
On the contrary, seasoned veterans of managing the Coast Guard’s finite appropriations 
and the contracting officers who put this spending on target were on the job throughout 
these commands, working countless hours to establish the support required by the field.  
Instead, the Coast Guard experienced a simple of the “lack of imagination” that plagued 
the Intelligence Community in the months and years prior to 9/11.  We had not foreseen 
the need to generate plans, make preparations and immediately shift to a ‘contingency’ 
financial and logistical response system when terrorism became evident and widespread; 
it was not part of the culture and no plan sat on the shelf awaiting activation.  The 
response to 9/11, as has been mentioned, was a fundamental shift in operations that had 
to take place in just hours.  As operations shifted, the financial and logistical organization 
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bent and flexed to support the operators, but at what cost to inefficiencies, delays and 
lapses in internal controls?  What if supplemental appropriations were not an option, how 
accurate would Coast Guard cost tracking have been during those early days?  What if 
Congressional appropriators required demonstration of rigorous internal controls 
following the event?  Was substantial time lost procuring, contracting and receiving 
supplies, services and inventory that we, or another service, actually already had on the 
shelf to put to use?  For the 9/11 response, it is difficult to consider these questions today, 
but shouldn’t we preparing to answer these questions for the contingencies of the future?   
The second pivotal event for the Coast Guard took place nearly four years after 
9/11 when Hurricane Katrina meandered through the Gulf of Mexico and then landed a 
devastating punch to the City of New Orleans and the surrounding states.  Just as the eye 
of the storm was passing over lower Louisiana, Coast Guard aircraft from throughout the 
country were already airborne and making their way towards the city, ready to evaluate 
the scene and rescue what the Coast Guard hoped were the few people who had 
unwittingly tried to ride out the storm on the coastline or local waterways.  What they 
found instead was an urban disaster of catastrophic scale.  Understanding the importance 
of evacuating the refugees and rescuing them from extreme heat, pollution and starvation, 
the crews immediately got to work plucking people from rooftops and flooded streets 
while additional Coast Guard operational and support assets made their way to New 
Orleans.  At the height of the rescue operations, more than 62 aircraft, 30 cutters and 111 
small boats of various sizes were participating in rescue and recovery operations.  When 
the days and weeks of exhaustive rescue operations were completed, at least 33,520 
people had been saved and evacuated from the devastated area.2   
2. Financial Management Response to Hurricane Katrina 
The Coast Guard was somewhat better prepared for the financial management and 
contingency logistics repercussions of Hurricane Katrina.  Lessons had been learned from 
9/11 and were immediately implemented which mandated field units to retain local 
                                                 
2 Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Coast Guard Fact File, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-
cp/comrel/factfile/index.htm (accessed June 29, 2007). 
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control of funding.  To facilitate the reimbursement to individual units for emergency 
purchases in support of Hurricane Katrina, a modification in the financial accounting line 
was approved which served as a marker for queries in the Coast Guard’s Core 
Accounting System (CAS).  In addition to these changes, and prior to the start of the 
hurricane season, the Coast Guard established additional lines of accounting which would 
be used to capture FEMA-related mission costs.  This was a smart move and in most 
cases would have clearly segregated FEMA reimbursements from Coast Guard operating 
funds.  However, the massive volume of FEMA mission assignments was 
“unprecedented”, totaling more than $360 million in the first few weeks.  In addition, 
tracing FEMA reimbursable costs became even more difficult as certain operations (e.g., 
aircraft operations) crossed into multiple FEMA regions during a single mission.  As with 
9/11, oversight of these accounts became onerous and reduced flexibility and 
responsiveness to the local units, similar to the situation encountered during 9/11.  
Instead, MLC Atlantic established accounts at the field levels, providing access to a 
limited number of users in an effort to strike a balance between internal control, 
efficiency, and flexibility.3  For all practical purposes, the cost-accounting for Hurricane 
Katrina was completed and validated, but there is likely an increment, of an 
undetermined size, which when subjected to heavy scrutiny may not have difficulty 
proving legitimacy.  The Coast Guard financial management systems of today make this 
challenging to identify, but rest assured that savvy auditors will lend their strongest 
investigative eye in the future, especially if operations or services to the nation should 
falter. 
These two pivotal events in Coast Guard history are discussed and highlighted not 
in an effort to boast or chalk up additional public relations points.  Instead, these 
operational successes demonstrate the eagerness, tenacity and devotion to duty that Coast 
Guard personnel are imbued with by a culture that emphasizes humanitarian support and 
individual initiative.  First and foremost, any efforts at improving the financial 
management, accounting and logistics infrastructure of the organization must not dampen 
                                                 
3 Frank Capitano, Craig Bennett, Allen Thuring, Paul Baca, and August Martin, “Semper Paratus – 
Always Ready: U.S. Coast Guard Financial Management Support Its World-Class Disaster Response,” 
Armed Forces Comptroller, Spring 2006, 22. 
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this sense of duty and initiative.  As some have suggested, this is where the Coast Guard 
succeeded and FEMA failed in responding to Hurricane Katrina.4  Instead, the Coast 
Guard can take the initiative to ensure it has the capacity and capability to continue 
effective financial and logistics management in times of crisis and contingency.  Efforts 
today at preparing the organization for contingency response and business continuity will 
pay significant dividends when the next catastrophe strikes. 
D. FRAME THE FUTURE TODAY 
In preparation for this essay, a question was posed to the financial and budget 
execution branch at Coast Guard Headquarters: if multiple terrorism incidents were to 
take place today, without warning and across a wide geographic area, what guiding 
principles would field-level decision makers have available related to procurement, 
funding and logistics?  My research would have been a short and useless if I had received 
an answer such as: “simple…refer to manual X paragraph Y and implement steps 1-10.”  
Unfortunately for the Coast Guard (but fortunate for my research sake), the answer 
received was: “good question, let me get back to you.”  A few days later, I received 
another call from a different headquarters branch looking to clarify the question.  After 
several minutes of discussion with yet another headquarters-level policy maker, the 
answer again was: “let me work on this, I’ll get back to you.”  In fact, other than the 
establishment of a few cost centers (i.e., accounting system mechanisms which allow for 
pooling of costs), little has been done to generate and communicate an effective 
contingency financial management strategy for the Coast Guard since 9/11.  This is not to 
say that the desire, professionalism, or intent is lacking, it is instead the organizational 
imperative to lend limited manpower to this task which is to blame.  As mentioned, other 
efforts such as Modernization (a functional reorganization of the Coast Guard), Chief 
Financial Officer audits, operational contingency planning and the annual churn of 
budget and Congressional appropriations battles which stir up too many small fires to 
even consider working on those that have not, or may not, even take place.  If the 
                                                 
4 Bob Orr, “Katrina Makes Coast Guard Heroes: While FEMA Had Sluggish Response, Coast Guard 
Quickly Acted,” CBS News, September 19, 2005, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/19/eveningnews/main859663.shtml (accessed June 30, 2007). 
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hypothetical low-probability/high-consequence terrorism attack or national catastrophe 
occurred today, we would once again have substantial financial and logistics disarray in 
the field while units struggled to figure out how much funding authority they had, what 
types of procurements they could legally obligate, what sources of supply would best 
accomplish the operational mission and how to communicate the costs of Coast Guard 
missions.  To complicate matters as we plan for contingency operations, we have to 
assume that the national infrastructure for electricity and communications may fail in the 
face of catastrophic disasters.  If disruptions were to occur in communication systems 
(i.e., Coast Guard intranet, telephone/cellular networks, etc.), there would be no policy 
statements that would guide decision makers in the field towards making effective 
decisions on their own.      
The world today is replete with examples of organizations of global reach that 
rely upon the effectiveness and efficiency of their logistics systems to ensure success.  
Companies such as FedEx and Wal-Mart have perfected the art of supply chain and 
logistics making it the critical success factor or key business process upon which their 
business rests.  The armed services, throughout history, have also relied upon the 
effectiveness of their supply chains to ensure that the units at the proverbially “tip of the 
spear” have the materiel resources required to put plans into action.  When those 
resources are not procured, contracted, accounted for, delivered and consumed as 
required, the system falters and plans come to a halt.  World history has proven this 
axiom true in numerous occasions.  The French Army’s invasion of Russia in June of 
1812 is a stark example.  “The invasion of Russia clearly and dramatically demonstrates 
the role that logistics, or in this case the lack thereof, will play in a campaign where the 
land will not provide for the number of troops deployed in an area of operations far 
exceeding the experience of the invading army.”5  Emperor Napoleon led the “Grand 
Armée” into Russia with 678,000 men, at that time the largest fighting force in European 
history.  After only weeks in the field, his supply trains became mired in mud and 
freezing temperatures and his inability to forage for supplies was hampered by harsh 
terrain and relatively unpopulated and uncultivated land. The French Army, with barely 
                                                 
5 Richard K. Riehn, 1812 Napoleon's Russian Campaign (New York: Wiley, 1991), 138-40. 
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100,000 troops remaining conquered a deserted, sabotaged and burning Moscow in 
September.  With no food or supplies, and as a result of city-wide fires, no shelter, the 
French Army soon after started a pitiful retreat back to France, on foot and in freezing 
temperatures, finally arriving with less than 30,000 surviving troops (only 1,000 in actual 
formation).6   Navy Lieutenant Commander Christopher Van Avery, in his article “12 
New Principles of Warfare” cites this logistical capability as a critical principle for 
success; a principle which he terms ‘Sustainment’.  “A force in the field, no matter how 
well equipped or trained, is useless if it cannot be sustained, and in the future, 
sustainment is an indispensable principle of war.”7 
The Coast Guard must continue to drive the future success of our contingency 
logistics and financial management systems.  Several shortcomings of the current 
logistics and financial management structure include: 
• A lack of contingency-based financial and logistics policies for field-level 
commanders to quickly and seamlessly enact in times of catastrophe 
response.  Consider the ubiquitous red “Break in Case of Fire” boxes 
found in many public buildings.  These serve to trigger alarms and provide 
fire emergency firefighting water immediately, following pre-planned 
routes (e.g., sprinklers and firemain pipes).  The person responding to a 
fire and activating the alarm need not understand how the system works, 
just follow the directions and respond appropriately.  Field-level financial 
management policies for contingencies should serve the same function by 
providing essential service and support to units without requiring them to 
pour through procurement manuals and contracting hierarchies to 
understand how to receive the services they require.  Our operators and 
field-level personnel should be focused on operations, but they should 
                                                 
6 James Rubarth-Lay, “Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812,” University of Texas at Austin, 
http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~jrubarth/gslis/lis385t.16/Napoleon/ (accessed September 6, 2008). 
7 Christopher Van Avery, “12 New Principles of Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2007, 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/07/2807407/ (accessed September 6, 2008). 
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know how to call on the appropriate support when needed rather than 
either relearning or ignoring the process.  
• Unprepared financial management and cost accounting mechanisms to 
track contingencies.  Current financial management policies do not include 
the capability to immediately begin tracking costs associated with a 
contingency.  Often there is a lapse in time while a cost center (accounting 
system cost-accounting mechanism) is created, communicated to all 
applicable units, and then changes are made to procurement procedures 
(i.e., reconfiguring credit cards, contracts, etc.) to charge the appropriate 
cost center for expenses related to response and recovery.  In the interim, 
costs expended in support of operations are invisible to decision makers 
and planners. 
• A non-resilient financial management structure.  There are numerous 
critical chokepoints or bottlenecks within the Coast Guard that could 
become points of logistical failure in the midst of a crisis.  These 
chokepoints can be communications systems, people having 
responsibilities which cannot be delegated, or sole-sources of supplies.  As 
one example, a vast majority of contracting for large procurement and/or 
services throughout Florida goes through a very small subset of people in 
Miami for approval.  At this time, there is no dedicated regional back-up 
individual, located outside of Miami, to fill that position in the event that 
Miami is cut-off from assistance due to major natural or man-made 
disaster.  Regional continuity of operations plans lend only one paragraph 
to discussing this shortfall. 
• A lack of pre-screened, geographically focused, logistics plans that may be 
enacted for a variety of contingencies.  For instance, if a major chemical 
attack occurs in Boston (and thereby incapacitates the Coast Guard 
infrastructure in Boston), the geographic neighboring and adjacent support 
commands do not have local knowledge about Boston’s logistical 
requirements and supplies to pick up the flag and provide support.  In 
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addition, partnerships do not exist between Coast Guard and federal, state, 
local, and private sector organizations to provide mutual assistance during 
times of contingency. 
• Operational commanders and their executive officers (typically the 
finance/logistics lead personnel at field units) are not adequately trained 
and exercised in crisis resource management.  They do not understand the 
planning requirements that should take place in advance of a catastrophe.  
While the Coast Guard does have pre-arrival training for personnel before 
they report to these duties, the training is short and does not include any 
emphasis on this important issue.  
Addressing, overcoming and mitigating these shortcomings are the aims of this 
thesis work.  Concerted efforts to build resiliency, refine policy and bring contingency 
preparedness to our financial management staffs and logisticians will ensure the Coast 
Guard remains an effective and trusted military, multi-mission, maritime force.   
Chapter II will discuss the general themes and approach of the research method, 
primarily focusing on the method, approach and themes of a web-based qualitative 
survey of financial management and logistics professionals within the Coast Guard.  
Chapter III will present a brief overview of what existing literature brings to light on the 
topics of business continuity planning, disaster logistics and contingency contracting.  
Chapter IV will then lay out a plan for steering the Coast Guard towards change in five 
crucial areas related to contingency financial management and logistics.  Chapter V will 
discuss one of the more crucial elements of building the contingency logistics mindset, 
particularly as it relates to developing localized collaborative logistics plans and long-
term groups of interagency logisticians (a Contingency Logistics Planning Group).  This 
chapter will also serve as a starting point for field units and support commands to begin 
mutual consideration of various contingencies, modeled upon the National Preparedness 
Guidelines.  Finally, Chapter VI will introduce ideas for implementing the changes 
espoused in this proposal throughout the Coast Guard. 
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This Coast Guard practice and financial management policy for contingency 
readiness is flawed.  Without change, the next major catastrophe, or even a rapid 
succession of smaller incidents, will repeat the financial management and logistics 
challenges of the past and may set the Coast Guard up for significant failure. 
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II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH METHODS 
To make plans and project designs brings with it many good sensations; 
and whoever had the strength to be nothing but a forger of plans his whole 
life long would be a very happy man. But he would occasionally have to 
take a rest from this activity by carrying out a plan – and then comes the 
vexation and the sobering up. 
     - Nietzsche 
A. PRIMARY ARGUMENT 
I contend that the Coast Guard needs to engage in the development and 
implementation of contingency-focused financial and logistics improvements with an 
emphasis on supporting contingency operations and ensuring business continuity.  The 
contingency-focused efforts shall not supplant the existing financial management or 
logistics infrastructure, but shall rather provide an efficient means for ensuring accurate, 
timely and transparent financial information and logistics flow during large-scale regional 
or national crisis. 
In carrying out this implementation, the Coast Guard must prepare the finance and 
logistics staffs of all Coast Guard Districts (i.e., geographic divisions), as well as field 
level unit command cadres, for a range of potential disasters and contingencies and their 
commensurate impacts on financial management, logistics and business continuity.  A 
failure to plan and train at all levels of the organization for various, and potentially 
simultaneous, contingencies will lead to inefficiencies in resource acquisition and an 
improper, unethical or even illegal, use of federally appropriated funds when a disaster 
does occur.   
Implementing improvements of business continuity and logistics planning in the 
Coast Guard should emphasize that the National Preparedness Guidelines be used by 
financial management and logistics staffs to begin the inter-District and inter-agency 
logistical preparations.  The resulting discussion and logistics response plans should be 
formulated into Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperative Agreements for 
promulgation and sharing with partner agencies.  The nuances of the contingencies of the 
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National Planning Scenarios will generate substantial and detailed discussion among 
resource and financial planners at the local and regional levels, specifically as relates to 
the overlapping of logistical and financial requirements which are unique to each Coast 
Guard District.  More profoundly important, these requirements and the resulting plans 
will become valuable as various Districts are called to respond to an incident.  The plans 
will also likely lead to discussion and planning with other first responder agencies in 
local areas as well as uncovering challenges and enhanced capabilities achieved through 
cooperation and collaboration with private industry and non-governmental organizations. 
Reports published on the Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned 
Information System (LLIS) indicate and encourage the use of these shared and preplanned 
resource lists and also tout them as highly valuable.  Poor results discovered during after-
action reviews of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City have 
been cited as examples of this shortfall in the disaster preparedness plans of many 
agencies.8 
Reducing personnel “chokepoints” in the Coast Guard financial and logistics 
infrastructures will also build much needed resilience in the disaster response capabilities 
and could prevent the “human aspects” of contingencies and disasters from potentially 
crippling Coast Guard emergency response.  These financial and logistical process 
chokepoints exist where single or small groups of individuals have considerable network 
and infrastructure clout, primarily when related to contracting and procurement officials.  
Having these people incapacitated, unresponsive or unable to communicate with the rest 
of the organization can potentially bring financial execution and logistics provisioning to 
a grinding halt.  Numerous articles and reports of business continuity management and 
planning suggest the criticality of removing or reinforcing these potential bottlenecks 
prior to a disaster or contingency taking place.  Several of these articles discuss the 
implementation of contingency contracting officers as alternatives which build in 
additional business resilience.  Additionally, several studies cite the “human aspects” of 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Large-Scale Logistics Operations: Call List of Equipment 
Suppliers,” Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/htmldetail.cfm?content_id=13632 (accessed September 25, 2007).   
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contingencies as the crucially important areas for review and reinforcement, particularly 
as relates to pandemics and other widespread and lengthy scenarios. 
To the astute financial manager, the claims above may appear superficial and/or 
over-simplified.  Simply developing additional policy, buying supplies or hiring more 
individuals will not in themselves change the capability to adapt and respond during a 
contingency.  What is important to realize is that the recommendation to enhance the 
financial management and logistics system with a focus and concern for contingencies 
and business continuity involves several complementary aspects.  Benefits such as inter-
agency collaboration, more efficient procurement and contracting, personnel confident in 
their duties during contingency, reliable field-level instructions for contingency, and a 
more resilient Coast Guard will result from considering these overdue improvements.  
Coast Guard logisticians will also recognize that there are innumerable 
interdependencies already at play between the Districts and that challenging operations 
have been undertaken with success.  The research at hand does not necessarily refute this 
premise, only that successful results are far less guaranteed in the future and should not 
rely on heroic initiative, but instead process-based plans and methods.  It is important to 
note that nothing is spurring the Districts to collaborate and understand the 
interdependencies that exist, especially in the face of the variety of on-going 
contingencies and personnel shortfalls.  As Districts are faced with providing mutual 
support, errors in financial tracking, resource acquisition, and logistics will inevitably 
occur.  The research proposal and collaborative methods recommended here will 
alleviate, or at least investigate and mitigate, the inefficiencies which currently exist. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The research conducted and the recommendations espoused from this thesis bring 
value to the Coast Guard and to homeland security practitioners in several areas.  First, 
the literature collected, reviewed and summarized within will stand alone as a summary 
and history of business continuity planning and its applicability to the Coast Guard. 
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The research methodologies employed during this study have also yielded 
interesting results, above and beyond the scope of financial management, logistics 
planning, and business continuity.  The research methods, discussed in more detail below, 
brought together the thoughts, opinions and insights of a variety of resource managers 
and continuity planners at all levels of the Coast Guard.  It is the Coast Guard’s 
responsibility to ensure that these influential leaders in the organization have the tools 
and the confidence in the system to enable them to do their jobs effectively in times of 
crisis.  
This research effort has also led to recommendations and seeks to demonstrate 
how a program of implementing change for improved contingency preparedness can be 
launched within the Coast Guard.  Chapter VI in particular describes how other 
geographic areas in the Coast Guard can employ a similar methodology to generate local 
logistics systems and to join them throughout the country to form a single logistics 
compendium for emergency response.  This document will have considerable importance 
to future continuity of operations plans (COOPs) and possibly advance these plans to 
become industry-recognized business continuity plans. 
Finally, other agencies throughout the United States and foreign governments will 
be able to enact the research and methods contained within this work for developing 
business continuity, contingency support and contingency training plans to improve their 
own preparedness and resilience. 
C. METHOD 
I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. 
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to 
suit facts. 
      - Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
The research methodology for this thesis focused primarily on the accumulation 
and analysis of qualitative sources (i.e., interviews, surveys and personal 
communications) as well as the research into existing published materials.  First, 
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interviews were conducted with 3-5 Coast Guard subject matter experts (SMEs) related to 
financial management, logistics planning and continuity planning.  The results of these 
interviews were coded to determine the critical subjects related to ensuring the ability of 
the Coast Guard to carry out operations and to be mutually supportive of other agencies.   
In order for this research work to be of reliable value to the Coast Guard, the 
hypotheses that were generated regarding problems in contingency logistics and financial 
management would need to be vetted with top professionals in these fields.  Therefore, 
the second phase of research involved a web and e-mail survey of 50 Coast Guard 
financial management and logistics experts.  The qualitative survey instrument was 
created in an effort to obtain thoughts, comments, stories, anecdotes, lessons learned and 
recommendations from respondents, without steering the responses down a guided path.  
A list of more than 50 individuals that have involvement with contingency work on a 
number of levels was created and used as a starting point for the population of the survey.  
These individuals came from across the financial management and logistics communities, 
including: contingency planning, contingency cost accounting/forecasting, contracting, 
procurement, ICS trainers and several contingency practitioners with regular experience 
operating in contingency evolutions and exercises.  One of the final questions of the 
survey was encourage participation of other respondents which led to additional 
distributions of the survey as people were identified.    
When the survey was closed in its final round, 25 respondents had each taken 
approximately 30 minutes each to participate in the web survey.  The respondents had a 
cumulative experience-base of 393 years in Coast Guard financial management, 
contracting or logistics planning & execution; with an average of nearly 16 years per 
respondent.  As hoped, the responses were very heavily biased towards providing 
qualitative data from each respondent.  The responses were carefully reviewed and coded 
for particular themes which have bearing on the research effort.  These themes included: 
• Contingency Planning 
• Resource/Time/Funding Shortages and Issues 
• Deficiencies and Recommendations for Training 
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• Standards and Standardization for Improving Contingency Preparedness  
• Contracting 
• Conflicts with Current System (segregated into issues of Modernization, 
Personalities, and Communications) 
• Internal Controls 
• Cost Accounting, Tracking and Documentation Concerns 
• Issues Involving Exercises and Contingency Financial Management 
• Success and Ideas 
In general, the results of the survey are contained within the pertinent sections of 
this paper.  The full tabulated results appear in Appendix A.  I consider the results of the 
web-based qualitative survey to be extremely useful and insightful in themselves, with 
further opportunities to gleam useful information that can be applied to other research 
and change initiatives already in progress or considered.  Interestingly, only 5 of the 25 
respondents requested that their personal information be kept confidential and that they 
would prefer not to participate in further inquiry.  I think this speaks to the eagerness of 
these professionals to share, collaborate, and seek a higher level of preparedness within 
the linked communities of financial management and logistics.  
The following is the list of survey questions contained within the web-based 
survey instrument.   
Survey Questions 
1. How many years of experience do you have working in Coast Guard financial 
management, contracting or logistics planning & execution? 
2. In the event of a major contingency (e.g., hurricane, major earthquake, 
pandemic virus, weapon of mass destruction event), how well do you believe 
the Coast Guard is prepared logistically to respond?  For example, do you 
believe that we understand and have planned the necessary logistics  at the 
local level for the wide range of contingencies we may face (i.e., purchase 
lists, vendors & contractors lists for items, deconflicting with other units 
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which may be requesting same type items, etc.)?  Please select a level of 
preparedness and comment on your response. 
3. Similarly, how well is the Coast Guard financial management and contracting 
infrastructure ready to support Coast Guard operations for a major 
contingency?  For example, do you believe we have considered the policies 
and procedures that support units (e.g., ISCs, ESUs, CEUs, etc.) will need to 
follow so they can operate independently of other headquarters and Area 
commands to provide local unit support AND support to other units which 
have lost their support infrastructure due to disaster?  Please select a level of 
preparedness and comment on your response. 
4. Have Coast Guard operational personnel at the field level (e.g., Executive 
Officers, Sector Logistics Officers, Supply Petty Officers, etc.) been trained to 
conduct procurement and logistics in a crisis and/or contingency 
environment? 
5. If communications with field level commands were suddenly lost in a major 
contingency event, do you feel operational units in the field would understand 
how to carry out logistics, procurement and financial management to continue 
operations?  Please answer each individually using a scale of 1 to 5: 
a. Logistics (e.g., understanding supply and resource requirements that will 
be needed to maintain operations to respond to contingency and/or 
disaster) 
b. Procurement (e.g., the understanding and ability to execute purchasing and 
contracting actions, in compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations 
and other instructions, for necessary supplies and services to maintain 
operations to respond to contingency and/or disaster) 
c. Financial Management (e.g., understanding the necessary cost 
management and accounting requirements to ensure accountability, 
transparency and effective tracking of unit-level and CG-wide funding in 
support of contingency and/or disaster response operations) 
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6. What examples can be provided to demonstrate readiness to conduct 
logistical, procurement or financial management support in a contingency 
(e.g., oil spill, terrorism incident, local disaster)? 
7. What examples can be provided to demonstrate a lack of readiness to conduct 
logistical, procurement or financial management support in a contingency 
(e.g., oil spill, terrorism incident, local disaster)? 
8. For the next several questions, assume a tactical nuclear weapon has exploded 
in downtown Miami (or any other major metropolitan coastal city in your 
Area of Responsibility). 
a. Given the catastrophic event noted above has occurred today and without 
warning, would the Coast Guard be able to rapidly respond with likely 
operational success?  
b. Is it your opinion that the Coast Guard would be able to begin cost 
collection for the response immediately? 
c. Is cost collection for the response important? 
d. If the District Command Center, Integrated Support Command, and Coast 
Guard infrastructure throughout Miami and South Florida is destroyed or 
incapacitated, would another command be able to take over operational 
control for District 7? 
e. Considering (d.) above, would another command be able to take over 
logistical and support control for assigned operational units in the field? 
9. Do you perceive that logistics (i.e., consider supply ordering and receiving) 
and financial management (i.e., consider contracting, invoicing and 
accounting) in your geographic area have different requirements and/or 
sources of supply than similar units in other areas?  If so, why?  Please 
provide examples of the differences?   
10. Given a set of planning scenarios for significant disasters and/or contingencies 
for your geographic area, would it be possible to forecast necessary supplies 
and services that would be needed to support Coast Guard rescue, response 
and recovery operations? 
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11. Consider now the training that financial managers and supply personnel at 
field level commands receive regarding contingency financial and logistical 
response:   
a. Do you believe that training if sufficient?  
b. What are the strongest areas of training? 
c. What are the weakest areas of training? 
d. List several areas of training that you consider most in need for logistical 
preparedness. 
12. Can you identify potential chokepoints or bottlenecks in our financial 
management and logistics systems?  Are these obstacles primarily related to 
communication systems (i.e., phone systems, e-mail, Coast Guard Data 
Network), policies (i.e., Simplified Acquisition Procedures, Financial 
Resources Management Manual, etc.), personnel (i.e., COCOs, COTRs, SKs, 
other personnel, etc.), or some or all of these?  Please provide a few examples 
of those bottlenecks that you consider most important.  
13. Consider a massive pandemic event in the United States (e.g., pandemic 
influenza, smallpox, SARS, etc.).  Has your office or unit considered the 
ramifications of a large portion of the work force not showing up for weeks at 
a time?  Please answer as you consider implications to the following areas: 
a. How would the logistics procedures be affected by absences of people for 
extended periods of time? 
b. How would the procurement and contracting procedures be affected by 
absences of people for extended periods of time?    
c. How would the financial management procedures be affected by absences 
of people for extended periods of time?  
d. What practices could be put in place to counter the danger of a contagious 
viral attack (e.g., remote access systems, digital signatures to documents, 




14. What other individuals who may be interested in logistical and contingency 
preparedness would you recommend to be contacted as part of this research?   
15. Would you be willing to discuss your answers more fully in person, on the 
phone or during a focus group? 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Victorious warriors win first…and then go to war, while defeated warriors 
go to war first…and then seek to win. 
      - Sun Tzu  
Research conducted in conjunction with this thesis work has covered a broad 
range of topics and ideas which overlap and contain applicability for the Coast Guard and 
for a wide range of organizations interested in preparedness.  Fortunately, the field of 
study in contingency preparedness, specifically in the areas of business continuity 
management is growing and increasing in relevance as our society depends upon shared 
infrastructure at an ever-growing pace.  Additionally, study in the areas of disaster 
logistics planning and advanced readiness procurement/contracting are inherently critical 
to this research and lent immensely to conclusions and recommendations.  This chapter 
will provide a very broad overview of relevant literature which was reviewed and became 
pertinent to the research.  It is intended to give the reader an idea of the scope of work 
which already exists on this topic and ‘sets the stage’ for other discussion which will 
follow.  For those readers looking to quickly get to the heart of the recommendations for 
improving Coast Guard financial management and logistics preparedness for 
contingencies, it is possible to jump ahead to Chapter IV. 
Existing studies and conventional wisdom on the principles of business continuity 
management (BCM), business continuity planning (BCP), disaster preparedness, 
contingency planning and disaster logistics planning/preparedness are numerous, and for 
the most part, tend to agree on a basic framework.  Efforts here will reiterate and amplify 
this framework, but more importantly, will demonstrate the relevance of this planning 
methodology for the U.S. Coast Guard. 
A brief review of the existing literature can be broken into several themes.  The 
first theme which has applicability for the ideas being presented is Business Continuity 
Management & Planning (BCM/P).  Within the topic of BCM/P, several sub-topics are 
relevant including: 
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• Importance and preparedness priority of BCM 
• Components and policy issues of BCM 
• Implementation of BCM principles 
Following the discussion of BCM, this review will look at the literature 
concerning disaster logistics planning.  Next, there will be a discussion of the literature 
related to training for contingencies.  Finally, this review will look at the gaps in the 
researched literature across these sections and how they relate to one another. 
A. BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT (BCM) & PLANNING (BCP) 
1. Importance and Preparedness Priority of Business Continuity 
Management (BCM) 
Agencies, companies, states, and especially the federal government have an 
obligation to prepare their respective organizations to deal with disaster and catastrophic 
events.  September 11, 2001, the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka and Hurricane Katrina stand 
out as prime examples that disasters of a catastrophic scale can happen, and when they 
do, organizations need to be prepared to respond, mitigate damage and overcome losses 
(people, infrastructure, communications, etc.).  Organizations whose responsibility is to 
serve the public and assist with response and recovery must place an even greater 
emphasis on business continuity measures.  Several important pieces of literature and 
analysis discuss the importance of business continuity management (BCM) and 
contingency preparedness. 
One issue that seems to cut across BCM organizations and literature is the need to 
define BCM and its basic premises.  One particularly strong resource of information, 
which is actually a consortium of multiple BCM practitioners, educators and consultants, 
is the Business Continuity Institute.  This Institute, in a 2004 article titled Business 
Resilience, defined the practice of BCM as “an [sic] holistic management process that 
identifies potential impacts that threaten an organization and provides a framework for 
building resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the 
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interests of its key stakeholders, reputation and value creating activities.”9  Chapter V of 
this thesis work will introduce a recommended process by which the Coast Guard can 
improve and advance BCM in the areas of financial and logistics management. 
IBM Corporation took the definition of business continuity a step further and 
provided a definition for what they term “business resilience.”  According to IBM, 
business resilience involves “the ability of an organization’s business operations to 
rapidly adapt and respond to internal or external dynamic changes – opportunities, 
demands, disruptions or threats and continue operations with limited impact to the 
business.”10  Understandably, IBM is focusing on the information technology piece of 
business continuity, as many practitioners do, but the concept and model they imply is 
pertinent to the Coast Guard nonetheless.  The idea is further elaborated by describing 







Figure 1.   Resiliency Building Blocks11 
 
Defensive Posture efforts, as in the diagram, include building redundancy, 
hardening structures and systems, and developing the means to recover in times of loss.  
The Offensive Posture efforts at resilience include diversifying the organization which 
ensures that units in multiple locations can conduct the same types of operations (as 
opposed to redundancy which just means having more of the same units).  Additionally, 
                                                 
9 IBM Corporation, “Business Resilience – The Next Step Forward for Business Continuity,” 





other offensive or active efforts at building business resilience include “accessibility” and 
“autonomic computing.”12  Accessibility refers to the capability to access the network 
from any location.  Again, there are similarities in the Coast Guard financial management 
infrastructure.  As will be discussed later, the ability to access our financial, procurement 
and contracting systems remotely, currently via a Remote Access Server (RAS), is 
paramount to our current workflow of procurement and contracting.  If unable to work at 
our primary locations, and with failure of the RAS system, the Coast Guard would be 
crippled as most units and personnel are unprepared to work in an “unplugged” 
environment.  The other active measures mentioned by IBM included “autonomic 
computing” which is described as the ability of computer or other networks to repair 
themselves from damage or failure without human intervention. 
In spite of recent disasters and the concerted efforts of many large companies and 
municipalities to implement BCM measures, there is evidence that some organizations 
are only paying lip-service to the ideas of preparedness and BCM.  For at least six 
consecutive years, AT&T has conducted a survey to define the current level of business 
continuity planning by large public and private corporations in the United States.13  
Looking at the levels of readiness and preparation for man-made and natural disasters, 
AT&T found that more than 30 percent of businesses across the country are still not 
adequately prepared for “worst case” scenarios.  The study provides statistical evidence 
to demonstrate that companies have a false sense of security and that certain cities (i.e., 
clusters of top companies) are not heeding government warning to make adequate 
preparations.  The study was also discussed widely on CNN Money where weaknesses 
were pinpointed to certain geographic segments of the country.14  Studies such as this 
reinforce the contention that many large group of organizations fail to actively advance 
                                                 
12  IBM Corporation, “Business Resilience – The Next Step Forward for Business Continuity,” 
Continuity Central, 2004, http://www.continuitycentral.com/feature083.htm (accessed September 23, 
2007).   
13 AT&T Press Room and Media Kits, “2007 AT&T Business Continuity Study,” (San Antonio: 
AT&T, May 2007), http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=7922 (accessed September 19, 2007). 
14 AT&T, “As Hurricane Season Heats Up, AT&T Survey Finds Disaster Preparedness Not a Priority 
for Nearly One-Third of Atlanta Businesses,” AT&T News Room, August 27, 2007, 
http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=24272 (accessed September 19, 
2007). 
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the planning for contingencies and disasters.  If business will not even focus on 
contingency preparedness for their profit centers, how much less so for their financial 
management and logistics infrastructures?   
An interesting take on the AT&T study was also discussed in a report by the 
Institute for Preventive Strategies (IPS) at the Center for Rural Development.  The IPS 
noted that “the fact that companies tend to develop business continuity plans and keep 
them updated, but seldom test them, seems to indicate that those responsible are 
confusing planning and preparedness.  Failing to integrate activation of a business 
continuity plan with state and federal alerts seems to indicate that IT executives view 
disaster response as primarily a public sector responsibility rather than a joint 
challenge.”15  This urges that organizations need to include elements of testing their 
preparedness rather than simply planning for contingencies.   As my research has shown, 
the Coast Guard also falls victim to this according to many of our top financial managers 
and logisticians.  We have a multitude of Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) in 
place which are not adequately tested and exercised to the fullest extent possible. 
2. Likely Mindsets of Resistance 
Studies have yet to be found which directly disagree with the priority and 
importance of forming business continuity or logistics readiness plans.  However, 
adapting organizations for the purpose of business continuity is likely to confront at least 
three mindsets which oppose moving BCP forward with an organization, including within 
the Coast Guard.  These mindsets may include: 
1. Current financial management and business continuity structures are sufficient 
to weather the storm.   
2.  Time and energy required do not justify change (risk-benefit analysis). 
3.  Too much on-going and conflicting work taking place. 
                                                 
15 Institute for Preventive Strategies at the Center for Rural Development, “Disaster Preparedness and 
Business Continuity Planning,” Institute for Preventive Strategies at the Center for Rural Development, 
Open Source Daily Brief, August 29, 2007, 
https://www.preventivestrategies.net/public/news_article.cfm?newsId=5223 (accessed August 29, 2007). 
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The first mindset opposing BCP interventions and implementations is one which 
seeks to maintain the status quo.  When an organization succeeds at an effective response 
it can be assumed that they will be ready for any contingency.  Hurricane Katrina and the 
Coast Guard’s successful operational response to this catastrophe are one example of this 
found in the literature and can be heralded as how to succeed in contingencies.  In fact, 
several individuals have cited not only the operational response, but the logistical 
response of the Coast Guard as noteworthy.16   
The second mindset which will be challenging to overcome says that business 
continuity management, and the plans which it advocates, are not worth the tangible costs 
of implementation.  There are individuals and organizations which espouse that the threat 
of terrorism, and the effect of the anticipated attacks, is less likely than our own 
government would like us to believe.  Ian Lustick discusses this theory in his book 
Trapped in the War on Terror.  When discussing the War on Terror, Lustick states “[i]t 
became a kind of permanent national emergency.  Its effects surged across the 
government, overwhelming both legal and budgetary constraints.  It has engulfed 
American society in a whirlwind of activities, none of which can ever be proven 
successful, but all of which can be criticized as inadequate.”17  There are examples which 
need to be found to support the mindset that “business continuity could be useful, but not 
at the cost of adequately developing, updating, and testing it.”  While not conducted in 
conjunction with this research, it would be interesting and enlightening to some to 
provide estimates on cost-benefit analysis as related to BCM implementation.  One 
starting point is a white paper by Mark Young of IBM’s Global Business Continuity & 
Recovery Services (BCRS).  Mr. Young’s work provides data about the anticipated 
impacts of a pandemic flu outbreak.18  He forecasts that the impact on human resources 
                                                 
16 Frank Capitano, Craig Bennett, Allen Thuring, Paul Baca, and August Martin, “Semper Paratus – 
Always Ready: U.S. Coast Guard Financial Management Support Its World-Class Disaster Response,” 
Armed Forces Comptroller, Spring 2006, 22. 
17 Ian Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 
71. 
18 Mark Young, IBM Disaster Recovery Services – Continuity Planning Assessment and Virtual 
Workplace Continuity (Portsmouth, UK: IBM Global BCRS Sales, IBM Corporation, 2007), 20. 
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of organizations will be particularly strong and will affect other areas of the business.  
Citing various pieces of research, he believes that:19 
• organizations should expect staff absences up to 40% during a pandemic 
• that there will be multiple waves of infection, each lasting up to eight 
weeks; 
• that a pandemic could last many months and may contain peaks followed 
by periods of reduced illness 
• that there could be government-ordered reduction of people at 
nonessential places of employment, and  
• planning should include employees being un-willing or unable to work, 
even if they do not become ill themselves. 
The results of such an impact on an organization can likely be tabulated to 
discover breakdowns or shortages in critical positions and the financial implications of 
such shortfalls.  In the same study, Mr. Young gives statistics about the cost of 
conducting a wide-ranging continuity planning assessment (CPA).  For large 
organizations, the cost can be as high as $100K-150K.20   
The third mindset which disagrees with a change in business continuity policy 
will argue that there are currently other organizational initiatives which hold priority.  For 
many organizations, senior leadership will be unwilling to place additional burden upon 
the existing processes and plans of the organization due to conflicts or other initiatives.  
The Coast Guard also finds itself embroiled in this mindset with numerous competing 
interests and demands upon the time of our financial management professionals.  These 
diverging activities include ongoing Department of Homeland Security Chief Financial 
Officer Audit remediation efforts, annual budget cycles, operational planning, 
modernization of our operational forces, and reorganization of Coast Guard communities. 
                                                 
19 Mark Young, IBM Disaster Recovery Services – Continuity Planning Assessment and Virtual 
Workplace Continuity (Portsmouth, UK: IBM Global BCRS Sales, IBM Corporation, 2007), 9. 
20 Ibid., 20. 
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Should contingency-focused changes be required for our financial management and 
logistics communities, as advocated in this thesis, the policy recommendations will need 
to strongly emphasize that delaying the implementation is dangerous, and may even be in 
violation of Presidential Executive Orders aimed at preparing for continuity of operations 
and continuity of government. 
3. Business Continuity Management Components and Policy Issues 
As organizations or agencies consider the idea of BCM, it is necessary to 
understand some of the components of BCM, organizational implications of BCM, and 
discuss relevant policy issues. 
One example of a component consideration to BCM is research and literature that 
has been compiled on the “human aspects” of BCM.  While the primary focus of the 
research proposal has been on financial management and logistics in the face of 
contingencies, many companies are beginning to understand that BCM is not just about 
information technology (IT) and computer backup and recovery.  There is an over-
arching necessity to consider the human linkages and bottlenecks that personnel 
shortages can play in business continuity.  A study by David Spencer of IBM Global 
Consulting cited recent experiences of failures in Crisis Management planning and 
preparedness as related to “human aspects”.  Spencer noted that “[a]lthough companies 
are beginning to look for ways to minimize the impact of a potential avian flu pandemic; 
few have fully addressed the human side of crisis preparedness.”21 A 2005 survey by the 
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) which found that only 34 percent of 
companies indicated that human resource (HR) issues formed a significant part of their 
organizations’ business continuity or disaster plans. Another thirty-six percent indicated 
that these issues were only somewhat part of their plans.22  In a similar but distinct 
article, Spencer identified other likely areas of contention and policy concerns as relates 
                                                 
21 David Spencer, “In the Spotlight: the Human Side of Business Continuity Planning,” IBM Business 
Continuity & Recovery Services White Paper, IBM Global, June 2006, http://www-
935.ibm.com/services/uk/igs/pdf/david_spencer_ibm.pdf (accessed October 4, 2007), 4. 
22 Society for Human Resource Management, 2005 Disaster Preparedness Survey Report (Alexandria: 
Society for Human Resource Management, July 2005). 
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to BCM.  One of these areas deals with issues he calls ‘slow burn’ situations, such as a 
pandemic flu threat.  He identified the following challenges:23 
• Human resource management differs in a crisis 
• Third party / outsource dependencies 
• Management of operational risks 
• The importance of cross-organizational response and regional support 
networks.  
While pursuing financial and logistical improvements in the continuity planning 
system, and in addition to the “human aspects,” the business planners must also be 
concerned with the legal and political ramifications.  Current research in this area is still 
short of where it should be, but one particular article proved interesting, though in 
reference to BCM practices in the UK.  Again, IBM provided interesting research when 
they presented a “Total Business Protection Model” in the form of a feedback loop 
system of several key BCM processes, including:24 
• Business Continuity Plan 
• IT Recovery Plan 
• Risk Analysis 
• Business Impact Analysis 
• Recovery Capabilities 
• Recovery Strategy 
• Enterprise Solution Design 
                                                 
23 David Spencer, “The Human Aspects of BC Planning,” IBM Business Continuity & Recovery 
Services, 2007, http://www-935.ibm.com/services/uk/igs/pdf/david_spencer_ibm.pdf (accessed October 4, 
2007), 5. 
24 IBM Corporation, “Addressing the Requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act,” IBM Information 
Technology Services, http://ibm.com/services/uk/index.wss/it/igs/a1006911 (accessed October 4, 2007). 
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This model is a useful discussion point, identifying several of the strategy and 
policy issues which must be considered by an organization looking to implement BCM. 
One of the most significant literature and policy issues for business continuity 
management, and contingency preparedness overall, is the implications of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Guidelines.  As Secretary 
Chertoff noted, "these documents will help focus policy, planning and investments at all 
levels of government and the private sector in order to strengthen our collective 
capabilities and better prepare for major incidents.”25  The National Preparedness 
Guidelines encourage the use of the National Planning Scenarios and the Target 
Capabilities Lists (TCL) as starting points for discussion and contingency capability 
planning.  The guidelines will obviously have varying levels of impact (or threat) to 
different geographic areas and will allow organizations to tailor their plans accordingly.  
As stated in the Guidelines, “The National Planning Scenarios establish common 
assumptions to guide planning nationwide regarding potential vulnerabilities and 
consequences (or impacts) of major incidents. Analysis of the range of potential impacts 
is essential for defining capabilities in terms of both capacity (i.e., how many are needed) 
and proficiency (i.e., how well must they be able to perform). These capabilities must be 
reflected in emergency operations plans (for the near-term) and in preparedness strategies 
(for the long-term).”  The Guidelines also have specific discussion and instructions for 
Federal Agencies to use when applying the National Preparedness Guidelines.26 
4. Business Continuity Management Implementation 
Much of the BCM literature that is widely available revolves around the 
development, implementation and testing of business continuity plans.  The numerous 
plans reviewed share similar frameworks with each advocating roughly the same 
principles.  Many of them look at designating BCM responsibilities, developing charters 
and plans, exercising the plans, examining risk management decisions, and understanding 
                                                 
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Releases National Preparedness Guideline”, Press 
Release (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, September 13, 2007), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1189720458491.shtm (accessed September 22, 2007). 
26 Ibid., 27. 
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the resources available to responders in times of national threat or disaster.  The literature 
and principles of BCM have been applied at the federal, state, city, and even 
organizational level.  A well-drafted example of a University BCM plan has also been 
observed and also shares these similar characteristics.27 
A particularly impressive effort which would be easy to draw parallels to the 
Coast Guard concerns the implementation of BCM within the United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defence (MOD).  The Director of Business Continuity Policy, MOD, released a Joint 
Service Publication aimed at establishing a set of BCM standards as well as conducting 
information sharing on best practices within BCM.28  The extensive publication is very 
informative, providing guidance and instruction to all levels of MOD.  Like several of the 
other implementation guides which have been reviewed, this particular manual guides the 
user through understanding the culture and business processes which will be impacted, 
followed by rules for implementation, and also including checklists (a common theme in 
the implementation guides) that are used to examine processes, BC strategy and assessing 
risk.   
The Business Continuity Institute has several guides which have been written to 
provide organizations with ideas, thoughts and issues to consider when implementing 
BCM.  Several of these guides are available on the Institute’s web-site.29  One 
particularly interesting document has been defined as a “best-practices guide” after it was 
generated by a consortium of BCM practitioners, academics, and public/private 
companies.  This report, titled “Generally Accepted Practices for Business Continuity 
Professionals” is a featured item of the Disaster Recovery Journal and can also be found 
                                                 
27 North Carolina State University Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Department, “Business 
Continuity Planning Checklist for Universities,” North Carolina State University, 
http://www.ncsu.edu/ehs/BCP/planning_templates/planning_checklist.php (accessed September 28, 2007). 
28 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Joint Service Publication (JSP) 503 Business Continuity 
Management, Director BC Policy, Ministry of Defence, 3rd Edition (March 2006), 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/DefenceManagementPublicatio
ns/BusinessContinuity/Jsp503BusinessContinuityManagement.htm  (accessed September 30, 2007). 
29 Business Continuity Institute, “Business Continuity Guides,” Business Continuity Institute, 
http://www.thebci.org/businesscontinuityguides.htm (accessed September 24, 2007). 
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on the organization’s web-site.30  In a sense, this document stands for a basic level of 
“common knowledge” and agreed-upon basic courses of action for continuity planning. 
Another resource which strongly summarizes the existing shared common 
framework of business continuity management, but with even more relevance to the 
research topic, is the Florida Business Continuity Plan.31  This is another BCM resource 
which provides guidelines for smaller businesses to prepare for, and recover from, natural 
and man-made disasters.  It is interesting and pertinent to this field of research because it 
tailors a substantial portion of the guidelines to the Florida region.  Providing details on 
particular Florida hazards (e.g., hurricanes, flooding, etc.), as well as issues dealing with 
Florida specific legal issues, local resources, local points of contact for assistance, etc. 
would be of considerable value to a Florida business seeking to plan and prepare for 
potential disaster.  This particular reference is a parallel to what will be advocated in 
Chapter 6, developing and implementing business continuity plans that are tailored to the 
geographic regions in which the Coast Guard and inter-agency operates, much as this 
Florida plan is written. 
B. DISASTER LOGISTICS AND PLANNING 
On the topic of building detailed logistical plans in advance of potential disasters, 
an article from the DHS Lessons Learned Information Sharing web-site lends support to 
research into overhauling logistics planning for disasters, an issue closely tied to the 
capability of first responder organizations and endemic to contingency readiness and 
preparedness.  In April of 1995, a bomb destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah federal building 
in Oklahoma City.  Responders desperately sought necessary supplies over the next few 
days, having to conduct research for suppliers, contractors and vendors, thereby wasting 
considerable time that could have more effectively contributed to rescue and recovery 
efforts at the site.  The article emphasized that “response agencies should maintain an up-
                                                 
30 “Generally Accepted Practices – A Look at Business Continuity Best Practices,” Disaster Recovery 
Journal, August 2007, http://www.drj.com/GAP/ (accessed September 24, 2007). 
31 Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council, Business Continuity Planning Alliance and State of Florida 
Division of Emergency Management, “Florida Business Disaster Survival Kit: Business Continuity 
Planning in Today’s World,” Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council, February 2004, 
http://www.tampabaydisaster.org/fldisasterkit/pdfs/guidebook.pdf (accessed September 23, 2007). 
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to-date, detailed call list of all local and regional equipment suppliers.”32  Notably, this 
was a single issue within a relatively confined location and it took place before the 
watershed events of 9-11.   
On this same subject of understanding and preparing local and regional disaster 
logistics plans, a report by Richard Baunbeck and Michael Mastria discussed the need for 
operational logistics planning, particularly with employing asset visibility technologies.  
The authors, proposed a logistical framework and management system that has, at least, 
the following primary components:33  
• Integrated Communications Network 
• Integrated Supply Chain 
• Tracking Methodology to Monitor Resource Movement through Supply 
Chain, including: 
1. Manufacturers/Suppliers 
2. Warehousing and Distribution Centers 
3. Operation-specific Transport 
4. Operational Logistics Centers 
5. Customers 
There are clearly benefits to an integrated logistics system, particularly a system 
that allows logisticians and planners to capitalize on data warehousing and logistical 
management capabilities.  However, the authors contend that RFID technology will be a 
feasible system for logistics tracking.  It is unclear if corroborative research will be 
available to support that claim; it seems that more data could support the inverse that 
RFID is unsuited to a hectic contingency environment, especially on the customer end of 
                                                 
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information Sharing, “Large-Scale 
Logistics Operations: Call List of Equipment Suppliers,” Department of Homeland Security, 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/htmldetail.cfm?content_id=13632 (registration required). 
(accessed September 25, 2007) 
33 Richard A. Braunbeck and Michael F. Mastria, “Crisis Management - Operational Logistics & 
Asset Visibility Technologies,” (MBA Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006), 4.  
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supply chain where it’s most important to get supplies to the field as rapidly as possible.  
Additionally, one must worry that computerized networks relying on connectivity and 
communications may be the weak-link in a disaster readiness system.    
Similarly, the “Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned” 
indicated that “FEMA personnel soon discovered, however, that the quantity of material 
requested post-landfall outstripped their logistical capabilities. FEMA simply could not 
procure enough resources to match the rate at which commodities were being consumed. 
The agency’s contracts with private companies, though sufficient for smaller disasters, 
were incapable of supplying the enormous quantities of resources needed. As a result, 
shortages plagued the affected area (White House, 44).” 34 
The associated “lesson learned” in the Federal Hurricane Katrina report indicated: 
LESSON LEARNED: The Department of Homeland Security, in 
coordination with State and local governments and the private sector, 
should develop a modern, flexible, and transparent logistics system. This 
system should be based on established contracts for stockpiling 
commodities at the local level for emergencies and the provision of goods 
and services during emergencies. The Federal government must develop 
the capacity to conduct large-scale logistical operations that supplement 
and, if necessary, replace State and local logistical systems by leveraging 
resources within both the public sector and the private sector.35   
Both this lesson learned and the judgment statement previously indicate that the 
White House is concerned about the ability of responders at the local level to identify, 
procure and employ supplies in a timely manner at the scene of the incident (or in 
multiple locations).  While the research and my conclusions steer away from stockpiling, 
this issue from the Katrina report does reiterate that the Coast Guard, as well as other 
federal, state and local agencies, need to consider not only the supplies required, but also 
the sources for those supplies and the competing demands that will be placed upon those 
sources in a contingency.   
                                                 
34  U.S. Executive Office of the President, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned (Washington: The White House, March 2006), 44.  
35 Ibid. 
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A final piece of literature which is pertinent to this research includes ideas put 
forward by the Naval Contingency Contracting Handbook (NAVSUP Pub 713).  As will 
be discussed later, this Navy publication will be a valuable resource for modeling how 
logistical, procurement and contracting operations should be handled during a 
contingency.  According to the handbook, “[t]he mission of contingency contracting is to 
responsively, effectively, and legally contract for, or to contract for the providing of, the 
supplies, services, and construction necessary to support the mission of the supported 
organizations.”36  The handbook emphasizes that financial managers and contracting 
officers in the field may need to operate independently during time of crisis.  The initial 
phases of a contingency are likely to be chaotic.  For that reason, “Contingencies require 
planning, rapid response, flexible procedures, and integration of efforts.”37  At this time, 
a similar manual or handbook does not exist within the Coast Guard. 
C. CONTINGENCY AND CONTINUITY TRAINING 
The emphasis of this sub-topic in the research is to focus on the issue of enhanced 
training within organizations on the subject of contingency financial management and 
business continuity.  Again, there are several resources available, including many 
examples of courses being offered by different organizations as related to BCM planning 
and/or contingency contracting.  However, a couple documents in the literature review 
were deemed particularly interesting. 
A study by several Naval Postgraduate Students in 2003 identified shortfalls in 
the Marine Corps’ ability to find properly trained Contingency Contracting Officers.  The 
study provides justification for the training and deployment of specialized Marine 
personnel to provide Contingency Contracting support for wartime or man-made and 
natural disasters.  As part of their justification, the study authors conducted data queries 
to determine how many contracting officers and purchasing specialists are in the Marines, 
how many are deployable, and how many have completed a contingency contracting 
                                                 
36 U.S. Navy, Naval Contingency Contracting Handbook, NAVSUP Publication 713 (Commander, 
Naval Supply Systems Command, May 16, 1997).  
37 Ibid.  
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course by the Defense Acquisitions University (DAU).38  This question was not asked 
within the Coast Guard surveys, but it is certainly a low number.   The latter half of the 
review report was focused on a discussion how the MBA students built a Marine Corps 
Institute course in Contingency Contracting.   
A study of a similar nature, also conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School, 
looks at the need to adequately train, prepare and integrate Contingency Contracting 
Officers (CCOs) in planning and executing Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW).  Several examples are presented why failure to accurately prepare or include 
CCOs created problems:39 
• Uncertain Funding in MOOTW 
• Difficulty in Coordination 
• Inadequate Training 
• Focus on Garrison Duties  
• Inadequate Hardware/Software Support 
• Need for Manual Contracting Procedures 
• Incomplete SOP to Facilitate CCP Transition 
• Inadequate Proficiency in Contingency Contracting Skills 
• Unauthorized Commitments 
• Customer-Supplier Relationship 
All these issues “ring true” for the Coast Guard and other military and federal 
agencies that look to employ contingency-focused financial management practices.  
Developing the contracting officers, budget analysts, and unit command cadre with the 
right tools, policies, authorities and mindsets to overcome these challenges is important. 
                                                 
38 Kenneth A. Burger, Jonathan R. Kehr, and Brian E. Wobensmith, “Marine Corps Contingency 
Contracting MCI” (MBA Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 6. 
39 William Robare, “Guidance for Army Contingency Contracting Officers in Preparation for Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)” (MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000), 84. 
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A study by Michael S. Anderson and Gregory P. Flaherty of the Naval 
Postgraduate School looks at the ability and justification to including Contingency 
Contracting Support Plans (CCSPs) into battle plans and planning staffs.    As stated in 
their executive summary: “The purpose of the CCSP is to define the needs of the 
Combatant Commander (COCOM) immediately so as to provide the contracting officer 
enough time to conduct battlefield procurement in an efficient and effective manner.”40  
Unfortunately, many organizations, including the Coast Guard, do not have these types of 
billets trained to include in planning efforts for contingencies.  A further question, not 
addressed in the literature, might be whether the Incident Management System logistics 
functions are adequately trained.  As organizations within the military become ever more 
ingrained in joint operations, they will need to cross-train these particularly assignments 
and/or include partners from other agencies that can understand the mission and 
requirements. 
D. GAPS AND ‘NEXT STAGES’ 
A crucial absence that has been noted in research so far is actual experience 
concerning the success of plans related to business continuity and financial management 
disaster preparedness.  It is likely that research may reveal examples of success or failure 
of disaster logistics planning (or business continuity planning) in areas which have faced 
man-made or natural disasters.  Drawing these examples together may highlight the 
shortfalls in logistical and financial management preparedness, and even the resultant 
financial and personal costs of this short-sightedness. 
It is also the intention of the research to identify lessons learned from other first 
responders and state governments concerning their implementation of similar policies.  
One question may be “what barriers to change were experienced in these communities as 
they worked to employ types of efforts?”  
                                                 
40 Michael S. Anderson and Gregory P. Flaherty, “Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support 
Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework” (MBA Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 2003), 2. 
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In response to specific literature inquiries on the topic of contingency financial 
management, Coast Guard Headquarters has subsequently issued a brief, and primarily 
tactical-level, instruction to provide basic guidance to financial managers for use in major 
disasters and contingencies.  The instructions are in close concert with these BCM 
research efforts, again at a basic level.  It is possible that if Coast Guard Headquarters 
continues on this basic course, they may answer the basic need for contingency-focused 
financial management policy.  It remains to be seen whether Coast Guard Headquarter 
efforts will conflict, coincide or supersede this BCM research. 
A brief note should be made to the Oversight Plan provided by the Committee for 
Homeland Security for the 110th Congress in the House of Representatives.  This 
oversight plan provided guidance on what can be expected as primary areas of concern 
during the two-year period covered by that session of Congress.  Of particular note, the 
Chairman of the Committee, Bennie G. Thompson, indicated that the Committee will 
“address the financial management challenges of individual [DHS] components, 
including the implementation of internal controls and the mitigation of organizational 
weaknesses which preclude the issuance of clean audit opinions.  Additionally, the 
Committee will examine the Department’s efforts to integrate the financial management 
systems of the component agencies into a unified system.”41  The oversight plan also 
stated that the Committee will look to review Continuity of Operations for DHS, as well 
as the Continuity of Government for other key agencies, should a terrorist attack occur.  
The Oversight Plan fell short of advocating advanced continuity plans, such as those 
targeted at financial management.   
E. LOOK FOR “SMART PRACTICES” 
This brief literature review demonstrates that there is considerable discussion and 
debate on the use of business continuity plans and whether specific organizations should 
take affirmative efforts to implement a contingency-focused financial management 
system.  It should be clear that the Coast Guard is not alone in studying and 
                                                 
41 Bennie G. Thompson, Representative, “Committee on Homeland Security Oversight Plan, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 110th Congress.”  United States House of Representatives. 
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implementing these initiatives. Many organizations, public and private, local and 
international, similar and dissimilar are studying their operations, logistics and support 
systems to understand how to improve preparedness and resiliency.  The remainder of 
this thesis work looks at measures the Coast Guard should implement to improve 
financial management and logistics readiness for contingencies.  As the Coast Guard 
implements these measures, they must simultaneously partner with other agencies, at all 
levels, to continually discover successes and failures with similar implementations and 
understand the context within which these results occurred.  The Coast Guard must 
ensure that they do not jump at each and every opportunity to implement practices that 
have succeeded elsewhere, but must instead appreciate that ‘best practices’ elsewhere are 
not always a similar fit for the Coast Guard.  Author Eugene Bardach encourages 
organizations to ask themselves, “Assuming this practice is indeed smart in some 
contexts, is ours a context in which it can work well enough to warrant trying it?”42  
Therefore, as knowledge, literature and examples continue to accumulate, the Coast 
Guard must be prepared to conduct inquiries and studies to see which items should 
become “smart practices” for the Coast Guard. 
                                                 
42 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, (CQ Press, 2000), 82. 
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IV. PLAN FOR IMPROVING COAST GUARD BUSINESS 
CONTINUITY PLANNING AND CONTINGENCY LOGISTICS 
Wars are not paid for in wartime, the bills come later. 
      - Benjamin Franklin 
A. THE CHALLENGES WE FACE 
The interview and survey results in the previous chapter, in-depth feedback and 
lessons learned from significant contingencies, and recommendations gleamed from 
numerous items within the literature review, clearly point towards certain conclusions 
which can only be ignored at our peril.  First, the Coast Guard operators and logisticians 
in the field, standing just behind our first layer of operational response, are not fully 
prepared or trained to properly execute the financial and logistical challenges of a major 
contingency.  We lack effective field-level policy for a range of contingencies and we 
have not armed these responders with unambiguous and resilient methods to ensure their 
financial and logistical actions from the beginning are helping the organization succeed. 
Second, there are significant areas of improvement in preparing our logistical 
planners, as opposed to field-level operators and support personnel, for the logistical and 
financial management challenges that may be faced in major contingencies.  This 
challenge can be viewed as an “opportunity cost” of not preparing in advance with our 
local, state, federal and private partners on the likely stream of logistical requirements 
that a major contingency response will require.  The less time we devote in advance, the 
more likely our contingency personnel will have to devise ad hoc policies and plans in 
the wake of a catastrophic event.  These ad hoc policies will come at a cost measured in 
lost and inefficient time, more expensive and unnecessary inventories or a failure to 
accurately track costs from the outset of an event, leading to real dollars lost to the Coast 
Guard.   
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Third, our ability to accurately and effectively capture costs related to a 
contingency from shortly after the event has remained relatively unchanged since the 
challenges encountered from 9/11 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  During those pivotal 
events, and with Hurricane Katrina in particular, financial management experts devised 
ad hoc tables to track the wide-assortment of FEMA mission and reimbursable costs.  
Additionally, extra personnel were summoned to the affected area to begin “forensic cost 
accounting” and establish “Cost Accounting Tiger Teams,” all measures which, in the 
end, were successful for capturing hundreds of millions of dollars in reimbursable 
costs.43  However, the current system remains relatively unchanged in policy and 
guidance that would make this process unnecessary, or at least simpler, for the next major 
contingency.   
Fourth, our workforce remains inadequately prepared for the challenges which 
may lie ahead in major contingencies such as pandemic viruses, electromagnetic pulse or 
simultaneous smaller attacks in major cities across the country.  These are certainly low 
probability events, though many would argue we are overdue for a pandemic, and yet the 
consequences of these events could lead to significant failures in our financial 
management and logistics systems which would cascade into losses in our operational 
capabilities.  Our workforce needs to build resilience and capability through an 
examination and correction of “bottleneck” procurement and contracting personnel 
positions and through a refocus on effective training and contingency exercising which 
goes beyond the classroom environment. 
B. AREAS TO DEVELOP A CONTINGENCY-FOCUS ON FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS 
Improving our financial management and logistics programs to become “business 
resilient” and with a capability to overcome major contingencies requires changes in at 
least the following areas: 
 
                                                 
43Frank Capitano, Craig Bennett, Allen Thuring, Paul Baca, and August Martin, “Semper Paratus – 
Always Ready: U.S. Coast Guard Financial Management Support Its World-Class Disaster Response,” 
Armed Forces Comptroller, Spring 2006, 22. 
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• Establishing financial management and logistics policy for operators and 
field personnel to understand the importance of cost tracking and how 
these personnel can immediately take procurement and contracting 
actions. 
• Modifying the accounting line and financial systems readiness to track 
costs. 
• Understand geographic-specific logistics requirements and developing a 
plan and information sharing construct to collaborate with other units and 
agencies. 
• Build resilience in contracting and contingency procurement which 
includes efforts at Advanced Readiness Contracting, Pre-Contracting and 
mitigation of the “human aspects” of business continuity planning. 
• Reconfigure and effectively market long-term training, education and skill 
maintenance for Coast Guard planners, logisticians and 
procurement/supply personnel at all levels.  
The remainder of this chapter will look at each of these efforts in detail. 
C. WHERE IT MATTERS MOST - CONTINGENCY FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT & LOGISTICS IN THE FIELD 
The Coast Guard is a busy organization of more than 87,000 active duty, reserve, 
civilian and Auxiliary employees.44   As of Fiscal Year 2008, these personnel operate a 
variety of assets which provide direct service to the citizens of our nation and the world.  
These assets include 252 cutters, 945 shore units, 194 aircraft and more than 1,660 boats 
of various size and mission.45  In an average day, the Coast Guard uses these assets to 
save 14 lives, assist 98 people in distress, conduct 74 search and rescue cases, complete 
31 Port State Control safety and environmental exams on foreign vessels, perform 18 
                                                 
44 U.S. Coast Guard, “CG Snapshot: A Summary of Facts and Figures About the U.S. Coast Guard,” 
http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/overview.asp (accessed August 3, 2008). 
45 Ibid., CG Snapshot. 
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safety exams on commercial fishing vessels, conduct 24 marine casualty investigations, 
issue 102 Certificates of Inspection to U.S. commercial vessels, service 135 aids-to-
navigation, correct 23 aids-to-navigation discrepancies, interdict 17 illegal migrants at 
sea, seize or remove over 1,000 pounds of illegal drugs ($12.9M value), escort over 20 
large passenger vessels, military outload vessels, High Interest Vessels (HIVs) or vessels 
carrying especially dangerous cargo, board 193 ships and boats, board 17 vessels at sea to 
enforce domestic fishers and marine protected species regulations, inspect 53 HAZMAT 
containers, and respond to 12 Oil Pollution/Hazardous Chemical Material spills.46  This 
is considerable work for a service of its relatively small size.  The Coast Guard is often 
viewed as one of the best investments of our government, providing an incredible six-to-
one return on taxpayer investment in terms of lives and property saved, drugs interdicted 
and numbers of illegal immigrants that do not make landfall and burden the social 
system.47   
Given the accomplishments just mentioned, how do we make these tens of 
thousands of people and thousands of field-level assets even more prepared to face the 
overwhelming challenges of a low-probability, high consequence major contingency 
without further burdening them as they flex their operational initiative?  The situation, as 
it exists today, is that the people operating these assets have rigorous daily missions and 
operating procedures which they abide by.  They are prepared for a high number of 
potential casualties, contingencies and emergencies.  And yet, one of the areas left 
unaddressed in their readiness posture, is how to effectively deal with the logistical and 
financial challenges of a major contingency.  As stated earlier in this report, these 
personnel are clearly ready to address the operational challenges.  Time and again, Coast 
Guard personnel have risen to the challenge of urgent and large-scale events and 
performed heroically with initiative and tenacity.   
                                                 
46  U.S. Coast Guard, “CG Snapshot: A Summary of Facts and Figures About the U.S. Coast Guard,” 
http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/overview.asp (accessed August 3, 2008). 
47 Donald T. Philips and James M. Loy, Character in Action: The U.S. Coast Guard on Leadership, 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 118. 
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The web survey indicated that the majority of financial management logistical 
personnel represented do not feel that the field-level personnel are adequately prepared to 
address the cost-tracking and logistical concerns of a large contingency.  For instance, 
when asked whether field level personnel were prepared to carry out contingency 
procurement, the comment was made by one respondent that “little training is available 
or enforced.”  Similarly, others responded on the issue of cost-tracking that “there is no 
CG standards on how to do it, so it would be track[ed] differently from unit to unit.”  
Another respondent felt that the field can get procurement completed, as evidence by 
Hurricane Katrina, however, “the problem is the internal control holes in the system.  
Also, the current move is to remove small purchase vehicles (credit cards) from the field 
operator to ease burden.”  These comments, and many others like them, indicate that 
there is a need to establish and standardize policy and instructions for field-level 
operators to employ in times of contingency.  The objective of these instructions is to 
make contingency procurement quickly, in accordance with regulations, and to 
effectively capture costs such that reports can be generated in the future when seeking 
reimbursements from emergency funding sources. 
1. Don’t Jeopardize Initiative and Flexibility 
Any policy or instructions developed for action by the field need to keep in mind 
several important issues.  First, policy or instructions for the field must not reduce the 
capability to act or respond.  As in nearly every operation or task, there are options and 
trade-offs which must be considered and some flexibility must remain, even proactively 
created, in the system to allow for initiative and response.  Due to the urgent nature of 
contingency operations, field personnel will not have time to pour through tomes of 
specifications, instructions, and redundant policies before making decisions.   
To take a random example of an item which may be needed in a contingency, 
consider that there are a myriad of instructions and standards which outline military 
specifications for handheld global positioning systems (GPS).  The systems have to 
match other models currently in Coast Guard inventory, be shopped competitively if 
purchasing a total of more than $3,000 and tracked in the Coast Guard general purpose 
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property system.  There are several events which may require purchasing dozens or 
hundreds of handheld GPS systems to send out with field units, recovery teams or even 
small shoreside security groups to radio in exact locations of security incidents along the 
shore or critical infrastructure.  The Coast Guard cannot afford to maintain warehouses 
and stockpiles of items such as these, nor would they want to given the fact that each 
model can become outdated in just a few years.  Therefore, when minutes and hours 
count to obtaining the devices from vendors or distributors, getting them to the field 
operators and putting the equipment to work, there is not time to undertake additional 
steps which may slow the process and could lead to dangerous inefficiencies or 
casualties.  Our field operators need abbreviated guidance on how to purchase off-the-
shelf systems, as an example, and they must be provided with the critical issues to keep 
purchases legal and justify their procurement.  In the end, we need to trust the field 
personnel, operating in the heat of battle, to make the right decisions that match policy. 
2. Speed & Efficiency Cannot Sacrifice Law or Internal Controls 
A second important issue as policy is developed is that instructions which provide 
guidance on how to effect emergency procurement must be developed in accordance with 
the Coast Guard’s Financial Resource Management Manual (FRMM), the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP).  These 
instructions, policies and regulations were not devised with the intent to provide for rapid 
procurement during times of crisis, but instead are intended to solidify and reinforce 
internal control practices and compliance with federal procurement law.   However, there 
are caveats and methods within these binding systems which can create flexibility when 
certain circumstances are met (e.g., units may be able to purchase equipment or services 
from a “sole source” during times of emergency rather than seeking purchase quotes for a 
number of competing vendors).  
As stated in a Government Accountability Office Report written after Hurricane 
Katrina titled “Preparing for and Responding to Disasters” there is substantial emphasis 
on ensuring internal controls remain intact during times of crisis.  The report stated 
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Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are 
used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision 
makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and 
accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and 
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples 
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required 
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital 
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples 
where FEMA’s processes assisting disaster victims left the federal 
government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance 
payments.48 
The Coast Guard, while in the midst of responding to the response and recovery 
of tens of thousands of people stranded in the city released an internal message reiterating 
the importance of these controls.  An important highlight of the message included the 
following: 
The Coast Guards massive operational response to Hurricane Katrina in 
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama has been accompanied by a 
monumental surge in financial and procurement activity at all levels of the 
Coast Guard, most notably at field units actively involved with disaster 
response and recovery.  The operational response to Hurricane Ophelia in 
North Carolina has been more geographically limited and the response to 
Hurricane Rita is still in its early stages, but the fact that the CG has had 
three back-to-back hurricane response and recovery operations has the 
potential to strain the level of oversight we have over our financial and 
procurement processes.  There has already been a considerable amount of 
high level executive, legislative and public interest in ensuring that federal 
agencies involved in disaster recovery operations continue to be good 
stewards of the taxpayers dollars that will eventually be expended in 
support of these efforts. For example, the DHS Office of Inspector 
General (OIG) has outlined its plans to review selected major contracts 
associated with Hurricane Katrina operations to ensure federal acquisition 
regulations are being adhered to, and that associated expenditures are 
necessary and reasonable.  Similarly, Congress has asked for a weekly 
report on the allocation and obligation of Katrina-related recovery funds.49 
                                                 
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Preparing for and Responding to Disasters, GAO-07-
395T, (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007), 14. 
49 U.S. Coast Guard, “Financial and Procurement Controls During Disaster Response and Recovery,” 
CG-8D message, Date-Time Group R 211446Z SEP 05. 
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As should be evident from the extract above, the Coast Guard understands the 
importance of these policies, but is it being effective and efficient in the spending of 
contingency related procurements and could it be more effective in cost controlling and 
collection if basic and fundamental policies related to contingency procurement are 
understood in the field?  Those should be driving factors to measure success in a revised 
policy, aimed at the field, for contingency-related procurements.  Unfortunately, our 
system of government will always look to place blame later on faulty decisions.  The 
Coast Guard must not set up the field personnel for failure in this respect.  Instructions 
and policy must be clear and unambiguous with footnotes and appendices which can be 
referenced if time permits or if there is paralyzing vagueness.   
Finally, the policy and instructions must provide ready-to-employ checklists and 
abbreviated procedures on how to acquire emergency supplies from a variety of sources 
(e.g., meals ready-to-eat, safety and response equipment, berthing services, contractor 
support, etc.).   These field-level appendices should evolve from the planning doctrine 
which will be described in Chapter VI.   It is likely that when contingencies or exercises 
occur, the checklists will be the only pertinent sections which will be used for reference.  
Much like the Use-of-Force checklists which are employed on cutters and boats today 
when conducting law enforcement and security operations, a series of contingency 
financial management or logistics checklists must be quick reference items which allow 
for documenting a decision process and following it through to a conclusion which can be 
supported and enforced. 
Similarly, it should be further investigated if DHS procurement policy may 
provide field unit authorization to procure/contract resources immediately, without other 
authorization, in order to begin emergency operations immediately following a 
contingency or disaster.  The National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, 
Annex 4 indicates that similar allowances and authorizations are being applied at the 
federal level. 
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D. MODIFYING THE ACCOUNTING LINE AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
READINESS TO TRACK COSTS 
Inevitably, when contingencies occur, funding and cost reporting to higher 
echelons become crucial and sensitive issues.  During the 9/11 response, rudimentary cost 
collection began within 3-hours of the event and grew in complexity over the course of 
the following months.  It became important in the first several days and especially in the 
final weeks of the fiscal year, to understand what the costs to the Coast Guard were as a 
result of the historically high level of security in the nation’s ports and waterways.  In 
spite of monumental increases in security related missions costs and a surge of reserve 
forces, the Coast Guard could not afford the black-eye of exceeding the funding 
appropriated and apportioned.  The Coast Guard was in need of accurate and 
substantiated cost data to generate estimates for presentation to Congress as part of 
supplemental appropriation funding requests.  These cost estimates were based upon 
burn-rates of funding and spending pulled directly from the financial system.  If costs 
were not reported accurately, or did not cite the correct triggering cost-center in the 
financial system (i.e., a five-digit numbered flag to indicate 9/11 response), then these 
costs were left off reports, forecasts and estimates.  Similar experiences by a survey 
respondent led the individual to comment that, “Hurricane Katrina was a good example 
of lack of preparedness in financial management.  During the initial response phase there 
was no clear guidance on how to track cost for units to obtain reimbursement from the 
CG or from FEMA.  If I remember correctly, guidance came weeks or even a month after 
the incident.”  A similar response was elicited by a respondent when asked if cost 
collection could begin immediately after an event: “What’s the definition of 
‘immediately’?  [We’re] still collecting cost documentation & billing FEMA for 
reimbursement from Katrina 3 yrs ago.  That said, we’ve recovered 99%+ of all 
expenditures, the system works, but it WILL NOT meet stated 60-day time lines.” 
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The Coast Guard Maintenance & Logistics Command, Atlantic, after action report 
from Hurricane Katrina also touched upon this critical component of contingency 
financial management:50  
Timely/comprehensive data capture and establishment/proper use of 
accounting strings is essential to effectively position the Coast Guard to 
attempt to get expenditures reimbursed by other agencies (e.g., FEMA) 
and/or seek supplemental funding…Disaster response creates funding 
requirements well beyond normal budget builds - immediate, near-term 
and long-term. It's imperative that expenditures hit proper cost centers to 
facilitate data calls associated with development of supplemental funding 
requests, seeking of cost reimbursement, development of follow on/out 
year budget requests and similar efforts. Special / specific data capture 
requirements (i.e., AOPS & ALMIS); the use of special accounting 
strings; and changes in accounting strings commensurate with operational 
developments [i.e., availability of FEMA mission assignments (MAs), 
availability of special sources of funding] complicates normal 
procurement & accounting procedures…Large scale natural disasters and 
similar contingency operations can create an extreme surge in financial 
and procurement activity. Resulting emergent /emergency response efforts 
can often times lead to improper cost accounting resulting in an intensive 
effort straightening out financial records after the fact. Proper 
"bookkeeping" up front and throughout ongoing operations will minimize 
the downstream effort that will be required. 
The Coast Guard is not alone in this challenge.  Other examples exist of agencies 
that also find themselves unprepared for effective cost accounting when disaster strikes.  
A major ice storm blanketed the city of Springfield and Greene County, Missouri, with 
approximately two inches of ice from January 12 to January 15, 2007. The large amount 
of ice forced area businesses and schools to close and severely limited surface 
transportation. The storm also disrupted electrical service, leaving up to 90,000 county 
residents without power for as long as two weeks following the ice storm. The 
Springfield-Greene County Office of Emergency Management (OEM) activated its EOC 
at 8:30 p.m. on January 12, approximately 5 hours after ice began to accumulate. The 
incident required assistance from the state government, including the mobilization of the 
                                                 
50 U.S. Coast Guard, “Hurricane KATRINA Response – Maintenance & Logistics Command Atlantic 
(FOUO)” in the Coast Guard Standard After-Action, Information and Lessons Learned System (CGSails), 
http://www.cgsails.uscg.mil/default.htm (Coast Guard intranet access required, accessed August 12, 2008), 
section titled “Financial Management.” 
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Missouri National Guard and the routing of resources from the Missouri State Emergency 
Management Agency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency declared Greene 
County and 34 other Missouri counties to be in a state of disaster, and Greene County 
sustained $40 million in public damages. 51 
The Springfield-Greene County EOC served as the focal point for resource 
collection and management for the area during the ice storm. Under its Emergency 
Operations Plan (EOP), the finance section is responsible for all cost accountability 
functions during the EOC’s operation. During the first days of the incident, however, the 
emergency management director did not contact the county finance department to 
maintain finance and purchasing records as mandated in the EOP. Without an established 
finance section, the EOC management team did not have sufficient documentation of its 
expenditures and could not produce accurate estimates of its spending. This lack of 
financial accountability impeded logistical processes during the early phases of the 
incident.”52, 53 
The Coast Guard often finds itself in similar situations.  Mission execution shall 
always be the undisputed focus of response.  Mission support structures must not 
jeopardize the quick, effective and efficient response.  However, as noted above, a failure 
to accurately account for the costs of response operations can inhibit accurate 
reimbursement requests and impact the understanding of mission cost vs. benefit 
calculations in the future.  Understandably, most unit-level personnel have cost-collection 
as the farthest thing from their mind when responding to an incident.  And yet, it is that 
mentality which can hinder accurate reporting, and more importantly, accurate 
reimbursement for services provided and costs absorbed.  This is not to say that Coast 
Guard personnel should reach for their life jackets and calculators when responding; 
however, a basic understanding of contingency financial management is necessary for all 
                                                 
51 Springfield-Greene County (MO) Office of Emergency Management, “Ice Storm 2007 After Action 
Report,” May 2007, http://www.greenecountymo.org/web/OEM/files/1-12-07.pdf (accessed August 12, 
2008). 
52 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergency Operations Centers: Practicing Financial 
Accountability from the Start of an Incident,” Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing, https://www.llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contentID=25628 (registration required).    
53 Springfield-Greene County (MO) Office of Emergency Management. 
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hands.  There are pockets of success in this challenge within the Coast Guard, most 
notably in the pollution response community.  When asked if cost collection for a 
response is important, a respondent commented, “Yes, the BIG money is in pollution (& 
now debris removal); and those funds, whether OSLTF54, CERCLA55 or ESF 
[Emergency Support Function] require billing someone for reimbursement, with a level 
of accuracy that meets both DOJ [Department of Justice] court requirements, and CFO 
[Chief Financial Officer] financial statement assertion requirements.”   
The web survey addressed this issue by asking respondents, when given a 
hypothetical scenario of a major contingency, whether the Coast Guard would be able to 
begin cost collection for the response immediately.  Of the 25 respondents, 20 indicated 
that they would not be able to do so while only five indicated yes.  Speaking to the point 
of my recommendation, a respondent indicated that cost collection would probably not 
begin “unless there was a strong financial management type at the larger command 
ensuring that guidance was put out in the field to capture costs.”  My response: why do 
we have to wait?  Why cannot this guidance be prepared, packaged and released well in 
advance, and be included in training, exercises and policies?  Another respondent spoke 
directly to this when they stated, “Unlike assets, we have no prepositioned accounting 
lines.”  This is the opportunity, as we take proactive actions, to mold the existing 
accounting lines and systems in the modernized Coast Guard financial management 
infrastructure, and as we are in midst of designing formats for future accounting lines, to 
ensure that our system is flexible, adaptable and prepared. 
A flexible contingency responsive accounting system would allow for cost-
collection in multiple formats and input methods depending on the severity and impacts 
of a contingency.  For instance, there is a range of contingencies, especially those 
scenarios involving pandemic illnesses that could make constant human intervention and 
data entry nearly impossible or, at a minimum, incredibly inefficient.  Consider that a 
prolonged pandemic has struck a major coastal metropolitan city; if only five people of a 
                                                 
54 OSLTF: Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
55 CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act (i.e., 
Superfund) 
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ten-person office can work on Coast Guard logistics and financial management, would 
you want any of these people doing work that could be easily automated or streamlined?  
Similarly, the system must be flexible enough to not rely solely upon the existence of the 
Coast Guard Data Network (CGDN) (i.e., Coast Guard Intranet) as there are many 
contingency and disaster scenarios that can begin with, or cascade into, electrical, 
telephone and/or internet network failure.  To remedy this possibility, alternate and 
creative solutions need to be investigated which could mitigate the danger of losing 
procurement transaction capability and financial and transparency during a major 
contingency.  As stated, for pandemic illness contingencies, or other events which cause 
substantial “human impact”, there is a necessity for a system which is flexible to support 
automation to the highest extent possible, from the initial procurement and logistics 
actions, through the assignment of cost centers, object classes, and accurate accounting 
line data.  Such a system would ideally also feed pre-built reporting mechanisms such 
that trend data to support designation of costs, creation of cost forecasts/estimates and 
support for decision making tools would reduce the requirements of human analysis.  
Imagine again, as an example, a major pandemic in a metropolitan area.  Coast Guard 
units, wanting to prevent further infection or spread to secured/uninfected areas, may be 
required to enforce security zones, inspect cargo vessels and would likely require 
procurement and assignment of equipment specific to those purposes (e.g., additional life 
jackets, body armor, ammunition, sensor & detection equipment, etc.).  A highly 
supportive and automated logic system would allow individual users to rapidly enter 
basic expenditure and budget data, input purchase card and procurement information 
using voice recognition technology and feed the data into pro forma cost reports which 
are then automatically pushed or pulled to other systems or levels of hierarchy within the 
Coast Guard and federal government.  This would significantly reduce the need for 
additional report design and tailoring, generation of messages, and coordination on the 
collection and dissemination of data which is highly rule-based and well suited to 




correct?) and mission assignment data to determine when an asset has entered a disaster 
zone and can begin to accumulate reimbursable costs against the “standard cost” of the 
asset.   
A flexible system for cost-collection would also provide for the eventuality that 
communication systems or any computer/electrical systems are unavailable.  
Understandably, this outage would be hectic and disorderly in the long-term, bringing 
cost collection for the entire federal government to a stand still while ad hoc methods are 
created.  However, units in the field, at a minimum, will need to understand their cost-
collection obligations in such an eventuality and how a loss of communications or 
network infrastructure should be mitigated.  It is hoped that such a disastrous situation 
would be short-lived.  When systems then become operational again, it will be necessary 
to recreate the financial and logistical events that took place in the interim. 
An adaptable system for cost-collection would be readily malleable to mold into a 
variety of potential contingencies.  As our accounting system is prepared today, the Coast 
Guard uses the piece of the accounting line known as the ‘cost center’ to record a five-
digit number to identify the unit, command, or event to which the cost is attributable.  For 
instance, the Coast Guard has designated cost center 70880 to be for the use of natural 
disasters (e.g., hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes, etc.).  When a unit has a hurricane 
impact its area which causes the necessity to spend unit funds (e.g., clean-up and disposal 
of debris), applying the 70880 cost center within the accounting line would allow for 
reimbursement by Coast Guard headquarters.  Coast Guard Headquarters, in turn, would 
pull all data related to the contingency out of the financial system by searching for the 
70880 cost center.  These costs could then be summarized for submitting to FEMA, DHS 
or another agency that may be cost-collecting for building a single Congressional 
supplemental funding request as was done in the years following 9/11 for terrorism 
response and recovery operations.  For many years, this has been an acceptable 
methodology for cost collection.  However, as was discovered in 2005 when multiple 
hurricanes struck in quick succession in Florida and the coastal states of the Gulf of 
Mexico, causing more than $178M in expenditures by the Coast Guard, simply using the 
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pre-designated cost center was inadequate to accurately reflect costs.56  Some units could 
not delay spending until the cost centers could be loaded into their accounts (the USCG 
Finance Center in Chesapeake, Virginia becomes involved by manually assigning cost 
centers which can be spent against unit funds, another delay in the system).  To prepare 
ourselves for future contingencies, disasters and major terrorism incidents, what is 
needed instead is multiple pre-designated cost centers which shall be programmed well in 
advance for a variety of contingencies, locations and sequential numbers (to allow for 
separation of costs for successive events).  These cost centers shall be open to any unit 
and any program element (funding source) to apply costs against.  An example of  
establishing such a system is included below, with a more complete listing of potential 
cost centers is included as Appendix B:                         
Nuclear Detonation USCG HQ Org 50000 through 50009
Nuclear Detonation USCG HQ Units 50010 through 50019
Nuclear Detonation Atlantic Area 50020 through 50029
Nuclear Detonation Pacific Area 50030 through 50039
Nuclear Detonation 1st District 50040 through 50049
Nuclear Detonation 5th District 50050 through 50059
Nuclear Detonation 7th District 50060 through 50069  
   …         …           …      …       … 
Cyber Attack 13th District 52200 through 52209
Cyber Attack 14th District 52210 through 52219
Cyber Attack 17th District 52220 through 52229
Cyber Attack MLC Atlantic 52230 through 52239
Cyber Attack MLC Pacific 52240 through 52249  
 
A prepared cost collection system would have a series of pre-formatted cost 
collection formats and standard reports.  In the early hours and days of a contingency, 
when field-level operators are still consumed in the mire of response and weary from 
activity, they will have little attention or incentive to devote to generating reports for 
submission up the chain-of-command to report expenditures and consumption of 
resources.  Similarly, middle-level support and financial management commands will 
want to quickly collect and report data required by Coast Guard Headquarters, FEMA or 
other supported agency.  To facilitate a contingency-focused financial system, the 
methods of collecting, collating and reporting data should be standardized and understood 
by all commands well in advance.  As stated in paragraphs above, the system should 
                                                 
56 Capitano, et al., 21. 
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require as little human intervention as possible, and yet, provide clear understanding of 
what events the costs and resources were supporting using cost center codes.   
To facilitate this rapid and prepared reporting system, units must become familiar 
with, trained and exercise with a standard reporting system.  This reporting system must 
also be flexible to allow for submission in a number of formats as discussed previously 
(i.e., automated via CGDN, e-mail submission, fax, voice recognition via phone call or 
even hand delivery). 
E. PLANNING LOGISTICS FOR A TAILORED GEOGRAPHICAL 
RESPONSE 
The Coast Guard is a widely dispersed organization.  With more than 95,000 
miles of shoreline to protect, it is challenging to maintain awareness and to devise plans 
for every contingency that may erupt.  And yet, without an effort at planning, the Coast 
Guard will be caught blind and not have the wherewithal to respond with speed and 
efficiency.  To our credit, operational planning is very much a part of our culture and 
intent.  However, ensuring that a sustained logistics plan and a responsive financial 
organization are functioning to support mission execution is where we are in danger of 
falling short.   
A well-respected and experienced Coast Guard contingency planner remarked 
during survey research that “[Hurricanes] Katrina/Rita tested the contingency response of 
the CG, and for the most part we succeeded, but we succeeded because of our can-do 
culture, not because we had workable policies/procedures in place and solid COOP 
systems.  We succeeded because we had a few good key experts who could coach 
everyone else along.”  I am confident the Coast Guard will continue to recruit, train and 
educate the best and brightest military and civilian employees, however, the organization 
must support the members by not forcing them to reinvent the wheel during times of 
contingency.   
To ensure that we have considered the mission support that will be required in the 
multiple events and contingencies the Coast Guard may become involved in, we need to 
lead efforts at collaborative logistics and financial management planning at the local and 
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regional level, based on the framework of the capabilities-based planning discussed in the 
National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG).   
As stated in the National Response Framework, “Preparedness involves a 
combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, 
and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the 
personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and 
developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an 
incident.”57  It also says about capabilities based planning, “[t]he Framework is 
capabilities based, which is to say that local governments, tribes, States, and the Federal 
Government all develop functional capabilities and identify resources that may be 
required based on hazard identification and risk assessment, threats, and other potential 
incidents such as those represented by the National Planning Scenarios.”58  Using 
capabilities based planning and meshing it with collaboration by local and regional first 
responders to determine collectively the logistics and support infrastructures required will 
be synergistic and will represent the future of catastrophic disaster response.  If formed 
and utilized properly, it will provide maximum mission support by devising 
contingencies plans which have already withstood rigorous exercises and collaborative 
testing. 
                                                 
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, January 2008), 9. 
58 National Response Framework, 7. 
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Figure 2.   Capabilities-Based Planning59 
 
The National Response Framework addresses this critical imperative by defining 
the goal and objectives of contingency preparedness: "Preparedness involves a 
combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and organizing to build, sustain, 
and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the process of identifying the 
personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of potential incidents, and 
developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an 
incident."60 
On the face, this may seem like an easy prospect.  But when you consider the 
challenge of understanding the possible contingencies that could develop within a 
particular region and the many stakeholders and responders that become involved, the 
planning can become amazingly challenging.  It is likely this reason, and the time 
commitments involved, which have made this very much a “back-burner” issue for most 
agencies.  But do Coast Guard financial and logistical planners feel that this type of 
advance planning is feasible, realistic, or even desired?  Respondents to the web survey 
were asked: given a set of planning scenarios for significant disasters and/or 
contingencies for your geographic area, would it be possible to forecast necessary 
                                                 
59 Capabilities-Based Planning Diagram obtained from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
“Office for Domestic Preparedness Support – HSPD-8,” 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/assessments/hspd8.htm (accessed August 8, 2008). 
60 National Response Framework, 9. 
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supplies and services that would be needed to support Coast Guard rescue, response and 
recovery operations?  The majority (68%) felt it would be possible.  Some notable 
responses included: 
• “Yes, it would be possible to forecast necessary supplies and services and 
the type of platforms necessary to replace those lost in a significant 
disaster.” 
• “To a limited degree yes.  Look at the BOA [Blanket Ordering 
Agreement] contracts MLCA has in place for pollution response – that’s 
the model you want to emulate for the rest of the response world.  That 
said, there will always be something you didn’t foresee, and you’ll have to 
retain flexible and responsive acquisition/logistics capabilities.” 
• “Not efficiently.  The Coast Guard does not maintain active and dynamic 
Logistics Factor Files for planning purposes.  We rely on written manuals 
and not collected data.  We also rely on personal experience.” 
• “I believe we are not prepared at this time to conduct that level of planning 
expertise.” 
• “Yes, I believe specific supplies and services can be identified with 
sources.  Also companies that are located throughout the US can be 
identified in the event local sources are incapacitated.” 
• “Yes, but actually having the resources to do the planning is lacking.” 
I would like to contend that this type of planning is not only possible, but we are 
doing taxpayers and our front-line responders and mission executers a disservice by not 
ensuring, well in advance, that we will support their contingency operations.  The 
National Response Framework reminds us of this responsibility when discussing the 
imperative to plan our response actions.  It states: 
Virtually every Federal department and agency possesses personnel and 
resources that may be needed in response to an incident. Some Federal 
departments and agencies have primary responsibility for certain aspects 
of response, such as hazardous materials removal.  Others may have 
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supporting roles in providing different types of resources, such as 
communications personnel and equipment. Regardless of their roles, all 
Federal departments and agencies must develop policies, plans, and 
procedures governing how they will effectively locate resources and 
provide them as part of a coordinated response.61 
The Coast Guard, in concert with other federal, state, local, non-governmental and 
public partners must take the lead in this planning effort.  As noted in the respondent 
surveys and in discussions at length that I have had with Coast Guard logisticians and 
planners, this is a huge undertaking but represents the future of emergency preparedness.  
An article, which will be discussed at length in Chapter Four, reminds us that “a major 
catastrophe cannot be managed by one entity or jurisdiction in isolation, strategic 
planning and response requires organizations to assume new tasks and responsibilities, to 
surrender others, and to create an operational inter-dependence that often contradicts 
instinctive desires for organizational autonomy and independence.”62  The Coast Guard 
must leverage its high-level of inter-organizational trust to make the next leap in 
collaborative preparation for the next catastrophe.  With process standardization, strong 
leadership and an effort at collaboration and coalition building, I am confident it can be 
achieved.  Given the scope and importance of this issue, Chapter Five in its entirety will 
focus on how the Coast Guard can begin this process. 
F. BUILDING RESILIENCE IN CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING AND 
PROCUREMENT 
When most people consider business resilience, they conjure images of alternate 
work sites for employees and secure bunkers housing backup computer servers and 
emergency inventory.  These initiatives are important, but their relevance to sustaining 
Coast Guard operations in the field is limited.  There are many additional aspects of 
 
 
                                                 
61 National Response Framework, 28. 
62 Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph M. Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National 
Emergency Preparedness: Strategies to Build Government Connectivity,” Working paper, June 1, 2006, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/leadership/images/stories/ksg/PDF/Publications/workingpapers/2005/marcusd
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business resilience and continuity of operations which are far more important for the 
Coast Guard to consider as efforts are made to reinforce and defend the capability to 
provide operational mission support. 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter III), the terms business continuity 
and business resilience are prevalent in contingency planning discussions.  The Business 
Continuity Institute defines business continuity management (BCM) as “an [sic] holistic 
management process that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organization and 
provides a framework for building resilience with the capability for an effective response 
that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation and value creating 
activities.”63  These principles have relevance for the Coast Guard and may assist with 
determining which business and operational areas are most in jeopardy of failure when 
stressed.  Some areas most critical to maintaining mission support can potentially cause 
cascading damages to the mission response and sustainability capability during a major 
contingency.  These areas, in particular, need to be identified, understood, and made 
resilient. 
Respondents to the web survey of financial management and logistics 
professionals in the Coast Guard revealed several areas of concern related to potential 
weak points in our organization.  The survey asked these subject matter experts to 
identify potential chokepoints or bottlenecks in the Coast Guard financial management 
and logistics systems.  Some of these comments included: 
• “Communications definitely.  Pre-established emergency procedures for 
procurement and accounting [are lacking].”  [Note: communications and 
network challenges were noted by 11 of 24 individuals who commented 
on the challenges of working in a contingency environment.] 
• “Loss of cell phones.  Loss of CGDN (the server for the FL West Coast is 
4’ above sea level).  Lack of COCOs [Chief of Contracting Office] and  
 
                                                 
63 IBM Corporation, “Business Resilience – The Next Step Forward for Business Continuity,” 
Continuity Central, 2004, http://www.continuitycentral.com/feature083.htm (accessed September 23, 
2007). 
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insufficient contracting warrants (waiting 14+ days for a $2,500 service 
contract to get approved during an emergency is untenable from an 
operational standpoint).” 
• “I think legacy expertise resides in prevention shops at the sectors (and 
their counterparts throughout the chain of command); while the current 
responsibility lies with the response chain of command.  It’s not clear 
we’re growing/developing new people to fill the role in the new response 
world.  It’s not clear the field knows what they don’t know.  We’ve got 
some centers of excellence, like the NSFCC [National Strike Force 
Coordination Center], MLCA [Maintenance & Logistics Command 
Atlantic] and NPFC [National Pollution Fund Center], but it’s not 
institutionalized and not systematic.” 
• “The COCO’s have the greatest latitude to conduct business but the admin 
follow up is a huge burden.  A majority of our personnel are extremely 
risk averse which will also hinder them in contingency situations.” 
• “Ability to execute purchases without access to FPD [Finance & 
Procurement Desktop] & CGDN [Coast Guard Data Network].  Huge!  
Procurement: personnel problem (lack of training) and policy (lack of high 
level engagement).” 
• “Most District, Area, MLC and HQ staffs can be bottle necks for field 
execution…however, these staffs tend to quickly flex and adjust to needs 
of line personnel during disasters as per Katrina.” 
• “FPD requirements.  Warrant management system process for issuance of 
emergency warrants.  Purchase card authority for APCs (authority 
restricted to geographic area).” 
• “Limitation on contracting warrants at the local level.” 
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• “Financial approval chains as they exist in FPD.  The approval will need 
to be centralized to one entity.  The FRMM [Coast Guard Financial 
Resource Management Manual] may limit purchase of highly necessary 
items to deal with the emergency.” 
It is clear from these results that challenges exist in supporting Coast Guard 
operational missions during a contingency, particularly with communications, 
contracting, and the approval process for emergency procurements.  Let’s take a look at 
each of these critical areas. 
1. Communications Impacts During Contingencies and Business 
Continuity 
The Coast Guard currently uses the Finance & Procurement Desktop (FPD) as the 
field-level and support command web-interface for initiating, tracking and executing all 
financial and logistical transactions.  The financial transaction data for the entire 
organization is subsequently merged into an Oracle-based system known as Coast Guard 
Oracle Financials (CGOF).  As many respondents to the survey indicated, if FPD were 
unavailable, either due to loss of unit internet/intranet/CGDN (Coast Guard Data 
Network) connectivity (a local problem), loss of the telecommunications or electrical 
power infrastructure in a geographic area (a regional problem) or loss of the FPD servers 
and backup systems (a national problem), the impacts would be dramatic.  Current policy 
and instructions for financial management are entirely presumptive that this system is 
available for use.  In fact, use of the system is mandatory as stated in an internal Chief of 
Contracting Officer Alert (08-34) which reminds users:  
This COCO Alert reiterates existing policy in the Homeland Security 
Acquisition Manual (HSAM) and the Coast Guard Acquisition Procedures 
(CGAP) stating mandatory usage of electronic Purchase Requests (PR) 
and PR approvals in the Coast Guard’s e-business suite… Compliance 
with these policies is a critical component in receiving a successful 
opinion on the Coast Guard’s audit and in providing sound financial 
management…All PRs must have the appropriate electronic approval 
signatures in FPD prior to being processed by the local contracting office. 
Hard copy PRs with hand-written signatures are not to be accepted unless 
a waiver has been granted under Section 8.F of the FRMM.  Compliance  
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with these policies is a critical component in receiving a successful 
opinion on the Coast Guard’s audit and in providing sound financial 
management.64 
Given the nature and destructive power of a contingency incident, the types of 
damages could be relatively short-lived or potentially carry on for weeks or months, 
forcing units to migrate to other options to maintain similar levels of service (then again, 
there are some that would contend that service to the field could increase if we went back 
to pencils and calculators because they would not be bound to the slow and buggy 
performance of FPD). 
For short-lived losses of communications or connectivity (e.g., hours or days), it 
is relatively easy to “wait it out” and hope the system will again come on-line.  Problems 
of this scale already happen today, even without the existence of a large contingency; 
sometimes it merely takes many people accessing the system simultaneously to bring it to 
a crawl.  Interventions today may be the same ones that should exist in a policy designed 
to be applied to overcoming short-lived losses of access to the financial systems.  
Essentially, if the loss of connectivity is expected to be short, paper files and 
documentation can be drafted using Adobe Professional or Microsoft Excel.  The forms 
used for authorizing procurement are nearly the same but would merely require drafting 
the documents in a different hard-copy format to provide for temporary proof of 
completing all the necessary documentation to support procurement (e.g., accurate 
accounting line information, signatures of authorized requisitioners and funds managers 
along with internal controls related to property management, hazardous materials, and 
required sources-of-supply).    
On the other hand, a long-term loss of communications or connectivity with the 
financial system will impact many critical aspects of our procurement, contracting and 
internal controls processes.  Today, there is no policy, plan or set of instructions to guide 
financial managers and personnel in the field for how to operate when financial systems 
are incapacitated and unlikely to be available for an extended period of time as may occur 
                                                 
64 U.S. Coast Guard, “COCO Alert 08-34: Mandatory Usage of Electronic Purchase Requests (PR),” 
U.S. Coast Guard, 2008.   
 71
during major disasters or contingencies.  Guiding policy, along with easy-to-follow 
instructions and forms must be created, promulgated and distributed in hard copy for 
managers in the field and at support commands to enact when it is evident that service 
will be unavailable.  One likely step is to require all field units and support commands to 
maintain procurement publications, policies, instructions and procurement/documentation 
forms in hard copy for use during a contingency.  This small step alone will allow 
documentation, approval chains, and internal control procedures to continue in spite of 
power, intranet or FPD failures. 
2. Advanced Readiness Contracting 
Contracting and the associated procurement functions necessary to provide 
equipment, services and resources to support mission execution, remains one of the most 
crucial aspects of business operations prior to and during a contingency.  Very few 
missions can be executed and supported without relying on the Coast Guard’s 
procurement, logistics and supply systems.  In many respects, the systems in place today 
are high functioning and conducted by an impressive cadre of professionals.  Then again, 
few inside or outside the organization, would term the system and methods “state of the 
art” or particularly resilient.  The contracting element in particular has some critical areas 
in need of improvement.  These include promoting a capability for advanced readiness 
contracting and removing contracting bottlenecks where they exist as a result of 
personnel shortages rather than training and authorities. 
The Coast Guard is not alone in its challenges to provide effective contracting and 
procurement capabilities during times of disaster.  The GAO Report, Preparing for and 
Responding to Disasters, following Hurricane Katrina discussed an analogous shortfall 
by DHS.   
Originally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following Hurricane 
Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of needs to 
confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or ensure that 
there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to 
ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We recommended that DHS 
create accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We 
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also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement 
practices (pre-contracting) and procedures for those federal agencies with 
roles and responsibilities under the NRP.  These federal agencies could 
then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an 
assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for 
their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of 
capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response 
practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how the 
federal government can better manage its disaster-related procurements. 
These practices include developing knowledge of contractor capabilities 
and prices, and establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and 
establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to 
match the response with the need.65 
As described in the National Response Framework, Advanced Readiness 
Contracting is a capability which “ensures that contracts are in place before an incident 
for commonly needed commodities and services such as ice, water, plastic sheeting, 
temporary power, and debris removal. This type of contracting improves the ability to 
secure supplies and services by streamlining the process of ordering, acquiring, and 
distributing resources when needed.”66  According to interviews conducted with 
contracting and procurement specialists, little or no advance readiness contracting is 
“officially” conducted.  Rather, there are a few informal relationships with private sector 
vendors and providers to give the Coast Guard preferential treatment if disaster strikes.  
While these relationships are certainly valuable and can make or break receiving support 
when a crisis emerges, they should be fortified with documentation and advanced 
readiness contracting so that logistical support plans are not left precariously to the whim 
of personal relationships. 
Advanced Readiness Contracting and other methods of “pre-contracting” not only 
provide for improved responsiveness when a contingency occurs, but also increase the 
resiliency of the procurement and contracting staff.  When information regarding pre-
contracting efforts is distributed to field commands, an additional layer of resilience is 
established to allow for rapid activation of potential contracting solutions to mission 
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support challenges, potentially without any further intervention of contracting officers.  
In other words, pre-contracted services can be obtained simply, effectively and with 
much fewer delays when needed in response to an urgent resource request because the 
ground work to establish potential sources of supply, examine contract requirements, 
receive approvals, etc. has already been completed.  For instance, during the immediate 
days and weeks following Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard Air Station Clearwater played 
an important role providing relief supplies to personnel and survivors in New Orleans 
with the shipment of hundreds of tons of bottled water via HC-130 aircraft.  In order to 
facilitate this, the Comptroller and Supply Officer in Clearwater had to arrange, via the 
Chief of Contracting Office at Integrated Support Command Miami, to purchase water 
locally and have it delivered on a regular schedule to the Air Station for loading on 
aircraft.  The supply and procurement personnel in Clearwater accomplished the mission 
effectively, but did they receive the best price/value for the water achieved?  If so, how 
long did the selection process take to arrive at the best price among potential bidders?  
Subsequently, how much time was spent arranging the contract?   Would arranging the 
contract have been more challenging if competitors existed from the private sector or if 
the vendor’s supply chain became exhausted?  The same questions could be asked of the 
multitude of support resources and supplies sent to New Orleans, or other areas impacted 
by disaster, to include fuel, food, berthing, transport, etc.  
Air Station Clearwater’s instance with a potential pre-contracting situation is not 
isolated.  An internal after-action and lessons learned database (known as CGSails) 
contained a detailed report on the Hurricane Katrina response, drafted by the primary 
logistics command for the Central and Eastern United States.  The report highlighted 
challenges faced by the organization in managing the large flow of contracting and 
procurement actions that the hurricane response necessitated.  The report stated that 
“[n]ormal procurement and contracting procedures & practices may not be able to 
provide logistics support within required timelines.  Adjustments to standard contracting / 
purchasing procedures and requirements may be necessary to meet time critical purchases 
during disaster response operations.”  The report went on to provide several very useful 
solutions to procurement challenges which are worthy of implementation: 
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• Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition (JOTFOC) can 
shorten contracting timelines by minimizing / eliminating the need to seek 
quotes from multiple sources (publication of contracting activity is not 
eliminated nor is the need for justification for price reasonableness).  
• Increases in purchase card limits and/or contracting warrants allows for 
greater purchase capacity for personnel in the field thus eliminating having 
to pass purchase requests up the chain of command for approval (i.e., 
creating more steps in the process).  
• Emergency procurement procedures / initiatives does not relieve personnel 
of required procurement & contracting practices [i.e., entering data in the 
CG's financial procurement desktop (FPD), creation of complete purchase 
records & contracting files, FEDBIZOP (Federal Business Opportunity 
System) publication requirements] and accountability for reportable 
property. 
• Use of agency wide JOTFOCs and increasing purchase card limits and 
contracting warrant authorities provide ways of streamlining and shorting 
contracting and procurement timelines.  
• Creating / maintaining financial & property records in a timely manner is a 
critical success factor to support retrieval & reconciliation of financial data 
and support of potential after action initiatives (e.g., audits, supplemental 
funding requests, demobilization)…  
• Explore the need for establishment of JOTFOCs and adjustments to 
purchase card and contracting warrant limits / authorities to maximize 
procurement flexibility and responsiveness.  
• Staff ICS positions (i.e., SPUL - Supply Unit Leader, Ordering Managers, 
purchasing officers) with experienced procurement & property personnel 
(i.e., MLC - ISC staff)… 
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• Other mechanisms potentially available to expedite purchases included 
utilizing DoD JCS authorized project codes providing for increased 
requisition priority (milstrip requisitions) and adjustments to travel 
regulations such as allowing personnel deploying to the disaster area to 
directly purchase necessary support items (e.g., air mattresses, folding 
cots, other type portable beds; sleeping bags, blankets, sheets and pillows; 
towels, wash cloths, sanitizing wipes/cloths, and paper towels; flashlights 
& batteries; gasoline cans) and claiming them on their travel vouchers / 
travel claims.”67 
Therefore, if pre-contracting or advanced readiness contracting had taken place 
prior to major contingencies such as 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina, it may have helped 
identify additional sources of supply, points of contact, prices, methods of delivery, and 
achieved each of the exhaustive approval steps necessary to more rapidly effect 
procurements.   Similar comments were found in the Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned 
detailed by Maintenance & Logistics Command, Atlantic (MLCA).  An after-action 
lesson submitted by the Finance & Procurement division at MLCA discussed the 
following as relates to identifying sources-of-supply for critically needed items 
immediately after a major contingency:  
In addition to the commercial market, Department of Defense, especially 
DLA [Defense Logistics Agency], and FEMA provide channels for 
obtaining many types of supplies and materials. DoD/DLA will typically 
establish priority ordering codes for disaster response. Existing contracts 
(e.g., food service contracts) and Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) 
provide avenues for expeditiously obtaining a variety of logistics support 
(security guard services, galley & field kitchen type operations, water & 
sewage barges)… Existing service contracts (e.g., food services, security 
guards) provide a ready vehicle to meet new / expanded requirements; 
BOAs provide a ready source of supply for a wide variety of services 
typically associated with disaster response; military requisitions 
(MILSTRIPs) provide efficient established avenues for obtaining many 
types of required supplies, especially once priority ordering codes have 
been established. CG/DoD units (ships, shore stations) often have on hand 
inventories of required disaster supplies (e.g., MREs & bottled water, 
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AMIO supplies) available for immediate access/delivery… Utilize in-
place sources of supply vice establishing new, commercial contracts 
whenever possible to speed up delivery time… Maximize contracted labor 
force whenever possible (e.g., security guards, tradesmen and technicians) 
to free up CG personnel to perform other duties.68 
Therefore, in times of crisis and contingency, time saving efforts and 
deconfliction could mean the difference between life and death for individuals in the area 
impacted by the contingency.  Mechanisms must ideally be identified which can be used 
to generate transparency into on-hand inventory as well as pre-contracting with 
commercial sources to identify the most rapid means to put hands on necessary resources. 
3. Building Resilience in Human Aspects of Financial Management & 
Logistics 
The last area for concern in focusing efforts at building resilience in financial 
management and logistics grows out of the challenges of the human aspect of business 
continuity.  Financial management and logistics personnel are crucial to mission support, 
whether they are contracting officers, financial management officials, supply personnel, 
warehouse managers, budget analysts, contract writers, or a variety of other positions that 
interface with the finance, supply and logistics community.  Many of these people hold 
positions that are critical to the functioning of the process.  When the individuals in these 
positions are sick, take leave, are in training, or otherwise missing from their office, it can 
greatly impact business.  Often, but not always, they have assistants or peers that can take 
up the slack created by their absence.  However, there is danger to the business process 
which can be created by extended or unexpected absences during a major contingency. 
A white paper prepared by IBM looked closely at this “human capital” aspect of 
business continuity.  The paper made the assertion that many organizations will be 
extremely challenged to support employees while simultaneously striving to continue  
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delivering business and operational services.  IBM Global Services identified three 
primary areas in which human capital risks associated with crises can be grouped, as 
shown by the following graphic.   
 
Figure 3.   Human Capital Risks Associated with Crisis Situations69 
 
This graphic from IBM Global Services (and the accompanying discussion below) 
emphasizes that there are at least three critical areas to research when studying human 
capital risks of an organization.  These are: (1) the ability of employees to attend work, 
(2) the ability to deliver critical internal services, and (3) the ability to maintain business 
operations.  Each of these areas has subcategories which highlight the true considerations 
that must be made by an organization which must continue to function during major 
contingencies.    
The first area, which focuses on the ability of employees to get to their place of 
employment, has three impacting subcategories.  One is the health and safety concerns of 
employees.  In many cases, with Hurricane Katrina being the most recent and pervasive 
example, absenteeism will be understandably high while employees focus attention on 
the health and safety of themselves and their families.  Another concern will be 
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transportation of employees who, though they are willing and able to come to work 
during a disaster or contingency may not physically be able to travel.  Outages to public 
transportation, strictly enforced travel restrictions, weather conditions, etc., can greatly 
hamper the ability of even the most enthusiastic and loyal employees to get to work.  A 
final consideration for the health and safety of employees is that some may have 
experienced substantial shock and grief as a result of the contingency or disaster.  
Witnessing the disaster, even second hand via television or print media, can have 
significant effects on morale and psychological stability.  
A second area of concern is ability of employees to deliver critical internal 
services during a contingency.  This ability is severely impacted by the communications 
capability of employees.  During major disasters, electrical power, landline phones, and 
cellular towers can be destroyed or rendered dysfunctional, making it difficult or 
impossible to communicate with employees or share critical information.  Additionally, 
communication often takes the form of collaboration and social networks.  When 
standard voice and video communication systems are impacted, this will reduce close 
coordination of social networks, reducing the ability of people to make rapid decision-
making which is often needed during disaster response and recovery situations.  
Therefore, without “normal” communication channels, maintaining functional 
relationships with stakeholders and supply networks can be difficult, reducing the 
effectiveness of the internal business.  A final internal services concern which must be 
addressed is a functioning payroll.  Having the ability to pay employees in a timely 
manner is critical for ensuring that they are able to meet personal obligations, take care of 
their families, and maintain loyalty with the organization.  Additional payroll capability 
may also be able to provide disaster relief funding (e.g., Coast Guard Mutual Assistance) 
to those severely impacted or experiencing hardship. 
The third focus area for examining the human capital risk related to business 
continuity looks at the ability to maintain business operations in the midst of a 
contingency.  Without an effort to support this segment, the Coast Guard would be only 
“taking care of it’s own” rather than providing those public services which the taxpayers 
trust the Coast Guard will perform in times of emergency.  There are two important areas 
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to look at for maintaining business operations.  The first is the capability to track and 
contact employees.  The Coast Guard expends considerable efforts to obtain, track and 
keep personnel data up to date, including such items as emergency contact information, 
employee IDs, passwords, training/qualifications, etc.  Having this information readily on 
hand when crisis strikes can allow the organization to contact those employees that are 
needed to support operations and determine who is capable of fulfilling certain critical 
roles/functions.  Having a well thought-out succession plan to backfill missing, 
unavailable or incapacitated key positions during or after a disaster is also crucial to 
ensuring a business can support operations.  Without a plan, personnel may be forced to 
fill roles with little or no warning, and more disheartening, with no training.  This 
succession plan should detail how the organization will deal with reductions in workforce 
(i.e., what critical positions MUST be filled and which can remain vacant) and identify 
which skill sets are the most important to ensuring operations are supported. 
A pandemic illness is one example of a contingency that can have substantial and 
prolonged impacts upon the Coast Guard financial management and logistics system, and 
subsequently, can drastically impact the ability of Coast Guard units to conduct 
operations.  Public health officials tend to agree that a pandemic illness in the United 
States is very much on the horizon, more of a matter of ‘when’ than one of ‘if’.  A recent 
report from the Institute of Preventive Strategies indicated that “the consensus among 
health officials is that the occurrence of a flu pandemic during the next few years is 
inevitable…According to a computer simulation study conducted by researchers from 
Virginia Tech, the United States government would need to quarantine infected 
households and ban public gatherings in the event of a pandemic flu outbreak. Schools 
and daycare centers would need to be shut down and offices and factories would need to 
operate at a reduced capacity.”70   
When the country is in the midst of this contingency, it will have far-reaching 
impacts.  A recent GAO report had the following to say: 
                                                 
70 Patti Simpson, “Open Source Daily Brief, 2008-08-13: Pandemic Flu Threat,” Institute for 
Preventive Strategies at the Center for Rural Development, August 13, 2008, 
https://www.preventivestrategies.net/public/news_article.cfm?newsId=5834 (registration required) 
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The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a 
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an 
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family 
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s 
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing 
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In 
addition, our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other 
major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first 
responders, health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise 
unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a 
pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and response 
for such a disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all 
levels of government, the private sector, individuals within the United 
States, as well as international cooperation.71 
It is not difficult to imagine the impacts upon the Coast Guard.  If this should 
happen in a major metropolitan area, as it is expected, the logistics and financial 
management staff will be severely impacted.  If personnel with contracting warrants or 
purchase card authority are unable to work, and plans have not been created to deal with 
such a contingency, operations in the field will certainly suffer. 
The web survey targeting financial management and logistics professionals in the 
Coast Guard found that there appears to be severe preparedness gaps, or a lack of 
information sharing, about how the Coast Guard plans to continue business and mission 
support functions during this inevitable event.  The web survey asked respondents to 
consider a massive pandemic event in the United States (e.g., pandemic influenza, 
smallpox, SARS, etc.) and then asked whether the individuals office or command had 
considered the ramifications of a large portion of the work force not showing up for 
weeks at a time?  Some notable responses include: 
• “If more than 1/2 of the workforce is out, it would be difficult to maintain 
the same level of logistic support.  Cross training should allow for absence 
of up to 50% of staff, at least for a few wks.” 
• “Same as in 1918. Limited capability even among those that can or could 
work.” 
                                                 
71 GAO Report, Preparing for and Responding to Disasters, 24. 
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• “Logistics (& eventually ops) would come to a standstill until unaffected 
units could assume responsibility. Logistics is normally a local activity.” 
• “Broken military vs. civilian members.  In ability to execute funds.  Lack 
of system authorization to approve, create documents, contract and 
transfer funds.” 
• “Not much if the missing folks had the ability to work remotely. If they do 
not, then everything will stop.” 
• “Could have a serious impact.  What if our KO and Credit card holders are 
out?  I suppose you could ignore the rules and order stuff anyway, but we 
could easily have a back fill plan in place.  Why don't we?” 
• “As long as we have strong support from MLC we could manage.” 
• “Increased use of credit cards and violations of policy in order to meet 
operational needs.” 
• “We're a centralized HQ unit.  We could RAS in and process/approve 
procurements through FPD, but it's not clear if our serving KO's would be 
in position to continue the processing -- we assume they have a plan.  We 
probably should engage them and test that plan...” 
• “[T]wo very large contracting shops are located in the DC area, CG-912 
and NPFC.  these shops are critical to executing multiple $100s of 
millions in contracts annually.  loss of these staffs would severely hamper 
operational and administrative functions of the CG.” 
• “This would have a severe impact since all the large contracts are issued 
from MLCA.  With the modernization of the Coast Guard and the loss of 
both complementing MLC’s, this will be extremely difficult in the future.” 
• “Lack of authorized authority.  Delays in obtaining operational support 
and or services.” 
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• “If procurement/contracting personnel were gone for extended periods of 
time, we may not be able to execute all of our operations funds; resulting 
in spend down not being met and more importantly, operational 
requirements could suffer.” 
• “Additional funds managers would need to be identified so that that funds 
certification wouldn't be the bottleneck for procurements.” 
• “At my level, CG-8, if we were out, the CG line units would function... 
centralized cost accounting and liaison with FEMA and other agencies 
would be lost.  However, the void could possibly be filled by any of the 
area staffs.” 
• “Budgeting, accounting, reconciling being done wrong or not at all could 
have an adverse effect on the CFO audit and could ultimately result in 
budget cuts if we aren't able to demonstrate sound financial management 
policies.” 
Given these considerable challenges, what must be done to start preparing the 
organization to be more resilient to the human capital dimensions?  There are many 
options for studying and expanding our organization’s capability to weather the crisis and 
storms, even of magnitudes such as major disasters, terrorist attacks and pandemics.  
Here are a few considerations: 
• Consider the use of network modeling to show the interconnectedness of 
contracting and procurement personnel.  Resilience can be enhanced by a 
network analysis, studying the points within a procurement/contracting 
network where individuals rely upon the information or actions of one or 
just a few people to sustain the network during times of failure.  
• Is it possible or feasible to have an isolated logistics and financial 
management command facility located outside major metropolitan areas?  
The ideal facility would be environmentally quarantined to ensure that the 
members staffing the facility can remain healthy and support operations. 
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• Exercise the capability of critical team members to function from home or 
an alternate work site (i.e., contracting officers, funds managers, 
procurement officials, legal officers, etc.).  Members should have remote 
access capability from the alternate work site in addition to hard copy 
publications and files which may possibly be required if network systems, 
connectivity or electrical power are unavailable. 
• Develop alternate methods to allow users to securely and easily 
collaborate and share information from alternate work sites.  Remote 
Access Servers and the costs to individual units is currently exorbitant and 
prohibitive to ensure that the right personnel have the capability and 
practice when necessary. 
• Ensure the cross training of employees so that a reduced workforce will 
not cripple an organization. 
Review telecommuting policies, practices and organizational culture issues to 
ensure that personnel are experienced in telecommuting.  It would be detrimental and a 
crippling strain on IT staffs for logistics and financial management personnel to first 
attempt telecommuting in the days following a crisis. 
G. TRAINING 
Coast Guard military, civilian, and Auxiliary personnel are bombarded with 
training on a continuous basis.  The training includes professional duties as well as 
general military training requirements and the wide range of training mandated under 
human relations policies.  Additionally, financial management, procurement and 
contracting individuals are placed through additional training and education during the 
course of each year in order to maintain a variety of professional certifications by the 
DHS.    
The web survey of Coast Guard logisticians and financial managers brought out 
an interesting assortment of feedback, with many comments pointing towards the issues 
of training, proficiency, and exercises.  When respondents were asked whether there has 
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been contingency financial/logistical training for operational personnel at the field-level 
(e.g., Executive Officers, Sector Logistics personnel, Supply Shop personnel, etc.) 56% 
said that training was not carried out (14 of 25 respondents).   The respondents were also 
asked to comment on the readiness of field-level personnel to carry out several functions, 
including contingency procurement, logistics, and financial management.  Some of the 
comments included: 
Contingency Logistics: 
• “Not Prepared - the Coast Guard has little understanding of logistics” 
• “Somewhat Prepared - Very little training in ICS or contingency 
management” 
Contingency Procurement: 
• “Not Prepared - Little training is available or enforced.” 
• “Somewhat Prepared - Lack of understanding on credit cards and non-
dedicated accounting lines.” 
• “Prepared - I believe we have a well-trained procurement workforce that 
fully understands acquisition laws and regulations in response to a disaster 
response.” 
• “Well Prepared - Units are capable of efficiently executing procurements 
within their KO warrant authority.” 
Contingency Financial Management: 
• “Not Prepared -We have very limited repertoire of field personnel trained 
to do this, and almost none with experience.” 
• “Somewhat Prepared - Knowledge of financial management policy (rules, 
restrictions, etc.) is not level throughout the CG.  The oil spill community 
(old M) is well experienced with the NPFC [National Pollution Funds 
Center] route but the other side of contingency prep is more ad hoc.” 
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• “Prepared - Most units are capable of efficiently managing their own 
funds, and would have a good idea on how to track CG-wide funding but 
the problem is that there are no set CG standards on how to do it, so it 
would be tracked differently from unit to unit.” 
• “Not Prepared - Even though the information is there not a lot of people 
know about it.” 
• “Somewhat Prepared - I still get a lump in my throat when I see a 
hurricane approach one of my LANT districts.  We still do not have a 
good handoff mechanism so that all districts know what they are required 
to do and when their job ends and mine begins.” 
Those professionals that participated in the web survey were also asked to 
comment on examples of effective readiness and preparation to conduct contingency 
finance/logistics.  Some of the comments which related to training issues included: 
• “Since 9/11 & Katrina, there has been a significant increase in training and 
exercises designed specifically to increase readiness in these areas.  The 
ICS 351 course is well suited to help logistics and finance personnel 
prepare for these contingencies.  SONS [Spill of National Significance] 
and other similar exercises help keep skills sharp.” 
• “[C]onducting ICS training and setting up IMTs.” 
• “There is training available (i.e., ICS 351 course) for response finance & 
logistics but not a lot of people have had the course and not a lot of people 
get to practice it before an incident occurs.  There are plans and 
procedures in place, exercises/drills and working relationships w/Fed, 
State, Local partners that help us work thru things when the need arises.  
But as the people change often those relationships change and the way we 
respond changes.” 
 Similar but opposite to the previous question, survey participants were asked to 
comment on examples of a lack of readiness that they have experienced or witnessed 
when dealing with contingency logistics in the field.  Comments of note included: 
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• “No enforced training path, no professional logistics corps, few effective 
ICS courses dealing with logistics.” 
• “[We]  can't exercise/drill every scenario.  Even if we could, there just isn't 
enough time to commit to them.  There are few "professional planners" or 
trainers dedicated to properly developing exercises or providing training.  
Right now, it's on the unit, which are usually JO's [junior officers] who 
don't have any planning/exercise design experience and it takes 90% of 
their time.  Even with the new Exercise Support Teams & contractors the 
unit is still dedicating someone full time to planning/coordinating training 
& exercises.  That's hard when the planning staff only has 3 people and the 
JO has no formal training.” 
Respondents were then asked directly if training for financial managers and 
supply personnel at the field level regarding contingencies is adequate.  Notable 
responses included: 
• “No, we just get ICS training, which is not CG specific.” 
• “Yes for routine disasters.  [F]or an event described above, training has 
been insufficient.” 
• “No.  The financial management program doesn't even know what the ICS 
financial and logistical requirements really are.”  
• “No absolutely not. Additionally, what training?”  
• “No.  Not enough ICS-351 classes are offered.  ICS-351 is too much info 
in too short a time.  No CG LSC or FSC training. No CG Unit Leader 
training. Training received is not used in unit exercises.  SKs 
[Storekeepers: financial/supply/procurement personnel] do not receive any 
ICS training in "A" school, nor is it a practical factor for promotion.” 
• “Not ideal... it's ad hoc or irregular.  ICS training goes in fits and starts 
(from what I recall). However, even if training was more standardized and 
regular there is a problem with time availability and competing demands.” 
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• “No I believe more training can be provided in determining and 
documenting sources for various needs.  This information could be 
compiled and updated frequently that would aid in a quicker response.” 
• “There is not much reimbursement financial management, since there is 
no clear CG-wide guidance. Units do have decent understanding of 
logistics and could improve through training.” 
• “No - our financial experts should be the Storekeepers and Warrant 
Officers (in addition to civilian personnel / ie. COCOs).  Storekeepers are 
not trained to be financial managers, they are trained to procure w/credit 
cards and reconcile.  Look at HQ, how many Storekeepers and/or 
Warrant's are assigned to CG-8 (none!)?  The CG needs to start 
developing the Storekeepers into financial managers - the experts.” 
• “For cost documentation under an ICS environment, probably.  Real life 
scenario that affects a certain region, probably not.” 
I was also curious what the professional financial managers and logisticians 
thought were the strongest areas of training for field personnel?  Here’s some of what 
they had to say: 
• “ICS Logistics/Finance Section Chief course is very good.” 
• “ICS 300, 320, etc.” 
• “Contracting, purchase card, ICS” 
• “ICS framework, basic budget authority” 
• We (CG-5332, NPFC, Yorktown) now have a C school, ICS-351 to teach 
the basics of logistics in the ICS world, but it does not cover financial 
management in detail, and it's limited in scope.  An ICS-451 is in the 
works.  I don't believe everyone that needs the training (this training or 
any other) is getting it.  Again, the pollution response world has a pretty 
good model for cost documentation and financial accounting with respect 
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to pollution contingency response, that model should inform other ESF's 
and OE/Supplemental processes.” 
• “There is no formal training program in place for CONTINGENCY 
finance/logistics other than OTJ [on-the-job] and what PO's [petty 
officers] would receive in school.  the ICS 351 course is one of those 
course that's not mandated and people only get to if someone knows about 
it and the command is willing to let them go for a week.” 
• “All senior officers are exposed to a little training (ie. Sector 
Commanders) wrt [with regard to] financial policy/procedures over their 
career, but frankly, you learn it via OJT [on-the-job-training].  All CO's 
have to rely on their financial staffs (ie. logistics) and expect they have the 
training to respond effectively.  I think our senior E7's and above have had 
the training, but not really confident in everyone's ability.” 
What are the weakest areas of training? 
• “When we have exercises, we usually don't include logistics in the drill.  
We expect operations to drive our logistics training instead of having our 
training stand alone.” 
• “[t]he lack of contingency training at all levels. For instance, my CDR & 
CWO would probably do ok but the other SK's wouldn't have the first 
clue...and those are the folks we need to help us out in times of disaster 
response since the CDR & CWO would be doing more command/general 
staff management level things.” 
A final question was posed to respondents, asking them what areas of training are 
most in need for logistical preparedness.  The items commented on could easily form the 
basis, or at least the starting point for discussion, for building a syllabus for contingency 
training.  Here are the areas that our professional logisticians and financial managers 
thought would add value to our contingency readiness: 
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• “[I]dentifying available resources (Air and sea ports, rail, tug and barge 
services, alternate fuel sources.) 
• “Exercises and CG specific contingency processes.  Cost Documentation 
is also critical and tracking pre-scripted mission assignments for FEMA 
tasking.” 
• “Training on COOP [Continuity of Operations] procedures” 
• “Developing robust Comms Plans” 
• “Actually filling out Financial/Logistics ICS paperwork” 
• “Supplies and replacement platforms to work in a contaminated 
environment.” 
• “How to contract, establish MIPRs, IAGs & other reimbursables in the 
heat of battle.” 
• “Interagency agreements, other sources of supply, etc. Logistics Factor 
Files associated with Logistics Estimates.” 
• “LSC; Comms Unit Leader, Supply Unit Leader (in order of priority) SK 
"A" school” 
• “FM process... accounting line, cost centers, etc, and how to implement, 
request.” 
• “A career path for officers in logistics and finance.  If the CG wants 
experts on this they are going to have to allow folks to become experts 
instead of officers surviving billets they do not have training to fill.” 
• “Integration with DoD to include Joint Operations, Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES), Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS), and all of the systems that the Coast Guard should be using but 
are not.” 
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In addition to the many comments from respondents in the survey regarding 
training, feedback was also considered from the Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned 
compiled by Maintenance & Logistics Command, Atlantic (MLCA).  The report 
indicated: 
Many personnel involved in Hurricane KATRINA response efforts lacked 
sufficient ICS training & qualifications and/or had limited experience 
working a contingency response within an ICS construct… Positions 
should be filled by individual experience and not rank… ICS proficiency 
must be a core competency for all Coast Guard personnel (AD, Reserves, 
Civilians, and Auxiliary)… The population of "personnel potentially 
involved in response to incidents" should be very expansive and the CG 
should endeavor to a large resource pool of personnel possessing advanced 
ICS coursework (i.e., ICS 300 and position specific courses).72 
While I hesitate to suggest that even more training is required, it is clear that we 
are not adequately training, and just as importantly, exercising our financial management 
and logistics personnel for the rare but catastrophic events which they may become 
involved in.  I advocate that we need to reconfigure and effectively market the value and 
importance of training for Coast Guard planners, logisticians and procurement/supply 
personnel at all levels. 
1. Training & Education 
More training is not the panacea for correcting the real or perceived shortfalls in 
our financial management and logistics infrastructure.  Time and again individuals have 
commented that lessons learned in class rarely prepare you effectively for an event that 
could be a year or two away.  I can attest to this myself, having completed the ICS-351 
Finance/Admin course just nine months ago.  Today, I would be hard-pressed to put most 
of those skills to use immediately without spending considerable time in refresher.  This 
is not the fault of the instructors; they were top-notch and were professionally and  
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personally invested in seeing each person in the course succeed.   Four other factors 
impinge on our ability to retain intensive course-work such as this: time, breadth, other 
duties, and incentives.   
The first factor which can have detrimental effects on learning retention is the 
time between training for a contingency and the actual event.  Studies have shown that 
the more time that passes between first learning course material and then putting the 
course material to use, the less likely the student will be to have retained the knowledge.  
For the Coast Guard, this can have serious consequences, as we are now providing the 
majority of introductory ICS training during boot camp and “A” schools which are 
attended by our junior personnel.  As personnel advance, they have opportunities to 
attend more intensive and focused ICS training (e.g., ICS-351) but not every member 
responding to an incident is likely to have undergone this more advanced training.  For 
those that do not, they are becoming farther removed from ICS knowledge, skills and 
practice.  Therefore, an initial incident staff at the local level may have very few Coast 
Guard junior personnel who understand the ICS construct, and even fewer junior (and 
senior personnel) who are specialized enough in their contingency education and training 
that they will have the proper skills immediately at their fingertip to put contingency 
financial management and logistics skills into effect.  This makes the use of Incident 
Management Assist Teams (IMATs) as well as reliefs by more experienced personnel 
critical as soon as the opportunity presents itself.   
Another factor which can impact training retention is breadth of the training 
provided.  Few would argue that most courses within the Coast Guard, and likely those 
outside, attempt to teach too much material into a very short amount of time, spending 
less time working on skills or discussing lessons learned from others.  ICS courses, as 
well as those that cover financial management and logistics in particular are no different.  
Understandably, it is nearly impossible to cover every possible contingency within the 
span of a one-week or two-week course; much will still be left to learn while on the job.  
However, there are also many instances where on the job responsibilities have very little 
relevance to duties which may be assigned during contingency evolutions.  This constant 
attention to other responsibilities is the third interference to training retention; there is not 
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enough time during the work-day to expect to complete assigned duties in already under-
manned offices while also committing individuals to additional training.  When 
individuals are asked to choose between fighting “the battles of today” versus training for 
an event which may never take place, they often choose the former and accomplish more 
work that has immediate relevance.   
A final factor which may influence the level of retention of training material is a 
lack of incentive to review and build upon what has been learned.  Unless mandated, as 
much of the initial ICS training was, very few individuals see the relevance of ICS 
training, and thus, few are inclined to stay current on their skills.  The participation in 
ICS training is not a contributing selection mechanism for most jobs and billets, it is seen 
throughout much of the organization as a hurdle to be overcome and then forgotten about.  
Is the ICS training curriculum irrelevant or a non-value-added activity in the Coast 
Guard?  Certainly not.  Why then is there such a shortage of specialized ICS 
professionals and why is there a lack of enthusiasm about participating in cross-agency 
exercises?  We will get to those answers shortly. 
2. Exercises 
Before moving on to discuss efforts which can be made to remedy a few of these 
potential shortfalls, it is helpful to consider how well financial management and logistics 
personnel are integrated into contingency exercises.   
• Once again, there is significant value-added in obtaining the “ground 
truth” from those professionals on the front lines of contingency logistics 
and finance.  When asked about examples that demonstrate a lack of 
readiness to conduct contingency financial management, some comments 
from respondents to the web survey included: 
• “We rarely leverage the many required exercises for oil spills, port 
security, natural disasters to validate the processes and readiness for 
Logistics and Finance.” 
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• “In real life we make it work, that's the CG way.  Look to the after action 
reports from things like the SONS07 [Spill of National Significance] 
exercise.  These exercises typically either don't address financial/logistical 
requirements, or if they write them in, they end up ‘pretending’ the hard 
parts away, because the exercise administrators are mostly operators not 
familiar with how the logistics part that supports them really happens.” 
Other shortfalls in exercise participation, or logistics/finance-focused exercises, 
appeared when respondents were asked: when considering field level logistics and supply 
personnel, what are the weakest areas of training?  Noteworthy comments included: 
• “When we have exercises, we usually don't include logistics in the drill.  
We expect operations to drive our logistics training instead of having our 
training stand alone.” 
• “Not enough opportunities to exercise and validate.” 
• “Not enough people have advance ICS training; specifically position 
specific training.  We don't exercise our plans well enough and often 
enough.” 
3. Recommendations to Improve Training, Learning Retention and 
Exercise Participation 
The Coast Guard should act quickly to improve training methods to emphasize 
learning retention and accessibility.  To effect this change, we need to understand how 
the training, and the value of that training, is being marketed to our personnel.  And 
second, we need to consider alternative methods of bringing information and 
participation to personnel in the field. 
The first step in this process is to encourage and inspire our personnel, especially 
those fulfilling behind-the-scenes roles in finance, supply and logistics.  Understandably, 
these duties which are crucially important to response and recovery operations are often 
downplayed in favor of the scene-stealing rescue videos.  Leaders need to pay close 
attention to those duties and responsibilities which, though less glamorous, are keys to 
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successful mission accomplishment.  When these individuals gain recognition from the 
operators they support, they may begin to realize that the difficult work they complete 
adds value and needs to be constantly honed.  These individuals will likely be more 
inclined to learn about their duties and put additional emphasis on their own development 
– to further support the team and the mission. 
Other efforts to reinforce the importance and impacts of ICS training can be 
achieved by using lessons learned, studying recent contingencies and events, and then 
reinforcing successes and challenges in the logistics and financial management 
communities.  This achieves two aims: markets the importance of ICS and the 
finance/logistics communities while it also reviews the materials and events of the 
logistics/finance processes within the ICS structure. 
Another consideration for improving the effectiveness and retention of training 
and exercises, especially with a long-term perspective, is to provide additional 
mechanisms and systems for the individuals within our community to learn, discuss, 
argue, recommend, and debate on contingency issues.  I advocate the development, 
implementation and sustained usage of a web-based system that provides coursework, 
learning and discussion forums, exercises, lessons learned database, quizzes (with 
monthly prizes for high scores) and contingency response themed-wikis to support the 
continued development within contingency financial management and logistics.  One 
possible outlet for this, among likely many other alternatives, is the Moodle Course 
Management System.73  This system provides many of the features mentioned above, is 
open source and customizable, and could be supported within the Coast Guard 
infrastructure.  A few commands within the Coast Guard already use or have 
experimented with Moodle (e.g., Maintenance & Logistics Command, Atlantic, training 
and education staff). 
An implementation of Moodle is not cost-free, however.  Building, web-hosting, 
maintaining (debugging) and managing content on the system would likely require at 
least one full-time position.  This individual, either contracted or a GS-employee could 
                                                 
73 Moodle Course Management System web-site is available at http://moodle.com/ (accessed August 
19, 2008). 
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become certified and would need to be versed in project management and have a working 
understanding of the requirements of the end-users (i.e., financial management and 
logistics professionals).   
 A final consideration for improving the long-term effectiveness and retention of 
training and skills related to contingency financial management is to make it a measured 
factor on performance evaluations and advancement examinations.  Enlisted and officer 
performance evaluations could include behavioral dimensions aimed at improving 
contingency study, professional competence in ICS-related functions or, at the highest 
level of performance, personnel would demonstrate participation on ICS exercises or 
actual contingencies. 
This chapter summarized several of the critical areas, within the Coast Guard 
financial and logistics communities, that need to be emphasized, researched and 
reinforced in the very near future to ensure they are prepared when disaster strikes.   
These included: 
• Establishing improved financial management and logistics policies for 
operators and field personnel to understand the importance of cost tracking 
and how these personnel can immediately take procurement and 
contracting actions in compliance with law. 
• Modifying the accounting line and financial systems readiness to track 
costs 
• Understanding geographic-specific requirements and internal knowledge 
and develop a plan to share this knowledge and collaboration efforts with 
other units and agencies.  (also involved are the logistics associated with 
specific unit Pre-scripted Mission Assignments)  
• Building resilience in contracting and contingency procurement (this 
involves Advanced Readiness Contracting and a discussion of the “human 
aspects” of business continuity planning. 
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• Reconfiguring and effectively market the training for Coast Guard 
planners, logisticians and procurement/supply personnel at all levels.  
The following chapter will discuss more fully how we can improve the 
geographic-specific requirements of logistics planning and how to implement a process to 
develop and foster collaboration. 
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V. FORMING AND ESTABLISHING GEOGRAPHICALLY-
SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY LOGISTICS PLANNING GROUPS 
A. CONTINGENCY RESPONSE & PREPAREDNESS 
The Coast Guard faced one of its biggest challenges in its 218-year history when 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the northern Gulf of Mexico in the late days of 
August 2005.  The Gulf Coast is well-versed in hurricane readiness and carefully watches 
each storm system as they meander east to west, feeding off the warm waters of the mid-
Atlantic, Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.  The Coast Guard, like many organizations 
carries out preparedness plans in advance of hurricane season and ensures that they have 
the commonly needed supplies and stockpiles (water, generators, fuel, etc.) to quickly 
respond and recover from a storm.  Quickly overcoming any damage and getting back to 
the important business of ensuring the safety of citizens are primary concerns.  What 
made Hurricane Katrina unique in history was not only the sheer ferocity and size of the 
storm, but also the damage and cascading infrastructure (and governmental) failures that 
resulted.  Over the next several days, the Coast Guard, along with other first responders 
and Good Samaritans, led vast and heroic rescue efforts, saving tens of thousands of 
people from hunger, dehydration and threat of disease.  But, was the Coast Guard 
adequately prepared for this task?  Were federal, state, local and private partners as 
equally prepared?  Could more emphasis placed on preparedness have reduced the 2,500 
casualties which Hurricane Katrina left behind?  Are we (i.e., the Coast Guard and our 
partners at all levels) making the proper changes today to reduce the loss of life for the 
storms, disasters and nefarious terrorism attacks of the future?  In this chapter, we will 
look at those questions and propose a plan to aid in the efforts at collaborative logistical 
planning for contingency preparedness. 
The last chapter characterized the dangerous position our lack of deliberate 
planning for logistics has created: geographical high-threat areas (e.g., New York, 
Boston, Los Angeles/Long Beach, Miami, Galveston, etc.) could become subject to 
lapses in contingency preparedness as a result of logistical shortcomings.  Also 
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introduced in that chapter was a recommended action for the Coast Guard, and other 
interagency partners, to initiate efforts at contingency planning for logistics at the local 
and regional level, based on the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (NPG).  This chapter discusses this recommendation in more 
detail and provides a standardized method for starting this planning process as it should 
be applied to logistics. 
Contingency response and preparedness is rarely a single-agency responsibility.  
Typically dozens or agencies respond to an incident and must cooperate, operationally 
and logistically, to overcome the challenges.  Unity of effort is critical to an organized 
response, but this can be difficult to achieve with organizations that operate 99.9% of the 
time in isolation from other potential partners.  For the many contingencies that take 
place on a relatively small scale, it may be acceptable to form ad hoc partnerships after 
the event has occurred.  For instance, planning for response to a downed private aircraft, 
in areas not populated with airfields or tourists, may not necessitate extensive pre-
planning or multi-agency collaboration.  On the other hand, the threat of major 
contingencies in other areas of the country (e.g., New York, Washington DC, Seattle, 
Miami, etc.) cries out for the development of interagency partnerships well in advance of 
an event. 
The Coast Guard and other partners have not been adequately aggressive at 
developing these interagency partnerships, even in the immediate wake of disasters such 
as Hurricane Katrina, which should have served as a clarion call to additional planning at 
all levels.  The Coast Guard Maintenance & Logistics Command (MLC), Atlantic, played 
a decisive role in supporting Hurricane Katrina response and relief efforts by providing a 
variety of critical support teams (financial/contracting, communications, medical, legal, 
environmental, etc.) either directly to the New Orleans area, to the Relocation Center in 
St. Louis, or remotely from Norfolk, Virginia.  Following the extensive response and 
recovery, MLC created a detailed Lessons Learned resource which focused on a number 
of effective and ineffective issues which arose during the contingency.  The document 
provides important insight to this research project and, in fact, devotes several sections to 
the need to develop additional planning and preparedness groups for logistics efforts.  
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The opening “General Event Comments” from the Lessons Learned immediately speaks 
to the need for this collaborative planning effort.  The report stated that74 
[c]lose working relationships should be forged among organizations 
BEFORE events such as H-KATRINA necessitates coordination of effort 
between responding agencies. Partnerships need to be pre-existing and 
then continually fostered as agencies work through operations… On the 
logistics front, many federal agencies operated pretty much independently 
from one another and often times there appeared to be a race to obtain 
some critical support resources among federal partners. There should be a 
logistics cell established in PFO/JTF [Principal Federal Official/Joint Task 
Force] type organizations that is accessible to all partners to de-conflict 
some of these resources issues in the future…Related to this is the need to 
guard against any kind of turf protection. Some agencies can deliver 
various services better and more efficiently than others; the PFO should be 
able take advantage of these inherent agency capabilities.  For example, 
field level contracting, establishing network connectivity, medical 
services, and legal support are all areas the CG excels in. It should be 
determined / established which agency has the best capability in all service 
categories and leverage them…There needs to be a focus on pre-planning 
and emphasis on exercising – ensuring roles and responsibilities are 
clearly defined. 
The interagency and collaborative planning mentioned in this Lesson Learned is 
at the heart of the NRF and NPG purpose and aims at some of the important planning 
capabilities that we must seek to develop within the Coast Guard.  This is not a new 
principle or recommendation, it has been mentioned a number of times in different after-
action reports and Lessons Learned, but it is one that seemingly falls short of receiving 
full attention.  A Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI Hurricane 
Preparedness Tabletop Exercise (TTX) was conducted in May 2006 with representatives 
from federal, state, and local governments as well as the private sector in New Orleans, 





                                                 
74 U.S. Coast Guard, “Hurricane KATRINA Response – Maintenance & Logistics Command Atlantic 
(FOUO)” in CGSails, section titled “General Event Comments.” 
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hurricane that made landfall directly over New Orleans on the Louisiana coast.   The 
Lessons Learned from that exercise revealed the following insightful, but now well-worn 
refrain:75 
Exercise participants identified various planning and response issues and 
proposed recommendations to improve the region’s emergency 
preparedness. A key objective for federal, state, and local officials during 
the TTX was to assess their ability to communicate and work with the 
private sector.  Participants discussed the requests from governmental 
agencies to the private sector for information and resources following a 
disaster. Private sector participants observed that duplicate requests from 
different federal, state, and local agencies hindered their ability to 
contribute to response and recovery operations in past disasters such as 
Hurricane Katrina.  Each duplicate request requires a separate response 
from private sector personnel, leaving fewer resources available to restore 
vital services and business operations. In order to limit duplicate requests, 
participants concluded that government agencies should first coordinate 
their respective requests to the private sector. The exercise after-action 
report recommended working through a federal, state, or local command 
center to coordinate these requests. 
Christine Wormuth, a Senior Fellow with the Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, International Security Program, wrote a similar recommendation to DHS 
following Katrina.  She wrote,76 
DHS, working closely with the interagency, should coordinate a baseline 
survey of federal capabilities and maintain a database of federal 
capabilities as part of the national preparedness system… At the same 
time as it works to identify needed requirements and to target capability 
levels for those requirements, DHS should lead an interagency effort to 
survey existing federal capabilities that could be used to respond to a 
catastrophic event. This initiative to establish baselines would enable the 
federal government to assess potential capability gaps as well as overlaps 
in agencies’ target capability levels, thereby providing a sense of the 
current readiness of federal capabilities. 
                                                 
75 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VI 
Hurricane Preparedness Tabletop Exercise, 17-18 May 2006, After-Action Report,” June 20, 2006, 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=18700 (registration required) (accessed 
June 19, 2007), 35. 
76 Christine E. Wormuth, “Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe,” Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC: June 2008, 11. 
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If people within and outside the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland 
Security are seeing the need for this level of collaboration and federal agency leadership, 
why has it not evolved or been thrust to attention?  An answer to that question is not 
readily available.  One can assume that the ever-growing “urgency of the moment” 
continues to push these forward-leaning recommendations to a back-burner position until 
they become recommendations again following the next catastrophic event.  The Coast 
Guard must not fall into that morass but continue to be on the leading edge of change, 
innovation and emergency preparedness. 
B. WHAT IS PLANNING TO THE WORLD OF CONTINGENCY 
LOGISTICS? 
Within the NPG, planning is described as “a methodical way to think through the 
entire life-cycle of a potential crisis. Good planning repays the investment of time and 
effort in development and rehearsal by shortening the time required to gain control over 
an incident and by providing favorable conditions for rapid and effective exchange of 
information about a situation, its analysis, and alternative responses.”77 
Rather than attempt to devise and create yet another methodology of 
preparedness, I advocate that we need to adhere to, promote, employ and strengthen the 
existing preparedness and planning models that exist within DHS.  The National 
Preparedness Guidelines (NPG) provides an overarching methodology which, if adjusted 
properly as detailed below, can be used to enhance logistical preparedness.  According to 
the NPG, preparedness can be viewed as a continuous cycle which includes the following 
steps:78 
• Plan 
• Organize and Staff 
• Equip 
                                                 
77 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, September 2007), 20. 
78 Ibid., 3. 
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• Train 
• Exercise, Evaluate, and Improve 
The cycle is seemingly self-explanatory, but for our purposes, keep in mind that 
this generic process is a macro-level methodology, predominantly aimed at the 
operational planning level.  As noted repeatedly by survey respondents, the Coast Guard 
culture tends to employ planning in multiple forums, but rarely fully engages the logistics 
and financial management professionals.  For our logistics planners, the aim should be to 
pull the plans from the operational cycle above, and use that as entering arguments 
(among others) for determining logistical capability to meet the needs of operations.  
Even if these personnel are to merely sit back and take notes, the support communities 
can gain substantially by taking back operational plans for vetting within resources and 
logistics channels and for attempting to “cost out” the various plans under discussion.   
A more thorough example of a planning system which meets the needs of 
logisticians is the capabilities-based planning system firmly embedded with the NPG.  
This system relies on studying a series of pre-formatted disaster/attack scenarios, 
understanding the tasks involved in each agency’s response, and then developing “target 
capabilities” and outcomes that allow the agency to effectively respond to the threat.     
 
Figure 4.   Capabilities-Based Planning Process79 
 
This process has a number of important benefits.  As discussed in the NPG, 
“Capabilities-Based Preparedness encourages flexibility and requires collaboration. More 
importantly, it helps to ensure that operations planners and program managers across the 
                                                 
79 Capabilities-Based Planning, from “Strengthening National Preparedness: Capabilities-Based 
Planning” Fact Sheet, DHS, p1. 
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nation can use common tools and processes when making planning, training, equipment, 
and other investments, and can produce measurable results.”80 
The scenarios which make the up the National Planning Scenarios include:81 
1. Nuclear Detonation 
2. Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax 
3. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza 
4. Biological Attack – Plague 
5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent 
6. Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
7. Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent 
8. Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion 
9. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake 
10. Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane 
11. Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices 
12. Explosive Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices 
13. Biological Attack – Food Contamination 
14. Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease 
15. Cyber Attack 
Ideally, how each agency intends and plans to respond to these theoretical but 
highly-detailed scenarios will be discussed in a collaborative environment at the local and 
regional level.  We will discuss the mechanics of this collaborative effort later.  In the 
mean time, this is how the capabilities-based planning and preparedness system appears 
graphically: 
                                                 
80 National Preparedness Guidelines, 10. 
81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, Version 21.3, (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006), i. 
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Figure 5.   Capabilities-Based Preparedness Process82 
 
The NPG describes the individual steps of this system in detail to show that a 
“capability” can be achieved by focusing on the development and combination of 
“elements of capability” such as planning, organization and leadership, personnel, 
equipment and systems, training, and exercises.  Ideally, individual organizations and 
partnerships of organizations, are to focus on developing certain “capabilities” from a 
prescribed list that achieves a particular outcome.  In reality, few agencies are moving 
forward with carrying out this capabilities-based planning, and even fewer are integrating 
financial management and logistical planners into the sequence. 
More often than not, for a local or regional area to succeed in the midst of a crisis 
or contingency there must be cooperation and partnerships with multiple response and 
support agencies.  As mentioned briefly earlier, these relationships can be ad hoc and 
developed quickly in response to a contingency, or they can be discussed in detail and an 
effective response plan generated well in advance of any crisis.  It is likely that the 
majority of response strategies fall somewhere between these two extremes with some 
level of familiarization and weak collaboration between organizations. 
                                                 
82 National Preparedness Guidelines, Figure B-2, 33. 
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C. CONTINGENCY LOGISTICS PLANNING GROUP (CLPG) 
1. Membership for an Engaged Partnership 
To take full advantage of the capability-based planning process, local and regional 
areas need to employ the high tenets of collaboration and partnership with participation in 
a construct I have identified as a Contingency Logistics Planning Group (CLPG).  In the 
spirit of capabilities-based planning, the CLPG will be a standing group in local and 
regional areas with the intent purpose to identify, via collaboration, the resource and 
logistics priorities and capabilities of an area in order to prepare, respond and recover 
from major contingencies.  The members of the CLPG should be the lead financial and 
logistical planners and professionals from local, state, federal, non-profit and private 
agencies that may be involved, or play a supporting role, during any of the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios.  In addition to these members, it is essential to involve operational 
planners or strategists that would be responsible for enacting response plans based on the 
planning scenarios.  These individuals will lend the operational intent to discussion 
scenarios whereas the financial managers and logisticians will develop the logistical 
response and priority networks.  The NRF calls this type of arrangement an “Engaged 
Partnership”.  The NRF goes on to say that "[l]eaders at all levels must communicate and 
actively support engaged partnerships by developing shared goals and aligning 
capabilities so that no one is overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually 
supporting capabilities at Federal, State, tribal, and local levels allow for planning 
together in times of calm and responding together effectively in times of need."83  Some 
concepts for developing and fostering this partnership will now be discussed, however, 
do not get mired in the “group dynamic” details.  Instead, bear in mind that it is the 
concept of the collaborative partnership which must be the focus of the implementation. 
                                                 
83 National Response Framework, 9. 
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2. Planning Groups Meeting Dynamics 
CLPG meetings should be held at regular intervals in consistent locations.  If 
facilities are available, the ideal meeting location would be at Emergency Operations 
Centers (EOCs), Joint Field Offices (JFOs) or other locations where planning materials 
and infrastructure is available to facilitate a meeting.  Depending on the geographic area 
and the number of plausible scenarios, the number of potential participants can become 
large.  The space should be large enough to accommodate not only the critical players, 
but also others that may wish to observe but not participate.  
The initial CLPG meetings should be formative in nature, by which the group will 
still be determining who is present and developing group norms.  For the first several 
sessions, the focus should be on building an understanding of the group members, with 
each group detailing their responsibilities, resources, funding mechanisms and 
organizational structure.  Many critical functions take place at these types of collective 
planning meetings and require an array of responsibilities that the group will have to 
designate, including recorders, group meeting planners, communication methods and 
protocols, group facilitation, etc.  In addition, there are a vast array of books and 
instructional materials on effective group interaction and group decision methods.84  I 
will not belabor the discussion more than to say that the group must develop a method for 
group interaction which allows each organization, regardless of size or assets, to 
contribute to the logistical planning process.  It is very likely that even the smallest 
organization has a niche in which it excels and can serve as a force-multiplier in 
particular scenarios. 
The CLPG must then devote a meeting or two towards determining which 
potential scenarios, of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, realistically exist in the 
geographic area which the group represents.  For instance, cities like San Francisco must 
contend with the majority of the planning scenarios but may choose to not devote time 
                                                 
84 One example includes John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Profit 
Organizations, 3rd edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 297-316, which focuses on the strategic 
planning and decision processes. 
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and effort towards planning for a major hurricane.  Similarly, the logistical planning 
group in Miami may choose to devote vastly more time towards considering the agency 
responses to a major hurricane, but devote very little time the logistics of earthquake 
response.  As the group meets and convenes, it may also become apparent that there are 
plausible scenarios of major contingencies which are not covered by the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios.  The 15 scenarios should certainly not be limiting; collaborative 
bodies of operational, logistics and support groups should also devote time to 
brainstorming other scenarios which may exist in their respective areas, and then develop 
pertinent scenarios to explore the response.  One example which is readily available is 
wildfires.  There is no scenario within the National Planning Scenarios which discusses 
wildfires yet for several years, portions of California have been involved in major 
contingency responses of national disaster scope.  For planning groups within California 
or other areas affected by the possibility of wildfire, this should be on their list. 
3. CLPG Interaction with National Planning Scenarios 
Once the groups are able to determine the plausible scenarios which must be fully 
investigated, they can use the guidance and explanation of the scenarios from within the 
NPG as starting points for discussion.  At this point, the group should have an 
understanding of the scenarios and understand which agencies will have significant 
bearing on the particular contingency.  These agencies which are responsible for 
overseeing the response should present their operational plan and then be followed by 
each other agency with a role to play.  Operational plans can, and certainly should when 
available, include descriptions of the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) which they 
will be called upon to perform as well as the Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) 
which discuss specific asset and resource requirements to be met. 
As agencies are discussing their plans to the group, there must be documentation 
being kept which makes an effort to summarize, and where possible, prioritize, the 
resource requirements of the theoretical disaster response.  Only by understanding what 
types of resources will be required and at what time and to which agency will the group 
begin to have a full understanding of where shortfalls may occur.   The CLPG should also 
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look to build and share logistical feedback, from their jurisdiction and others, concerning 
the challenges and successes of resource acquisition.  For instance, the Lessons Learned 
from the leading Coast Guard support commands identified several of these issues during 
the Hurricane Katrina response which would be shared in a collaborative forum with 
other agencies via the CLPG: 
Typical initial concerns were bottled water, MREs, lodging (hotels, 
apartments, other commercial sources, RVs, trailers), shower-laundry-
toilet facilities, fuel (gasoline, diesel, AVGAS), fresh water & sewage 
support for cutters (i.e., barges), safety gear/PPE for responders (general 
and area/response specific), uniforms (replacements) for responders from 
impact zone, spare & replacement parts. As operations continued and 
matured; equipment maintenance & repair requirements became a focal 
point of support effort, as well as a more longer term focus on personnel 
support, both for responders and displaced workers to include such as 
issues establishing messing / field kitchen operations and erecting 
temporary work spaces such as modular office trailers… Pre-existing 
Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) and extension / expansion of existing 
service contracts can provide readily available sources of supply for a 
wide range of disaster response requirements. Similarly, utilization of 
Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) can significantly streamline 
service delivery timelines. IDIQs are particularly beneficial for the repair 
and renovation of damaged facilities and shore plant infrastructure… 
Supply lines should be robustly established up front; attempt to overstock / 
oversupply initially. It’s better to have to cut back and withdraw resources 
than have to wait on critical resource requirements.85 
As agencies within the CLPG continue to fully explain the logistics of their 
response plans, one of the most significant challenges that would be evident to CLPG 
participants is the interdependency and potential conflicts which can arise when looking 
at shared and common resources.  As a basic example, if you consider a major disaster, in 
this case consider a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb) detonated in the 
Port of Miami.  An event of this magnitude will have considerable response actions by 
many interagency partners including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Security Administration, the Transportation 
Security Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of 
                                                 
85 U.S. Coast Guard, “Hurricane KATRINA Response – Maintenance & Logistics Command Atlantic 
(FOUO)” in the CGSails, section titled “General Logistics & Support Considerations Comments.” 
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Investigations, the Coast Guard, Florida State investigative agencies, many non-
governmental organizations and watch-dog groups as well as dozens of relief agencies to 
care for the sick and wounded.  As all these agencies pour into the city (outside the 
danger zone of course), there will be a demand for many resources to support the 
investigative, response and recovery operations, but also resources merely to maintain the 
thousands of responders.  Hotels, rental transportation, food, communications providers, 
and other basic necessities of operation will become heavily taxed.  The operational and 
strategic planners need to clearly have in mind which outcomes take priority in this type 
of situation (e.g., care for the wounded, investigate the scene, restore city services, etc.).  
The CLPG must be able to take the desired outcome and work backwards to determine 
issues such as: 
• Which agencies receive priority for resources which are constrained? 
• What is the logical infrastructure solution to managing this large influx of 
responders (i.e., where do you berth them, how shall they be fed, what city 
services should be focused on providing support to responders)? 
• What logistical concerns must be ordered immediately from outside the 
general area (i.e., what are the necessary items which must immediately 
begin transit into the area and where are the items located?  A RDD 
scenario may call for housing for tens of thousands of people outside the 
danger zone as well as bringing in medical supplies to treat victims of 
radiation poisoning.  The supply train into the affected area needs to be 
optimized to ensure urgent items receive priority. 
• Are there economic considerations which need to be addressed?  Is there 
legitimate commercial shipping traffic which needs to be rerouted?  Will 
rerouting particular traffic cause any cascading infrastructure problems 
(e.g., shipping was bringing in raw materials for critical infrastructure)? 
Many more questions such as these will be developed and handed-off to working 
groups to come up with potential solutions.  As the CLPG begins to see the multitude of 
issues and questions come into play, they will likely feel somewhat overwhelmed by the 
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complexity of the response and recovery requirements.  However, as problems are solved 
and plans developed, there will likely be an improved sense of accomplishment and 
preparedness for the community and the nation.   
As mentioned earlier, it will be an important tool to build collaborative lists of 
available and required resources needed by agencies to fulfill their obligations and 
assignments for the various contingencies (i.e., ESF assignments, Universal Task List 
resource requirements, etc.).  These lists of logistical and resource requirements should 
be tabulated and organized to support a variety of functions.  For instance, by building 
total lists of resources for various contingencies, it would be fairly simple to build 
decision support systems capable of supporting the needs of contingency financial 
managers.  A decision support system with the resource requirements embedded could 
very quickly provide cost estimates for disaster response by simply adjusting for the 
number of assets requested, on-scene or in-transit.  The same support system could also 
be used to compare the number of likely response assets required for a given scenario 
versus the number on hand.  This type of data can be used to support justifications for 
additional resource requests, even for budget building and grant proposals.  Additionally, 
the data collected should be protected for security purposes, but also sent to remote 
locations so that if a major disaster or a series of disasters occurs in a local area that 
forces the local CLPG to become inoperable, another CLPG in a neighboring jurisdiction 
could pick up the database, understand the logistical requirements tailored to that region, 
and begin the process of resourcing the necessary requirements to support missions. 
Christine Wormuth with the Center for Strategic & International Studies has also 
acknowledged that this process of inventory and database compilation has not progressed 
as far as it should have.  In a recent article, she noted the following: 
Finally, no inventory or database has been compiled at the federal level, 
much less at the state level, listing what capabilities might be available to 
respond to a catastrophe.  Effective planning would require a mechanism 
to assess the readiness of inventoried capabilities, but individual Cabinet 
agencies do not even consistently compile and track this kind of 
information. Although the National Preparedness Guidelines, which were 
issued by the Department of Homeland Security in September 2007, do 
envision a preparedness system that would include such inventories and 
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assessment mechanisms, to date that system exists only on paper…Unless 
it undertakes deliberate planning to drive the creation and allocation of 
required capabilities and resources, the government risks being caught 
flat-footed during a future disaster.86 
The CLPG members and participants will also benefit by getting a thorough 
understanding of the capabilities, the assets and the resources of their partner agencies.  I 
contend that as agencies examine logistical requirements for scenario responses, they will 
discover many mutually supporting missions and tasks that can be arranged in partnership 
rather than each agency attempting to “fend for itself.”  These economies of scale will 
make logistical arrangements much easier and faster and will also, in most cases, create 
cost-savings for the locality or the nation.  
The private sector has always played a crucial role in disaster response, and they 
will continue to be an important partner in the CLPG.  According to a multi-agency May 
2006 report by the National Response Teams (NRT), it has been challenging to find the 
proper inroad for private sector to be involved in pre-planning.  The report stated,87 
There has not been an effective mechanism for engaging the capabilities 
of private sector organizations. For example, private loggers sought to 
assist in clearing roads, but there was not an effective method to involve 
them.  Although DHS established a private sector database, which was 
done in conjunction with EPA for hazmat contractors under ESF #10, this 
did not necessarily assist private companies in determining how they could 
participate in response activities.   
The report went on to recommend that private sector assets which may prove 
useful during contingencies and disasters should be identified in advance, and those 
companies should be involved in disaster planning and exercises, especially at the 
regional and local levels.  The CLPG is the mechanism which can make this happen, 
 
 
                                                 
86 Wormuth, 11. 
87 U.S. National Response Team, “Interim Final Observations and Lessons Learned from Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita,” National Response Teams/Regional Response Teams, May 19, 2006, 
http://www.nrt.org/ (accessed September 3, 2008), 8. 
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providing important updates to available assets and inventories which could then be 
further integrated into emergency support functions (ESFs) under the National Response 
Plan.   
A final critical benefit of building the resource requirements necessary for 
logistical support for various scenarios is that the processes discussed in Chapter 5 for 
Advanced Readiness Contracting and pre-procurement can begin.  Understanding the 
resource shortfalls can allow for the various agencies (or working group acting on behalf 
of the CLPG) to begin building lists of potential contractors and private partners that can 
provide resources quickly in the event of a contingency and tailored towards the 
prioritized agencies for the scenario at hand.  
When disasters or other real-world contingencies do occur, a minimized CLPG 
should be stood up to provide support to the ICS structure, specifically the Planning 
Section Chief and his or her staff.  By this time, the CLPG should have developed 
logistical plans for a number of scenarios and for the various operational response plans 
by the individual agencies.  The CLPG can provide advice about resource availabilities, 
sources of supply, pre-contracted resources and prioritization of issuing/providing 
resources based on the mission assignments.  During Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, this 
type of construct was noted in Lessons Learned reports as a mechanism which could have 
added significant value to the response efforts.  The MLCA Lessons Learned website had 
the following to say 
Throughout Hurricane KATRINA response efforts, many basic tenets of 
ICS were used to certain degrees of conviction and effectiveness. But not 
all roles, responsibilities, and functions were utilized or activated. This led 
to much inefficiency. For example, logistics issues including personnel, 
equipment and supplies were ordered through various channels and 
avenues without a centralized prioritization and validation process. This 
resulted in many duplicate and confusing resource requests. Financial 
accounting was problematic; proper procedures were not administered 
from the onset of operations.88 
                                                 
88 U.S. Coast Guard, “Hurricane KATRINA Response – Maintenance & Logistics Command Atlantic 
(FOUO)” in the CGSails, section titled “Use of the Incident Command System (ICS) Comments.” 
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This chapter emphasized the need to develop Contingency Logistics Planning 
Groups (CLPGs) to achieve a number of important benefits.  I am confident that these 
groups will bring the Coast Guard, and the nation as a whole, closer to the vision inspired 
by the National Preparedness Guidelines.  Using the Capabilities-Based Preparedness 
model as a springboard for the CLPGs will ensure continued alignment with the strategic 
vision of preparedness envisioned by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 and 
will ensure that each agency is honing their ability to collaborate, cooperate and prepare 
for a variety of plausible catastrophic scenarios. 
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VI. IMPLEMENTING IMPROVED CONTINGENCY-
PREPAREDNESS IN THE COAST GUARD 
The timing is right for the Coast Guard to make assertive change efforts to 
support and strengthen contingency preparedness for the financial management and 
logistics communities.   This paper has suggested seemingly common sense changes, but 
each change initiative, big or small, comes with a price tag, whether the denomination is 
actual dollars, people’s time, or organizational willingness to change to counter the low-
probability/high consequence events.  But now that these changes have been presented, 
how can they be implemented and what barriers are likely to be encountered?  This 
chapter aims to present the strategy and efforts which can be launched within the Coast 
Guard to create change.  First, there will be a very brief recap of the changes necessary, a 
discussion identifying the critical players in moving forward, and finally, an answer to 
the question: “what must be done right away to advance Coast Guard contingency 
preparedness?” 
A. REVIEW OF CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Five over-arching change initiatives were recommended within this research 
project.  Each would have considerable impact upon the continuity of Coast Guard 
operations, improve preparedness for the Coast Guard (and other contingency response 
partners) and help to foster processes that ensure the high level of performance expected 
of financial planners and logisticians.  The changes recommended included: 
1. Establishing financial management and logistics policy for operations and 
field personnel to employ easily and immediately for guidance actions on 
cost tracking, pre-contracting and rapid procurement.  This 
recommendation will require policy discussion, writing, review and 
approval of materials generated.  Involvement should include field level 
operations and response personnel as well as an assortment of 
professionals within the Coast Guard financial management, procurement, 
contracting and logistics communities. 
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2. Modifying the accounting line and financial systems readiness to track 
costs.  This change will require considerable investment in financial and 
organizational planning.  There are likely conflicts or challenges 
associated with pending changes in the line of accounting to be compliant 
and compatible with DHS.  It will be necessary to ensure that the new 
DHS accounting line has the capability for the level of granularity in cost 
tracking required to meet cost recovery objectives. 
3. Understand geographic-specific logistics requirements and develop a plan 
and information sharing construct to collaborate with other units and 
agencies using a Contingency Logistics Planning Group (CLPG).   This is 
the most far-reaching recommendation within this report.  This initiative 
will require the establishment of cross-organizational and collaborative 
teams in a number of critical geographic areas, especially those that are 
often the target of terrorism or those that are at considerable risk of natural 
disasters.  The teams will work with other federal, state, local, private 
sector and non-governmental organizations to study the logistical 
responses to the 15 National Planning Scenarios, study inventories and 
shared equipment, and with the cooperation of operational planners, 
discuss agency responses.  Teams will search for asset requirements, 
priorities of available resources, conflicting expectations, etc.  This 
recommendation will require significant planning time from at least one 
individual in each geographic area (possibly at the District level), involve 
a coordinator at Coast Guard Headquarters or Forces Command 
(FORCECOM) and report to the Principal Federal Official (PFO) in each 
applicable region. 
4. Build resilience in contracting and contingency procurement through 
several interventions including Advanced Readiness Contracting and 
meeting the “human aspects” of business continuity planning.  This 
recommendation will study work flow and business networks to determine 
which areas are most prone to failure during contingency or disaster, 
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especially disasters that can incapacitate personnel providing necessary 
logistics and procurement functions (e.g., contracting officers, 
procurement specialists, local knowledge experts, etc.).  This project can 
be completed with a few full-time individuals who travel to the various 
logistics and financial management commands for on-site studies.  These 
personnel must be experts in network analysis and planning, preferably 
with prior-Coast Guard experience.  Additionally, several contracting and 
procurement specialists will interface with members of the Contingency 
Logistics Planning Group (CLPG) to determine which resources should be 
secured and/or pre-contracted in each geographic area. 
5. Reconfigure and effectively market the training for Coast Guard planners, 
logisticians and procurement/supply personnel at all levels.  This 
recommendation will require a study of current and proposed ICS, 
logistics and financial management training.  The focus will be on 
developing a more effective long-term study and participation training 
program to keep learning current, interesting and growing after initial 
training has been completed.  I recommend several ICS experts become 
involved along with a full-time individual for development and 
maintenance of the on-line learning management system (LMS). 
B. IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
With the recommended changes in hand, it is imperative to know which 
stakeholders involved in Coast Guard contingency planning need to be approached with 
the vision ahead.  A power versus interest grid as shown in the diagram below serves as a 
reference to which “players” are critical to success and what other power bases exist that 
must be considered.89 
                                                 
89 Power versus Interest Grids are discussed in John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and 
Non-Profit Organizations, 3rd edition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 338, as well as C. Eden and F. 




















Figure 6.   Power vs. Interest Grid 
 
“Subjects” in the upper-left quadrant of the grid are those that are highly 
interested and vested in seeing the program succeed, but have little power and influence 
on their own to institute the change efforts.  In this case, field level financial managers, 
which might be Comptrollers at large units or Executive Officers at smaller units, do not 
have the power necessary to institute the change but they can certainly visualize the 
danger of not improving our current policies and planning.  Other stakeholders in this 
area include external agencies, whether they are local, state, federal, tribal, private, or 
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others.  They are interested in seeing such an implementation proceed, especially if their 
agency would benefit substantially from the collaborative efforts, but they are relatively 
powerless to affect change within the Coast Guard.  Overall, the stakeholders in this 
quadrant should be encouraged to help support and steer the change effort once it gets off 
the ground to ensure that it will meet the objectives of those entrusted to put plans into 
action. 
“Players”, in the top right quadrant, are those that would certainly benefit by 
change as it would make their own work more efficient and effective.  These stakeholders 
also have the power and influence that they can help to institute the changes necessary to 
put the plans into practice.  Individuals and offices in this area will be an easy sell for the 
change initiatives and should be leveraged against other groups to help encourage 
change.  They must be consulted early and often. 
Stakeholders in the bottom left quadrant constitute the “Crowd” and have little 
interest in the outcome and relatively low organizational power to influence change.  In 
general, of the stakeholders I had involved, I thought this was primarily the contingency 
training teams and contingency exercise staff.  While these individuals constitute Coast 
Guard organizational experts in contingency training and exercising, their only “dog in 
the fight” is that they will be required to change their training syllabus and/or manuals to 
accommodate changes in the system; and for the most respect, even those changes to the 
overall playbook will be minimal.  Out of all the groups, I saw these as being the most 
resistant to the change efforts.  And yet, because of their constant interaction with these 
types of events (at least in training and practice forums), they should be able to provide 
valuable insight and thoughts into how to improve the involvement of contingency 
financial planners and logisticians from a theoretical perspective.  It is known from 
survey and personal interaction that some of these individuals are highly motivated 
toward seeing these changes implemented.   
The final quadrant in the bottom right of the grid includes the “Context Setters”.  
This is an important group to tailor the message of the thesis towards.  These are 
stakeholders and groups with significant political and organizational power.  However, 
they may be less inclined to make changes in the system without understanding how 
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important, precarious, or dangerous our current continuity and contingency planning 
systems are.  For these groups, it is important to show them the relevant results of 
surveys, lessons learned recommendations from major events (e.g., repeated calls for 
change in the Hurricane Katrina after-action reports), and examples of potential failures 
in our current system, and how these failures could cascade into operational failures at 
the most critical of times.  The goal, moving forward, must be to increase the interest and 
understanding of these individuals so that they can be included as “Players”. 
C. THE PRECURSOR TO CHANGE – FOSTERING AND ENCOURAGING 
META-LEADERS 
With a concept of where we need to go, and where the power players will need to 
come from, it is necessary to foster a cadre of individuals who are motivated and 
informed about leading a change effort.  These individuals should be carefully screened 
and interviewed to ensure that they not only understand the changes that are necessary, 
but that they are willing to expend personal and professional energy in seeing the changes 
through to implementation.  In essence, we are looking for a cadre of meta-leaders.  The 
concept of a ‘meta-leader’ is not new, but was very appropriately introduced in the 
emergency preparedness context in a working paper by Leonard Marcus and Barry Dorn 
of the Harvard University Center for Public Leadership and Joseph M. Henderson of the 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.90  As described in this well-crafted 
discussion of collaborative leadership, a meta-leader is one which will be able to 
influence and inspire change across organizations, acting to build synergies in a multi-
jurisdictional, multi-agency, and public-private partnership.  If done effectively, the meta-
leadership will provide “guidance, direction, and momentum across organizational lines 
that develops into a shared course of action and a commonality of purpose among people 
and agencies that are doing what appears to be very different work.”91  The 
                                                 
90 Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph M. Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National 
Emergency Preparedness: Strategies to Build Government Connectivity,” Working paper, June 1, 2006, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/leadership/images/stories/ksg/PDF/Publications/workingpapers/2005/marcusd
ornhendersonworkingpaper.pdf (accessed January 28, 2008). 
91 Ibid.,44. 
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recommendations provided throughout this research span a number of boundaries and 
partnerships as indicated in the table below. 
Table 1.   Boundaries and Partnerships for Recommendations 
 
Recommended Change Boundaries and Partnerships Required 
1. Establish Field-Level Financial 
Management Policy for 
Contingencies 
Operational/Field Level Personnel (Unit Command Cadre, 
Executive Officers, Storekeepers), MLC & ISC 
Procurement and Contracting Specialists, District and 
Headquarters Contingency Cost Managers 
2. Accounting System Alignment for 
Contingency Cost Tracking 
Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO), District Budget Offices, MLC & Headquarters 
Budget Execution Offices, CG Finance Center, CG 
Financial Management Systems (link to Core Accounting 
System) 
3.  Geographic-Specific 
Requirements and Establishment of 
Contingency Logistics Planning 
Group (CLPG) 
Coast Guard MLC & ISC Procurement & Contracting 
Specialists, CG Headquarters Fiscal Law Specialists, Coast 
Guard Contingency Planners, Contingency Exercise Staff.  
In addition, each geographic area will have a mix of 
representatives from federal, state, local, tribal, private 
sector and non-governmental organizations to discuss 
resource/asset requirements and inventories in response to 
contingency scenarios. 
4. Build Resilience in CG Business 
Continuity Plans (focus on the 
human aspects of financial 
management & logistics continuity) 
Coast Guard MLC, ISC & Field-Unit Procurement & 
Contracting Specialists, CG Headquarters Fiscal Law 
Specialists, Coast Guard Contingency Planners, 
Contingency Exercise Staff, District Budget Offices, 
Contracted Network Analysis Experts 
5.  Reconfigure and Market Long-
Term Training Efforts in ICS 
Field-Level Contingency Financial Managers and 
Logisticians, Contingency Exercise Staffs, ICS Training 
Teams, Learning Management System (LMS) internal or 
contracted expertise, Education/Training Content 
Developers  
 
It is clear that a group of meta-leaders will be necessary to bring these diverse 
groups together.  Many of the aforementioned offices, branches or agencies are separated 
geographically, organizationally (as in contingency planners vs. financial management or 
logistics personnel), financially (as in funding streams throughout the Coast Guard), or in 
different agencies altogether (particularly within the CLPG recommendation).  To get 
beyond the “silo thinking” and achieve cross-agency and intra-agency collaboration, the 
meta-leaders will need to be among our organizations best and brightest, with earned 
personal and professional respect that can be leveraged to bring partners to the table to 
discuss the issues in detail and determine where the best course of actions lie.  As authors 
Howitt and Piangi noted in 2003, “The great challenge facing the nation in further 
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developing its domestic preparedness program is not only to achieve coordination of 
effort and function within levels of government, but also to make the intergovernmental 
relationships work effectively.”92 
This work will not be easy.  The individuals involved will exceed their job 
descriptions, step beyond their experience levels and operate in new territory.  There will 
undoubtedly be resistance from a number of corners.  A list, certainly not inclusive all 
possible barriers, is indicated below. 
 
Table 2.   Barriers and Obstacles to Change 
 
Recommended Change Barriers or Obstacles to Change 
1. Establish Field-Level Financial 
Management Policy for 
Contingencies 
• Concerns about time & effort commensurate to 
the potential catastrophic threat (cost vs. benefit) 
• Additional training on already burdened field-
level personnel 
• CG Modernization efforts may impact the 
financial and logistics support chain.  Efforts 
made too early will require rewrite. 
2. Accounting System Alignment for 
Contingency Cost Tracking 
• Accounting System moving to a new DHS-unified 
accounting line “sometime in the future” 
• Finance Center may object to effort required to 
build the tables for the wide-variety of cost 
centers 
• Units may have to alter pre-established accounting 
lines to be compliant with new code scheme 
3.  Geographic-Specific 
Requirements and Establishment of 
Contingency Logistics Planning 
Group (CLPG) 
• No mandatory requirements (at this time) for this 
high-level of inter-agency participation 
• Some may argue that 15 National Planning 
Scenarios are constraining or non-applicable 
• Concerns about time & effort commensurate to 
the potential catastrophic threat (cost vs. benefit) 
4. Build Resilience in CG Business 
Continuity Plans (focus on the 
human aspects of financial 
management & logistics continuity) 
• May be fiscal or legal challenges to pre-
contracting or advanced readiness contracting 
• Significant cross-training of personnel at 
procurement and contracting offices to ensure 
redundancy of skills.  Union challenges? 
• CG Modernization efforts may impact the 
financial and logistics support chain.  Efforts 
made too early will require rewrite. 
5.  Reconfigure and Market Long-
Term Training Efforts in ICS 
• Some individuals likely prefer to complete a one-
time training and then relearn when an event 
arises 
                                                 
92 A. Howitt and R. Pangi, “Intergovernmental Challenges of Combating Terrorism,” in Countering 
Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness, ed. A. Howitt and R. Pangi (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 17-36. 
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• Concerns about time & effort commensurate to 
the potential catastrophic threat (cost vs. benefit) 
• How to incentivize an individual to want to 
participate in long-term training and skills practice 
The authors which applied meta-leadership to emergency preparedness emphasize 
that the benefits of the collaborative efforts are not always what one may expect.  Often, 
the benefits evolve from the relationships which are established.  They wrote:93 
[F]ormal linkages cannot predict or account for the range of anticipated as 
well as random interactions in the lead up to and moment of an actual 
terrorist incident. Those linkages ultimately must be on the people-to-
people level. Those responsible for leading terrorism preparedness efforts 
have commented often on the barrage of meetings and conferences that 
sprouted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. The content of these 
meetings turned out to be almost less important than the opportunities 
provided for a wide spectrum of officials to become acquainted with one 
another across agencies that would not have normally interacted. Those 
meetings led to development of cross-agency teams and workgroups that 
became an important reference point for the preparedness effort. 
D. WHAT TO DO TODAY? 
This discussion leads us now to determining exactly what the next steps must be 
towards higher Coast Guard contingency preparedness.  To see the recommendations 
presented within this effort deliberated and acted upon, I recommend the following: 
1. Establish and promulgate Coast Guard Flag-Level support for this effort, 
especially within the following levels: 
• Commandant of the Coast Guard 
• CG Chief Financial Officer (CG-8) 
• Commanders of Maintenance & Logistics Commands Atlantic & 
Pacific.  As Coast Guard Modernization efforts continue, these may 
                                                 
93Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph M. Henderson, “Meta-Leadership and National 
Emergency Preparedness: Strategies to Build Government Connectivity,” Working paper, June 1, 2006, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/leadership/images/stories/ksg/PDF/Publications/workingpapers/2005/marcusd
ornhendersonworkingpaper.pdf (accessed January 28, 2008), 53. 
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possibly be combined within a single command under Forces 
Command. 
• Secretary of Department of Homeland Security should be involved to 
the extent desired and necessary by the Department. 
• Appropriate Congressional homeland security offices should be 
apprised of the effort and involved to the extent they desire. 
2. Require Coast Guard Headquarters Contingency Cost Managers (CG-
832), CGHQ Office of Procurement, and the Finance Divisions of 
Maintenance & Logistics Commands Atlantic & Pacific (MLCA & 
MLCP) to review and approve of the overall direction within this report.  
As Coast Guard Modernization efforts allow, invite the involvement and 
support of the Logistics Transformation Program Integration Office 
(LTPIO).   
3. Using members of #2 above and including representatives from the field-
level, support level (e.g., ISCs, Districts, MLC contracting offices) and 
headquarters level (e.g., contingency planners), conduct a 3-day 
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) off-site session to discuss problems outlined in 
this report.  The goals of the 3-day session should include a decision on 
prioritizing the recommended courses of action, envisioning the future 
end-state of each of the recommendations, and developing a road-map for 
achieving the vision.  Meta-leaders should be identified or suggested that 
can lead individual pieces of the project. 
4. Establish a forum for continued debate, inquiry, and task accomplishment 
from the AI off-site.  Ensure individuals are in-place to take responsibility 
for the learning process but keep to stated timelines.  The imperative of 
preparedness needs to remain a mantra throughout the process. 
Work groups, under the direction of the identified meta-leaders, accomplish 
designated tasks towards accomplishment. 
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There is no time to lose.  Let us move forward today with Step #1 and begin the 
course towards a higher-level of financial and logistical preparedness for the challenges 
that our nation faces in the future. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Some people, including those within the Coast Guard, may be surprised to find 
that our organization, in these early days of September 2008, lies in a precarious position.  
We have weathered major storms and performed admirably and most consider that we are 
well-prepared from an operational perspective to face the next big challenge or 
catastrophe.  Amanda Ripley, a journalist for Time magazine wrote a featured article 
following Hurricane Katrina to highlight this perception of Coast Guard responsiveness 
and flexibility.  She wrote:94 
You can learn about the culture of an organization from the stories its 
members tell. One of the Coast Guard's most celebrated rescues was of the 
crew of the doomed oil tanker the Pendleton in 1952 off Massachusetts. In 
60-ft. seas, during a snowstorm, Coast Guard officers managed to pile all 
32 survivors onto a 36-ft. wooden lifeboat moments before the tanker 
capsized. But when the coxswain radioed his superiors for further 
direction, his commanders argued over the radio waves about what to do 
next. Instead of wasting precious time, the coxswain switched off the radio 
and made up his mind to head for shore. Everyone survived, and the Coast 
Guard crew received gold lifesaving medals. "There's no place to hide in 
the Coast Guard," says Rear Admiral Robert Duncan, commander of the 
Eighth Coast Guard District, which includes the Gulf Coast states. "So we 
end up with a culture that is not averse to taking measured risk. 
Effective risk management, flexibility, responsiveness, autonomy, trust in our 
people and processes and an all-hazards readiness posture have gone far to create a 
culture of preparedness within the Coast Guard.  And yet, as has been shown by 
interviews, surveys and reviews of Lessons Learned and After-Action reports within this 
research, this high-preparedness and trust in our system has gaps within our contingency 
logistics and financial management communities.  We do not unerringly trust that our 
systems will be able to provide top-notch mission support to the operators in the field.   
                                                 
94 Amanda Ripley, “How the Coast Guard Gets it Right,” Time, October 23, 2005, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1122007-1,00.html (accessed September 7, 2008). 
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This thesis work has emphasized a number of problematic areas and steps which 
can be taken to propel the Coast Guard to a higher level of logistical and financial 
management contingency preparedness.  In addition, steps for moving the project forward 
quickly have been described and now await execution.  The Coast Guard must strike 
ahead now, while we remain buoyed by operational success and while our organization 
culture is prepared for and acting on other change initiatives.  Following the next 
extensive hurricane, terrorist attack or other catastrophic incident, history may not shine 
so brightly upon the Coast Guard if our logistical errors and financial challenges cause 
response, rescue or recovery operations to falter.  Affirmative action today towards 
improving contingency preparedness can mean the difference between praise for our 
actions, or blameful investigations and a loss of trust following poor performance.  The 
Coast Guard should take these actions willingly, eagerly and while we are master’s of our 
own destination. 
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APPENDIX A. QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESPONSES 
The information within this Appendix represents the qualitative, and some 
quantitative, data obtained via a web-based survey of Coast Guard professionals in the 
communities of financial management, contracting, procurement, logistics, training, and 
contingency/incident management.  The survey results provided substantial support to the 
findings and recommendations within this thesis but can also add value to continued 
work by other individuals in similar research efforts. 
 
1. How many years of experience do you have working in Coast Guard financial 
































2. In the event of a major contingency (e.g., hurricane, major earthquake, pandemic 
virus, weapon of mass destruction event), how well do you believe the Coast 
Guard is prepared logistically to respond?  For example, do you believe that we 
understand and have planned the necessary logistics  at the local level for the wide 
range of contingencies we may face (i.e., purchase lists, vendors & contractors 
lists for items, deconflicting with other units which may be requesting same type 
items, etc.)?  Please select a level of preparedness and comment on your response. 
 1 = Not Prepared 
 2 = Somewhat Prepared 
 3 = Prepared 
 4 = Well Prepared 
 5 = Very Well Prepared 
 
Total = 59, Average = 2.36 
1 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Not nearly as well prepared as we could or should be.  We 
spend a lot of time on day to day issues, little to no time spent on strategic logistic 
planning. 
2 2 Somewhat Prepared - We rarely exercise this function. 
3 2 
Somewhat Prepared - We have basic plans in place, but lack depth of resources, 
capabilities, and detailed plans for such a response. 
4 4 Well Prepared -  
5 4 Well Prepared -  
6 2 
Somewhat Prepared - The pollution response world has procedures in place that are 
well understood by the old "mep" world, but less well understood by the traditional 
SK/30-coded world, which needs to take on management of these processes in the 
current CFO Audit world. 
7 1 
Not Prepared - We continue to talk about our response more than prepare for it. We 
are also not giving enough dedicated resources to this. Additionally, we do not have 
professional logisticians in the Coast Guard. By this I mean we do not have a trained 
officer corp. 
8 2 
Somewhat Prepared - we have not changed any processes at nat'l or local level.  
training is sporadic but started.  quals sys not in place WQSB varies sector to sector. 
9 3 
Prepared - COOP plans have been prepared in fits and starts throughout the CG.  The 
rollover to an ICS response structure has spured some of the action.  The stand up of 
IMAT teams has been a result as well. 
10 3 Prepared -  
11 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
12 2 Somewhat Prepared - Quick to respond, but lacking standardization 
13 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
14 1 Not Prepared -  
15 2 
Somewhat Prepared - We do have many of the lists and information prepared and with 
Contracting Officer's for use in the event of a major contingency.  The key is keeping 
this information up to date at all times which may not be case. 
16 3 Prepared - I think we are as prepared as our current funding level/resources provide. 
17 2 
Somewhat Prepared - We always seem to "get it done" but it's because of the people 
and what they already know...not because of any one overarching process we have in 
place. 
18 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Most units do have some planning on what to do on a major 
contingency event, but lack on knowing what resources are available locally and in 
establishing contact with local vendors and other responders  
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19 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
20 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
21 3 Prepared - It varies by command from Very Well to Not. 
22 3 Prepared -  
23 2 Somewhat Prepared - Some local preparation but no global policy or guidance 
24 4 Well Prepared -  
25 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Each contingency brings with it it's own nuances and no one 
can plan for them all.  While we did an admirable job responding to Hurricane Katrina, 
it did not come about without an inordinate amount of work, some of it unnecessary. 
 
 
3. Similarly, how well is the Coast Guard financial management and contracting 
infrastructure ready to support Coast Guard operations for a major contingency?  
For example, do you believe we have considered the policies and procedures that 
support units (e.g., ISCs, ESUs, CEUs, etc.) will need to follow so they can 
operate independently of other headquarters and Area commands to provide local 
unit support AND support to other units which have lost their support 
infrastructure due to disaster?  Please select a level of preparedness and comment 
on your response. 
 1 = Not Prepared 
 2 = Somewhat Prepared 
 3 = Prepared 
 4 = Well Prepared 
 5 = Very Well Prepared 
 
Total = 61, Average = 2.44 
1 3 Prepared - We have trained professionals in place.  We, (they) will get the job done. 
2 3 Prepared -  
3 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Based on personal experience, beyond the Sector level, 
ISC/MLCA is somewhat prepared to respond to disruption given the portability of 
computer systems.  Contracting authority is usually the sticking point. 
4 4 Well Prepared -  
5 4 Well Prepared -  
6 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Re pollution response during contingencies, we know how to do 
what we've always done, but we're losing that expertise because it was always in the 
MST/MEP staff, now owned by the Response staff, but the corporate knowledge that 
existed is in Prevention. 
7 2 
Somewhat Prepared - We have taken lessons learned from Katrina and applied them 
to some extent. However, we are modernizing which is taking time away from being 
ready. 
8 1 
Not Prepared - CG-8 & CG-91 are not engaged, they own budget & policy.  MLC 
support is not systematic but personality-dependant. Currently our strategy is we'll 
figure it out when it happens.  Contingency response is not embedded in support unit 
SOP.   
9 2 
Somewhat Prepared - We have had several incidents and drills in past several years 
that have tested our systems (Katrina, SONS, Oil spills, etc) 
10 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
11 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
12 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
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13 3 Prepared -  
14 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
15 2 
Somewhat Prepared - MLCLANT has supported real CG operations.  I believe we 
could greatly enhance this effort, however, I am not convinced these measures have 
been put in place. 
16 3 
Prepared - Again, I think we are as prepared as we could be with our current resources 
with a good balance.   We do not have a stock pile of equipment that would enable us 
to be Very Well Prepared, but that may not be the best investment of the tax payer’s 
dollars.  The Coast Guard gives a great deal of bang for the buck.  The only way to be 
better prepared is to increase resources – money & people. 
17 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Again, we get it done...but usually the individual unit ends up 
"eating" the costs. As an organization we need to be more educated on accessing 
disaster funds/ESF's (all levels), etc... 
18 2 
Somewhat Prepared - We have made some progress in these areas through lessons 
learned during 911 and Hurricane Katrina, but there are still many inadequacies in both 
areas.            
19 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
20 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
21 3 Prepared - Again, some aspects are very well and other are not. 
22 4 Well Prepared -  
23 2 
Somewhat Prepared - The contracting infrastructure is there IF it's not affected by the 
event. Financial issues would have to be handled locally until reimbursed.  What if the 
local level doesn't have the funds? 
24 3 Prepared -  
25 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Same as above, we get it but I don't think we are as prepared as 
we should be. 
 
4. Have Coast Guard operational personnel at the field level (e.g., Executive 
Officers, Sector Logistics Officers, Supply Petty Officers, etc.) been trained to 
conduct procurement and logistics in a crisis and/or contingency environment?  
(YES or NO)  Yes = 1, No = 0 
Total = 11, Average = 0.44 
1 No 0 
2 No 0 
3 Yes 1 
4 Yes 1 
5 Yes 1 
6 No 0 
7 No 0 
8 No 0 
9 Yes 1 
10 No 0 
11 Yes 1 
12 No 0 
13 No 0 
14 Yes 1 
15 Yes 1 
16 
Yes (Speaking from which I know best, the ISC perspective, the 
ISC was ready and did so in response to hurricane Katrina) 1 
17 Yes 1 
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18 No 0 
19 No 0 
20 No 0 
21 No 0 
22 Yes 1 
23 Yes 1 
24 No 0 
25 No 0 
 
5. If communications with field level commands were suddenly lost in a major 
contingency event, do you feel operational units in the field would understand 
how to carry out logistics, procurement and financial management to continue 
operations?  Please answer each individually using a scale of 1 to 5: 
 
a. Logistics (e.g., understanding supply and resource requirements that will be 
needed to maintain operations to respond to contingency and/or disaster): 
 1 = Not Prepared 
 2 = Somewhat Prepared 
 3 = Prepared 
 4 = Well Prepared 
 5 = Very Well Prepared 
 
Total = 59, Average = 2.36 
1 1 Not Prepared - 3 
2 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
3 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
4 4 Well Prepared -  
5 4 Well Prepared -  
6 2 
Somewhat Prepared - In some cases, for some aspects, but not uniformely, and not 
for the full range of potential requirements. 
7 1 Not Prepared - the Coast Guard has little understanding of logistics 
8 2 
Somewhat Prepared - CG personnel typically refuse to fail, and will do their best.  
However, the focus of preparation is typically on operations not logs or finance. 
9 3 Prepared -  
10 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
11 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
12 2 Somewhat Prepared - Very little training in ICS or contingency management 
13 3 Prepared -  
14 2 Somewhat Prepared - They tend to get the job done and clean up the paperwork later 
15 2 
Somewhat Prepared - I have actually worked in some of these events and there were 
some duplications of efforts and communication issues. 
16 3 Prepared -  
17 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
18 3 
Prepared - Units at their local level are able to carry out most logistic requirements on 
their own. 
19 1 Not Prepared -  
20 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
21 3 Prepared - Questions too generic I would say some are and some are not.  It also 
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depends on the experience of personnel at the unit. 
22 3 Prepared -  
23 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Some yes, others no. It depends on the unit type and personnel 
involved. 
24 3 Prepared - 3 
25 3 Prepared - I think they will be able to acquire what is needed however. 
 
b. Procurement (e.g., the understanding and ability to execute purchasing and 
contracting actions, in compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and 
other instructions, for necessary supplies and services to maintain operations 
to respond to contingency and/or disaster): 
 1 = Not Prepared 
 2 = Somewhat Prepared 
 3 = Prepared 
 4 = Well Prepared 
 5 = Very Well Prepared 
 
Total = 63, Average = 2.52 
1 2 Somewhat Prepared - 3 
2 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
3 3 Prepared -  
4 4 Well Prepared -  
5 4 Well Prepared -  
6 2 
Somewhat Prepared - In some ways, in some places, but not consisently 
throughout.  Also, emerging DHS reimbursable policies may require the CG to 
change the historical used IAGs to fund pollution response activities; big, unseen 
impact heading toward contracting program mgr. 
7 1 Not Prepared - Little training is available or enforced. 
8 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Field units are typically very limited in spending authority; so 
a loss of comms & expanded ordering would be devastating. 
9 3 
Prepared - As evidenced in Katrina, the procurement world is capable of meeting 
CG needs... the problem is the internal control holes in the system.  Also, the 
current move is to remove most small purchase vehicles (credit cards) from the 
field operator to ease burden 
10 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
11 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
12 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Lack of understanding on credit cards and non-dedicated 
accounting lines 
13 3 Prepared -  
14 2 Somewhat Prepared - Many do not know the rules 
15 3 
Prepared - I believe we have a well trained procurement workforce that fully 
understand acquisition laws and regulations in response to a disaster response. 
16 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
17 2 Somewhat Prepared -  
18 4 
Well Prepared - Units are capable of efficiently executing procurements within their 
KO warrant authority. 
19 3 Prepared -  
20 3 Prepared - Up to SAT only.  Not major contracting 
21 2 Somewhat Prepared - Depends on what level of purchasing and contracting you 
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are talking about. 
22 4 Well Prepared -  
23 2 
Somewhat Prepared - Some yes, others no. Again, it depends on the personnel 
invovled.  Field KOs know the rules (or most of them). Small units do not, but do 
what needs to be done to operate. 
24 3 Prepared - 3 
25 1 Not Prepared - They may not always follow procurement regs to acquire it. 
 
c. Financial Management (e.g., understanding the necessary cost management 
and accounting requirements to ensure accountability, transparency and 
effective tracking of unit-level and CG-wide funding in support of 
contingency and/or disaster response operations) 
 1 = Not Prepared 
 2 = Somewhat Prepared 
 3 = Prepared 
 4 = Well Prepared 
 5 = Very Well Prepared 
 
Total = 53, Average = 2.12 
1 1 Not Prepared -1 
2 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
3 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
4 4 Well Prepared - 
5 4 Well Prepared - 
6 3 
Prepared -Pollution response has good model for cost documentation, used by MLC 
during hurricanes.  Works for intended purpose, but will not meet emerging 
requirements of CFO Audit world, so there is work to be done with respect to UDOs, 
Certifications, etc. 
7 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
8 1 
Not Prepared -We have very limited repertoire of field personnel trained to do this, and 
almost none with experience. 
9 2 
Somewhat Prepared -Knowledge of financial management policy (rules, restrictions, 
etc) is not level throughout the CG.  The oil spill community (old M) is well experienced 
with NPFC route but the other side of contingency prep is more adhoc. 
10 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
11 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
12 1 Not Prepared - 
13 3 Prepared - 
14 1 Not Prepared -spend not track mentality 
15 3 
Prepared -I believe we learned a lot in response to this effort during the course of the 
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  I am not privy to this effort being captured 
and put in writing in the event of turnover of people. 
16 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
17 1 Not Prepared - 
18 3 
Prepared -  Most units are capable of efficiently managing their own funds, and would 
have a good idea on how to track CG wide funding but the problem is that there are no 
set CG standards on how to do it, so it would be track differently from unit to unit. 
19 3 Prepared - 
20 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
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21 1 Not Prepared -Even thought the information is there not a lot of people know about it. 
22 2 Somewhat Prepared - 
23 1 
Not Prepared -Even though there is local and service wide guidance, Local units are 
not aware or do not follow the guidance. 
24 3 Prepared - 
25 2 
Somewhat Prepared -I still get a lump in my throat when I see a hurricane approach 
one of my LANT districts.  We still do not have a good handoff mechanism so that all 
districts know what they are required to do and when their job ends and mine begins. 
 
6. What examples can be provided to demonstrate readiness to conduct logistical, 
procurement or financial management support in a contingency (e.g., oil spill, 
terrorism incident, local disaster)?   
 
1 
A full and up to date "rolodex"  I don't believe its necessary to have a warehouse full of stuff 
just in case.  (except for oil spill remediation equip) Reliable communications, transportation 
and trained people. A concise plan. 
2 
D7 Msg prior to Hurricane season that details the evacuation policy and process for TONOs is 
a great example of pre-planning and readiness. 
3 
We have conducted responses to 6 major hurricanes on FL west coast since I have been 
assigned to SSP.  I also served in the LANT IMT as the Logistics watch during 9/11 response, 
and we responded well considering the massive disruption of comms.  In each of these cases, 
logistics response met most of the Incident Commander's expectations. 
4 
Since 9/11 & Katrina, there has been a significant increase in training and exercises designed 
specifically to increase readiness in these areas.  The ICS 351 course is well suited to help 
logistics and finance personnel prepare for these contingencies.  SONS and other similar 
exercises help keep skills sharp. 
5 Published plans, ICS training, exercise participation 
6 
Katrina/Rita tested the contingency response of the CG, and for the most part we succeeded, 
but we succeeded because of our can-do culture, not because we had workable 
policies/procedures in place and solid COOP systems.  We succeeded because we had a few 
good key experts who could coach everyone else along.  The Oil Spill response world is pretty 
well established, and for the most part has good procurement support for contractors, and 
good accounting/cost documentation procedures, we can account to the transaction level 
every dollar spent using a pollution response accounting line (OLSTF, CERCLA, or ESF-10). 
The pollution response program will need to address emerging challenges with standardized 
DHS reimbursable policies, which may make obsolete the use of IAGs as we currently do for 
giving FOSCs the ability to give their federal, state and local governmental partners access to 
our response funds.  The future is that these federal partners will have to do a MIPR or formal 
MOU, and state/local partners will have to be contracted - both situation requiring KO 
involvement which will be a significant paradigm shift for both the response program (CG-
5332) and the acquisition program (CG-9). 
7  
8 
1. trained personnel (ICS 351 & ICS 450/460, USFS comms tech) 2. Logs & Finance positions 
established on unit WQSB w/ appropriate credit card & KO warrants in place;  3. unit exercises 
that include actual logistics & finance activities (ie. resource scarcity that affects operations; 
comms limitations that affects ops, etc.) 4. Contingency plans that pre-identify regional 
sources for critical resources, ID partner agency logisticians & capabilities 5. pre-established 
medical and comms plans.  6. pre-established initial resource orders. 7. established relations 
with local agency response partners in logistics & finance. 8. Logs & finance Go kits for all 
positions.  9.  Established relations incl POC identification with expanded ordering sources 
(MLC,ISC, etc).  10. Demonstrated capability, understanding to implement use of existing 
national or regional contracts; BOAs, USFS national contracts, etc. 
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9 
NPFC has a robust process and resources to respond to oil spills, chem spills... Since Exxon 
Valdez, we've maintained a sound process. 
10 Contracts and spill response organizations are set up and in place to respond.   
11 
LOCAL/AREA/HQ COMMAND'S ABILITY TO MOVE PEOPLE TO THE SITE TO ASSIST, 
REMOTE ABILITY TO SEND SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO THE SITE  
12 
A oil spill drill such as SONS is invaluable.  Here in Los Angeles, we perform table top 
exercises that allow us to exercise contingency response. 
13 
During Katrina we were able to execute procurement with increased credit card purchases, 
reducing prompt payment periods, increase use of emergency contracting methods by 
increasing small purchase limits and executing justifications for other than full and open 
competition.  We also have in place several, indefinite delivery order vehicles and GSA 
ordering sources to respond to immediate need of a multitude of contracts and services. 
14 conducting ICS training and setting up IMTs 
15 
Because we have teams of people in place to react and support a contingency, I feel we are 
somewhat prepared.  Probably prepared more than most.  These teams have practiced in 
drills and real life situations.    
16 
Responses to past contingencies and exercises that are critique that include logistical, 
procurement and financial management injects. 
17 
there is training available (i.e., ICS 351 course) for response finance & logistics but not a lot of 
people have had the course and not a lot of people get to practice it before an incident occurs.  
There are plans and procedures in place, exercises/drills and working relationships w/Fed, 
State, Local partners that help us work thru things when the need arises.  But as the people 
change often those relationships change and the way we respond changes. 
18 
Both hurricane Katrina and 911 demonstrate that we do a good job logistically and in 
procurement. But we can improve to make us more efficient by having adequate CG guidance 
and training.  In financial management is where we typically don’t do well.  
19 
Right now the CG really isn't prepared.  If something happened in Yorktown area, if we lost 
connectivity, it would be extremely difficult to maintain readiness.  In essence, we would have 
to utilize other support networks (ISC Portsmouth, etc.).  I'd deploy my staff to another unit 
where they had access to CGDN, FPD, telephones, etc. etc. 
20 
MLCLANT Contracting Office maintains 24/7 Contracting Support.  Individal KO's are well 
versed and have numerous contracts in place for oil spill response. 
21 
Use of the Incident Management Assist Team (IMAT).  There is a cadre of personnel that have 
the appropriate set of skills, but the fact that they are needed means that there is no 
confidence that the local units have the appropriate expertise. 
22  
23 
During our recent storm activity, the Group supply shop did all the procurement and logistical 
support even though they had to COOP to another location. This worked well for the Group, 
but not so for the station. 
24 
Use of IMAT Logistics Section Chief during Hurricane Katrina greatly enhanced our ability to 
effect the mission. 
25 
Accounting lines for FEMA response. 
ALMIS codes to track flight hours. 
$400M in recouped FEMA charges. 
 
7. What examples can be provided to demonstrate a lack of readiness to conduct 
logistical, procurement or financial management support in a contingency (e.g., 
oil spill, terrorism incident, local disaster)? 
 
1 
A lack of awareness of the resources available locally, and regionally.  No plan, or worse yet, a 
plan that is too large, or vague. 
2 We rarely leverage the many required exercises for oil spills, port security, natural disasters to 
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validate the processes and readiness for Logistics and Finance. 
3 
I have seen a number of cases (hurricane response in particular), in which we have been less 
than prepared during an evacuation. 
4 
Katrina exposed some shortfalls in procurement documentation. Steps have been taken to 
resolve these issues, but until there is another major disaster, it is hard to know for sure how 
effective these steps were. 
5 Enough personnel to staff out the contingency requirements. 
6 
In real life we make it work, that's the CG way.  Look to the after action reports from things like 
the SONS07 exercise.  These exercises typically either don't address financial/logistical 
requirements, or if they write them in, they end up "pretending" the hard parts away, because 
the exercise administrators are mostly operators not familiar with how the logistics part that 
supports them really happens. 
7 
No enforced training path, no professional logistics corp, few effective ICS courses dealing with 
logistics,  
8 absence or insufficient of all the above.   
9 
Honor, respect, devotion to duty only goes so far.  We tend to get the job done in the Radar 
Orielly mode.  However, we need to tighten up the internal control.  The problem is now how to 
balance the two.  The lack of readiness is not that we won't respond but we may not be able to 
do it in a repeatable auditable way... obviously it wouldn't matter if the incident is so terrible that 
some bureaucratic rules become ridiculous. 
10 
Procurement following all the suggested guidelines is not easy to understand. Having been with 
DLA for many years, I observed too many processes that existed and clarity on use did not exist.  
11 
LACK OF KNOWLEDGE TO ACCESS FUNDS WITHIN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TO SPEND 
FUNDING ALLOCATED TO INCIDENT.  
12 
Within major exercises within the Port of LA/LB, typically the maritime, fire, and response 
organizations take the leadership based upon experience and lack of abilities withing the CG 
work force. 
13 
Lodging has been particularly difficult to secure in planning and during emergencies, but the 
Coast Guard has been creative in that aspect 
14 
Operational folks placing orders without authority.  Logistics folks not in any planing phase or 
meeting 
15 
I believe it takes continual practice and improvement.  Although there seems to be a degree of 
continual practice, I am not sure that we have fully implemented lessons learned in our real life 
experiences. Maybe we have, I am just not privy to specifically what and how that was 
implemented. 
16 
sending a questionnaire to field units asking them how they would respond to certain 
requirements.  See how many respond to questions with “I don’t know.”) 
17 
can't exercise/drill every scenario.  Even if we could, there just isn't enough time to commit to 
them.  There are few "professional planners" or trainers dedicated to properly developing 
exercises or providing training.  Right now, it's on the unit which are usually JO's who don't have 
any planning/exercise design experience and it takes 90% of their time.  Even the with the new 
Exercise Support Teams & contractors the unit is still dedicating someone full time to 
planning/coordinating training & exercises.  That's hard when the planning staff only has 3 
people and the JO has no formal training. 
18 
Hurricane Katrina was a good example of lack of preparedness in financial management.  
During the initial response phase there was no clear guidance on how to track cost for units to 
obtained reimbursement from the CG or from FEMA. If I remember correctly guidance came 
weeks or even a month after the incident. 
19 
My guess is that most units don't have a contingency plan in place due to the fact they don't 
have the time and/or resources to effectively plan!  For most of us, financial planning is a very 
small aspect of our current job - and that restricts our ability to effectively address these types of 
shortfalls at a unit. 
20 If MCLANT is inoperative, subject matter expertise would be lacking. 
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21 Use of the IMAT same comment as above. 
22  
23 
The station or small units just did what they needed to continue to operate, then worked to make 
everything legal afterwards.  Training is being held to avoid this in the future. 
24 
Going back to Hurricane Katrina, the Logistics Section Chief (Sector Logistics Department 
Head) was a legacy M officer with little to no logistics background. 
25  
 
8. For the next several questions, assume a tactical nuclear weapon has exploded in 
downtown Miami (or any other major metropolitan coastal city in your Area of 
Responsibility). 
 
a. Given the catastrophic event noted above has occurred today and without 
warning, would the Coast Guard be able to rapidly respond with likely 
operational success?  (Y=1, N=0) 
 
Total = 19, Average = 0.76 
1 1 Yes -  
2 0 No - Internally maybe.  But not as prescribed in the National Response Framework. 
3 1 Yes -  
4 1 Yes -  
5 0 
No - We have very limited resources to move into an area and provide services under 
those conditions. 
6 1 Yes - We always succeed operationally -- at any cost... 
7 0 
No - Not prepared in any way to handle this. You also need to define operational 
success 
8 1 Yes - We are excellent at understanding & executing operational requirements. 
9 1 Yes - our bread and butter. 
10 1 Yes -  
11 1 Yes -  
12 0 No -  
13 1 Yes - The coast guard can respond by using other Sector for first response. 
14 0 No - Absolutely not, no equipment or training to deal with nuclear devices 
15 1 
Yes - My experience has been that the CG will always be one of the first to respond 
and rapidly as seen with 9/11 and Katrina/Rita. 
16 1 
Yes - that would be very traumatic for every federal and state agency.  However, after 
the initial shock, I’m sure the CG will be able to respond with assets from outside the 
effective area.  Having assets dispersed up and down the coast will help.  There will 
need to be some Just In Time (JIT) training with respect to CBR gear, etc. which is 
something the large cutter fleet trains for – I’m not sure about patrol boats, small boats, 
and shore stations.  
17 0 
No - we have no capability to protect ourselves from a nuclear weapon.  any response 
would be putting our people into direct exposure. 
18 1 Yes -  
19 1 Yes -  
20 1 Yes -  
21 1 Yes -  
22 1 Yes -  
23 1 Yes - IT may be slow at first, but I believe Command and Control would be assumed 
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by someone and response would be started but most likely confused. 
24 1 Yes -  
25 1 Yes - Ops will deploy and take action immediately. 
 
b. Is it your opinion that the Coast Guard would be able to begin cost 
collection for the response immediately? (Y=1, N=0) 
 
Total = 5, Average = 0.20 
1 0 No -  
2 0 No - It is the last thing on folks minds. 
3 1 Yes -  
4 1 Yes -  
5 1 Yes -  
6 0 
No - What's definition of "immediately".  Still collecting cost documentation & billing 
FEMA for reimbursement from Katrina 3 yrs ago.  That said, we've recovered 99%+ of 
all expenditures, the system works, but it WILL NOT meet stated 60 day time lines... 
7 0 No - No one would 
8 0 
No - This is usually considered when op tempo has slowed & other aspects of the 
response are considered. 
9 0 No - if immediately is from minute one... Yes if from day 2 or 3. 
10 0 No -  
11 0 No -  
12 0 No -  
13 0 No -  
14 0 No - It would take many days just to figure out where people are 
15 1 Yes - I would hope so based on our experiences, however, not absolutely sure. 
16 0 
No - Not immediately but shortly there after.  This was one of the lessons learned 
from Katrina and why I deployed with the COOP advance team that went to St. Louis 
in May 2008 – specifically for financial management. 
17 0 
No - it would take us at least a day - we respond first then think about logistics & 
finance 
18 0 No -  
19 0 No -  
20 0 No -  
21 0 No -  
22 0 No -  
23 0 
No - Probably not, unless there was a strong financial mgmt type at the larger 
command ensuring that guidance was put out in the field to capture costs. 
24 1 Yes -  
25 0 No - Unlike assets, we have no prepositioned accounting lines. 
 
c. Is cost collection for the response important?  (Y=1, N=0) 
 
Total = 23, Average = 0.92 
1 1 Yes -  
2 1 Yes -  
3 0 
No - This would be important after the first operational period.  The first operational 
period would likely be total chaos... 
4 1 Yes -  
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5 1 Yes -  
6 1 
Yes - The BIG money is in pollution (& now debris removal); and those funds, whether 
OSLTF, CERCLA or ESF requiring billing someone for reimbursment, with a level of 
accuracy that meets both DOJ court requirements, and CFO financial statement 
assertion reqmnts 
7 0 No - Not in the initial phase. This will be a national response. 
8 1 
Yes - Absolutely.  Ask GAO, OMB, DHS OIG, and Congress. Or, follow the media 
outlets. 
9 1 
Yes - eventually the CG needs to be made whole... this will be a Stafford Act operation 
with Mission Assignments. 
10 1 Yes -  
11 1 Yes -  
12 1 Yes - Critical for supplemental billing 
13 1 
Yes - Even in an emergency prudent use of funds is important and the system can be 
abused.  Besides, we want to look at effective use of resources 
14 1 Yes - to finance folks but not to operators  
15 1 Yes - Absolutely important for recovery of costs and accountability. 
16 1 
Yes - Absolutely, we have to answer to the tax payer, Congress, etc.  No such thing as 
unlimited resources. 
17 1 Yes - but only after safety of life 
18 1 Yes -  
19 1 Yes -  
20 1 Yes -  
21 1 Yes -  
22 1 Yes -  
23 1 
Yes - Very.  If it's a national event or even local, it could determine whether 
congressional reimbursement is possible. 
24 1 Yes -  
25 1 Yes - I know of 400M reasons 
 
d. If the District Command Center, Integrated Support Command, and Coast 
Guard infrastructure throughout Miami and South Florida is destroyed or 
incapacitated, would another command be able to take over operational 
control for District 7?   
 
Total = 23, Average = 0.92 
1 1 Yes -  
2 1 Yes - We would shift to LANT and then COOP to LANT. 
3 1 Yes -  
4 1 Yes -  
5 1 Yes -  
6 1 Yes - My guess is Yes, because we did it for New Orleans 3 years ago. 
7 1 Yes - Theoretically but this has not been practiced. 
8 1 Yes - COOPs & Area Contingency Plans apply 
9 1 Yes - Not absolutely sure, but what I have seen at HQ/Area, the Opcon can be shifted. 
10 1 Yes -  
11 1 Yes -  
12 1 Yes - With likely serious delays in set-up. 
13 1 Yes -  
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14 1 Yes - but it would be a mess for a while 
15 1 Yes - However,  do not consider myself in a position to be fully qualified to answer this. 
16 1 
Yes - but there will be growing pains and some on the spot decisions made by the 
Atlantic Area Commander. 
17 1 
Yes - someone would have to.  Don't we have designated command staff throughout 
the CG to do this? 
18 1 Yes - I believe D7 and ISC has figured out what to do in the event they are displaced. 
19 1 Yes - But it would take time! 
20 1 Yes -  
21 0 
No - Right now AREA would but not when the reorganization occurs.  Another district 
should be able to, but those agreements are not in place, like a hiearchy of command 
letter on cutters. 
22 0 No -  
23 1 Yes - In D13, Yes. The plan is in place and was just tested. 
24 1 Yes -  
25 1 Yes -  
 
e. Considering (d.) above, would another command be able to take over 
logistical and support control for assigned operational units in the field?   
(Y=1, N=0) 
 
Total = 21, Average = 0.84 
1 1 Yes -  
2 1 Yes -  
3 1 
Yes - ISC Miami provides minimal direct support to outlying Sectors; many of the ISC 
functions already exist at Sectors. 
4 1 Yes -  
5 1 Yes -  
6 1 Yes - Again, we'll do it, but we'll be leaving huge holes elsewhere in the organization. 
7 1 Yes - Theoretically but again not practiced 
8 1 Yes - eventually 
9 1 Yes - MLC in coordination with Area/HQ would be able to shift Adcon 
10 0 No -  
11 1 Yes - BUT WITH LIMITED ACCOUNTABLITY 
12 1 Yes - With great pain and effort. 
13 1 
Yes - The field units could plug and play because similar dispersions exists in 
various sectors and due to the automation capacity to work across the entire Coast 
Guard network. 
14 1 Yes - again if they can find them and get the information out 
15 1 Yes - Same as above 
16 1 
Yes - I would anticipate that all non affected ISC’s would respond and already do so 
with their support teams.  
17 1 Yes - I believe they could - IMAT concept 
18 1 
Yes - We always finds ways to get things done in the CG.  I believe AIRSTA 
Clearwater will play an important part logistically in D7 & ISC are displaced. 
19 1 Yes - But it would be extremely difficult and painful. 
20 0 No - I'm not sure they could to the same degree 
21 0 
No - Right now MLC after reorg no one unless agreements were made with adjoining 
ISCs. 
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22 0 No -  
23 1 
Yes - I would hope so, but that has not been tested.  There is a plan, but it's not 
tested. 
24 1 Yes -  
25 1 Yes -  
 
9. Do you perceive that logistics (i.e., consider supply ordering and receiving) and 
financial management (i.e., consider contracting, invoicing and accounting) in 
your geographic area have different requirements and/or sources of supply than 
similar units in other areas?  If so, why?  Please provide examples of the 
differences?   (Y=1, N=0) 
 
Total = 11, Average = 0.46 
1 0 No -  
2 0 No -  
3 0 No -  
4 0 No - Same processes, though some small purchases would come from local vendors 
5 1 
Yes - River tenders have different needs with aids to navigation, and duration of 
underway trips than coastal cutters. 
6 0 No -  
7 0 No -  
8 1 
Yes - scarcity of resources on gulf coast; lack of major metropolitan hub (nearest is 
Atlanta or Houston) 
9 1 
Yes - FM slight differences but more so with logistics... supply shops at multiple 
levels have their own business techniques 
10 1 Yes -  
11 1 Yes - COMPUTERS HAVE DIFFERENT WAIVER SYSTEMS  
12 1 
Yes - Accessibility to DOD forces is an advantage, while in LA we are more reliant 
upon the economy. 
13 1 Yes - Cold water ATON and Tropical ATON devices 
14 0 
No - The rules are the same everywhere but they are not applied everywhere. We 
tend to make excuses for operator mistakes in logistics and finance on a daily basis 
15 0 
No - Different requirements, no.  Different sources of supply, yes and no.  Different 
sources of supply may be necessary in an event that has wiped out an entire area.     
16 1 
Yes - Logistics will be different, primarily with different sources of supply.  The 
Financial Management should be the same for the most part since we use the same 
financial applications Coast Guard-wide. 
17 0 
No - Many of the contractors operate throughout the NE area or even the entire East 
Coast. 
18 1 
Yes -  I believe overall we have similar logistic needs and use same financial 
management methods. The only differences would be the sources used for SMAs 
and Construction & Service contracts which tend to be local vendors 
19   -  
20 1 
Yes - Contracting invoicing and accounting at the major contracting office is much 
different that SAT 
21 0 No -  
22 0 No -  
23 0 
No - I believe that similar struggles would take place through out the service.  There 
would be differences depending on where the unit was located (major metro area 
vice rural location) 
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24 0 No -  
25 1 Yes - Climate, geography, mission area focuses are different 
 
10. Given a set of planning scenarios for significant disasters and/or contingencies for 
your geographic area, would it be possible to forecast necessary supplies and 
services that would be needed to support Coast Guard rescue, response and 
recovery operations?    
 
1 
Somewhat.  You know you'll need fuel, food, parts, ppe, lodging, etc., regardless of the 
scenario.   




Yes it would be possible to forecast necessary supplies and services and the type of platforms 
necessary to replace those lost in a significant disaster. 
6 
To a limited degree yes.  Look at the BOA contracts MLCA has in place for pollution response 
- that's the model you want to emulate for the rest of the response world.  That said, there will 
always be something you didn't foresee, and you'll have to retain flexible and responsive 
acquisition/logistics capabilities. 
7 
Not efficiently. The Coast Guard does not maintain active and dynamic Logistics Factor Files 
for planning purposes. We rely on written manuals and not collected data. We also rely on 
personal experience. 
8 
probably not 100%, but I would estimate we could predict up to 70% of what is needed.  
Moreover, I believe that 70% would be consistent regardless of the nature of the incident, ie, 




YES GIVEN THAT THE LOCAL COMMAND HAS THE FUNDS TO PROCURE AS THE 
CURRENT SPEND RATES REQUIRE UNITS TO HIT TARGET RATES AND DEPENDING 
ON WHAT PART OF THE FY THE INCIDENT HITS 
12 I believe that we are not prepared at this time to conduct that level of planning expertise. 
13 
It is possible to forecast needs with the right input from various levels and disciplines within 
the organization. 
14 
Not being an expert in that type of response I can not say but if we use FEMA as an example 
we are in trouble.  That is their function in life and they couldn't pull it out for a while during 
Katrina 
15 
Yes, I believe specific supplies and services can be identified with sources.  Also companies 
that are located throughout the US can be identified in the event local sources are 
incapacitated. 
16 Yes, but actually having the resources to do the planning is lacking. 
17 
A laundry list would be to specific. 
 
Having something similar to a BOA for other contingencies (other than just oil) would be ideal 
(which i understand is being worked on) 
18 
Absolutly, we already do so when responding to oil spills and other incidents that are part of 
CG day to day responses. 
 
We can do a decent forecast of what is needed and make necessary adjustments through 
lessons learned from previous incidents. 
19 
Some things you could forecast, but with limited budget it wouldn't be wise to invest in the 
unforeseen (ie. getting hundreds of body bags).  Our budget don't permit that and if they did, 
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most units don't have the ability to store response/recovery supplies (and if they did, who is to 
say that building wasn't destroyed). 
20 
Yes,  lessons learned should reflect what basic supplies would be needed.  Water, shelter, 
fuel, food, supplies  
21 That would depend on the contingency. 
22  
23 
Possibly but at what costs?  If the supplies are available from other areas of the country, 
should the financial resources be sitting on a shelf just in case? 
24 
Yes.  Bottled water, MREs, fuel, lodging, comms gear are all needed regardless of size/scope 
of potential disasters.  We should stockpile these items. 
25 I believe it has already been done. 
 
11.  Consider now the training that financial managers and supply personnel at field 
level commands receive regarding contingency financial and logistical response:   
 
a. Do you believe that training if sufficient?  (YES or NO and WHY?) 
 
1 No.  ICS training is not sufficient, and that’s the only training being given that I'm aware of. 
2 There are good opportunities that are generic ICS but not CG specific trng. 
3 No, we just get ICS training, which is not CG specific. 
4 Yes 
5 Yes for routine disasters, for an event described above, not training as been insufficient. 
6 
No.  The financial management program doesn't even know what the ICS financial and 
logistical requirements really are.  
7 No absolutely not. Additionally, what training?  
8 
No.  Not enough ICS 351 classes are offered.  ICS 351 is too much info in too short a time.  
No CG LSC or FSC training. No CG Unit Leader training. Training received is not used in unit 
exercises.  SKs do not receive any ICS training in "A" school, nor is it a practical factor for 
promotion. 
9 
Not ideal... it's ad hoc or irregular.  ICS training goes in fits and starts (from what I recall). 
However, even if training was more standardized and regular there is a problem with time 
availability and competing demands. 
10 no 
11 NOT REALLY 
12 
The initial Logistics Officer, ICS-351 is a good beginning point.  Upon completion, there should 
be more practical training to sharpen the skillsets. 
13 No 
14 No not really.   
15 
No I believe more training can be provided in determining and documenting sources for 
various needs.  This information could be compiled and updated frequently that would aid in a 
quicker response.   
16 
It has improved since Katrina with courses like ICS-351, but in general, our junior folks need a 
lot of supervision because the overall training for our SK force was lacking for a few years, and 
some at the E-6 level have limited knowledge. 
17 No. 
18 
There is no much reimbursement financial management, since there is no clear CG wide 
guidance. Units do have decent understanding of logistics and could improved through 
training. 
19 
No - our financial experts should be the Storekeepers and Warrant Officers (in additional to 
civilian personnel / ie. COCOs).  Storekeepers are not trained to be financial managers, they 
are trained to procure w/credit cards and reconcile.  Look at HQ, how many Storekeepers 
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and/or Warrant's are assigned to CG-8 (none!).  The CG needs to start developing the 
Storekeepers into financial managers - the experts. 
20 No 
21 
I think the training is sufficient for the people who deal with this everyday, but awareness 
training for people who are peripherally involved do not get enough training. 
22 yes 
23 
For cost documentation under an ICS environment, probably.  Real life scenario that effects a 




b. What are the strongest areas of training?  
 
1 ICS 
2 ICS Logistics/Finance Section Chief course is very good. 
3 ICS 300, 320, etc. 
4 Contracting, purchase card, ICS 
5 ICS framework, basic budget authority 
6 
We (CG-5332, NPFC, Yorktown) now have a C school, ICS-351 to teach the basics of 
logistics in the ICS world, but it does not cover financial management in detail, and it' limited in 
scope.  An ICS-451 is in the works.  I don't believe everyone that needs the training (this 
training or any other) is getting it.  Again, the pollution response world has a pretty good model 
for cost documentation and financial accounting with respect to pollution contingency 
response, that model should inform other ESF's and OE/Supplemental processes. 
Other related courses: 
ICS-341 Incident Response Planning course, 
ICS-346/7/8 Situation, Resource and Demobilization Unit Leader course,  
ICS-450 Logistics Section Chief course (in planning stage), 
ICS-460 Finance Section Chief course (in planning stage). 
7 None. 
8 
Quality of ICS 351 is good, primarily reaching target audiences.  So far, that's all we're doing 
well. 
9 ICS training is good... the ICS logistics courses are just now coming on line and available. 
10 general knowledge 
11 PROCUREMENT UNDER 100K 
12 Experienced faculty. 
13  
14 Can't say haven't seen it yet 
15 I would suspect that ICS training is the strongest. 
16 ICS courses – COMDT required and tracked. 
17 
There is no formal training program in place for CONTINGENCY finance/logistics other than 
OTJ and what PO's would receive in school.  the ICS 351 course is one of those course that's 
not mandated and people only get to if someone knows about it and the command is willing to 
let them go for a week. 
18  
19 
All senior officers are exposed to a little training (ie. Sector Commanders) wrt financial 
policy/procedures over their career, but frankly, you learn it via OJT.  All CO's have to rely on 
their financial staffs (ie. logistics) and expect they have the training to respond effectively.  I 
think our senior E7's and above have had the training, but not really confident in everyone's 
ability. 
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20 I don't believe there are any strong areas of training. 
21 Financial training. 
22 procurement 
23 mission readiness. 
24 We are trained well to do our daily jobs, but not all of us are trained to deal with catastrophes. 
25  
 
c. What are the weakest areas of training?  
 
1 
When we have exercises, we usually don't include logistics in the drill.  We expect operations 
to drive our logistics training instead of having our training stand alone. 
2 Not enough opportunities to exercise and validate. 
3 CG-specific scenario training. 
4 Property tracking 
5  
6 
There really isn't good, specific training.  What needs to happen is for the program to work 
with the training folks to do a good Front End Analysis (FEA) on this issue, and then 
determine what the appropriate interventions are.  You're questions imply it's a training issue; 
and training is almost certainly part of the solution.  BUT, there may also be policy, procedure, 
IT, aspects to the solution that are more appropriate than training.  Maybe a good job aides 
solves a particular problem.   
7 All areas. There is no formal consistent training. 
8 See 11 a above. 
9 financial management and cost accounting. 
10 specific knowledge of special contingencies (e.g., Stafford act funding)  
11 
CONTRACTING OVER 100K, LACK OF MOU'S WITHIN AN AREA FOR SUPPORT AND OR 
SERVICES, ABILITY TO KEEP TRACK OF EXPENDITURES TO CHARGE TO THE 
INCIDENT PRIOR TO AREA/HQ IDENTIFYING FUNDS,  
12 Insufficient time. 
13 Establishing and utilizing Coast Guard Accounting system properly 
14 
to many people in charge and many levels of duplication in efforts.  No one wants to follow 
procedures in stressful events even if it ensures a better success rate.  I have been present 
during events and you will get a request for "pumps" nothing else listed or explained and if you 
ask for more information you are now part of the problem and not the solution.  Can't order 
something if you do not know what it is or what it is being used for.   
15 
Different areas of expertise having the necessary information at their fingertips such as 
sources of supply, pricing information, regional area sources.  This stems across multiple 
items of supply and service needs.   
16 
The big picture in financial management; entering obligations, etc.  SK’s seem to know 
property or small procurement or transportation or account management/reconciliation, but 
rarely do you have one that knows all. 
17 
the lack of contingency training and all levels. 
 
For instance, my CDR & CWO would probably do ok but the other SK's wouldn't have the first 
clue...and those are the folks we need to help us out in times of disaster response since the 
CDR & CWO would be doing more command/general staff management level things. 
18  
19 
There is no real training structure in place for our financial folks.  To maintain a contracting 
warrant, all must complete annual training, but even that isn't well defined - with most going to 
Management Concepts (the websites and college course proves difficult to find). 
20 COOP plans are written so poorly that the information is blurred. 
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21 Logistics training. 
22 true management 
23 Operational and contingency planning, but I think it's getting better. 
24 
Not enough people have advance ICS training; specifically position specific training.  We don't 
exercise our plans well enough and often enough. 
25  
 
d. List several areas of training that you consider most in need for logistical 
preparedness.   
 
1 
identifying available resources.  Air and sea ports, rail, tug and barge services, alternate fuel 
sources. 
2 
Exercises and CG specific contingency processes.  Cost Documentation is also critical and 
tracking pre-scripted mission assignments for FEMA tasking. 
3 
-Training on COOP procedures 
-Identifying resources 
-Developing robust Comms Plans 
-Actually filling out Financial/Logistics ICS paperwork 
4 Communications (primary, secondary), methods of requesting assistance. 
5 Supplies and replacement platforms to work in a contaminated environment. 
6 
How to contract in the heat of battle. 
How to establish MIPRs, IAGs, & other reimbursables in the heat of battle. 
7 
Interagency agreements, other sources of supply, etc. Logistics Factor Files associated with 
Logistics Estimates.  
8 LSC; Comms Unit Leader, Supply Unit Leader (in order of priority) SK "A" school 
9 
FM process... accounting line, cost centers, etc, and how to implement, request. 
Stafford Act vs. basic cost accounting 
10 Not in my field of experience 
11 
MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) FOR SERVICES OR SUPPORT TIED TO 
FUNDING, CONTRACTING  
12 
Planning, & cost accounting/recovery.  Presently, it is assumed that there is always an open 
checkbook. 
13 Understanding the overall plan and goal. 
14 
A career path for officers in logistics and finance.  If the CG wants experts on this they are 
going to have to allow folks to become experts instead of officers surviving billets they do not 
have training to fill.   
15 
I don't feel I can speak to anything except the procurement side of this effort and I consider 
my experience limited with logistical preparedness.  I know we did have difficulty pinning down 
specific needs due to many requests being much too vague. 
16  
17 
response finance; understanding of disaster funds/ESF's.   
What's the link between FOSC/R's case cost documentation training and actual SK type 
finance?  There is none right now but it seems there should be some sort of cross training or 
link of understanding between the two.  
18  
19 I don't even know of any such training.  I would have to research and see what is available. 
20 
Contingency finance training at every level of support. 
21 
Integration with DoD to include Joint Operations, Planning and Execution System (JOPES), 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), etc and all of the systems that the Coast 
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Guard should be using but are not. 
22 management 
23 
I don't know what training is out there, and the limited training I've taken wasn't real relavent to 
our AOR. 
24 ICS Training, position specific training, shadowing wild fire fighters in ICS command posts. 
25  
 
12. Can you identify potential chokepoints or bottlenecks in our financial 
management and logistics systems?  Are these obstacles primarily related to 
communication systems (i.e., phone systems, e-mail, Coast Guard Data Network), 
policies (i.e., Simplified Acquisition Procedures, Financial Resources 
Management Manual, etc.), personnel (i.e., COCOs, COTRs, SKs, other 
personnel, etc.), or some or all of these?  Please provide a few examples of those 
bottlenecks that you consider most important.   
 
1 
Communications definatly.  Pre-established emergency procedures for procurement and 
accounting.   
2  
3 
-Loss of cell phones 
-Loss of CGDN (the server for the FL West Coast is 4' above sea level) 
-Lack of COCOs & Insufficient Contracting Warrants:  Waiting 14+ days for a $2,500 service 
contract to get approved during an emergency is untenable from an operational standpoint. 
4 
FPD (dependent on CGDN)   
Personnel can quickly be flown in to respond as they were for Katrina. 
5 Personnel and FPD availability would most likely be the potential chokepoints. 
6 
I think the legacy expertise resides in prevention shops at the sectors (and their counterparts 
throughout the chain of command); while the currently responsibility lies with the response 
chain of command.  It's not clear we're growing/developing new people to fill the role in the 
new response world.  It's not clear the field knows what they don't know.  We've got some 
centers of excellence, like the NSFCC, MLCA and NPFC, but it's not institutionalized and not 
systematic. 
7 
Systems, Personnel. SK's are not fully prepared to deal with these situations. Our systems do 
not readily talk to other DOD systems. There needs to be common links among all responding 
systems. The COCO's have the greatest latitude to conduct business but the admin follow up 
is a huge burden. A majority of our personnel are extremely risk averse which will also hinder 
them in contingency situations. 
8 
1.  Ability to execute purchases w/o access to FPD & CGDN.  Huge!  
2. personnel sourcing (obtaining qualified personnel resources for the incident):  this is a 
policy/system problem (none exists) 
3.  Procurement:  personnel problem (lack of training) and policy (lack of high level 
engagement) 
4. Lack of pipeline/source for CG comms unit leaders 
5.  Lack of personnel qualification system or means to track personnel with qualifications. 
9 
Most district, area, MLC and HQ staffs can be bottle necks for field execution... however, 
these staffs tend to quickly flex and adjust to needs of line personnel during disasters as per 
Katrina. 
10 not my field of experience 
11 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR A DISASTER WHO WILL FUND IF THE CG IS 
DIRECTED TO ASSIST. RESPONSE IS FASTER THAN THE LOGISTICS AND FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES CAN BE PUT IN PLACE  
12 Our accounting system to update the accounting line requires an outside person to run a 
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script to activate the accounts.  There needs to be a pre-determined line of accounting, with 
practical guidance to ensure better management of scarce resources. 
13 
Financial approval chains as they exist in FPD.  The approval will need to be centralize to one 
entity.  The FRMM may limit purchase of highly necessary items to deal with the emergency. 
14 
all these problems are experienced by any agency during a event.  We are not experts on this 
stuff and we struggle to get our regular jobs done with the time we have and all the collateral 
duties.  There just doesn’t seem to be any time to plan for something that might happen.  I 
think the rules are fine and have a purpose and with any rule there are provision to allow 
flexibility.  The personnel are the biggest problem as they are not trained very well.  If you 
learn something in ICS training and never get the opportunity to apply it for years you don't 
retain it.   
15 I would consider a major chokepoint being communication systems.   
16 
FPD has problems in a normal environment due to connectivity problems.  We worked with 
our team that was deployed to NOLA, and entered items into the finance system for them – 
they faxed us a preprinted spreadsheet that they were able to hand write the information onto.  
It was important to us at the ISC to capture the data but we had a rather robust staff. 
17 
Comms is always an issue...no one (CG, industry, first responders (FD & PD's), CST's, 
etc...all have different toys. 
18  
19 
Absolutely, the chokeholes would clearly be lost communications - additionally, getting 
logistical personnel the time and support to develop contingency plans at each unit is almost 
impossible. 
20 
FPD requirements.  Warrant management system process for issuance of emergency 
warrants.  Purchase card authority for APCs (authority restricted to geographic area) 
21 Cannot think of any of the top of my head. 
22 comms systems... 
23 
Communications is a weak area and everyone knows. If the towers and cell phones go down, 
what next?  We are working on a solution but at this time, communications I think will be the 
weak link. 
24 Limitation on contracting warrants at the local level. 
25 
AREA IMT wants to run ops, when in a disaster it should be the operational commander 
closest to the action.  This breeds an unhealthy tension.  
 
13. Consider a massive pandemic event in the United States (e.g., pandemic 
influenza, smallpox, SARS, etc.).  Has your office or unit considered the 
ramifications of a large portion of the work force not showing up for weeks at a 
time?  Please answer as you consider implications to the following areas: 
 
a. How would the logistics procedures be affected by absences of people for 
extended periods of time?    
 
1 We would have to order in TAD folks to fill the gap. 
2 
I suspect it would slow down.  Technology and the ability to reach out to other commands for 
support really help. 
3 Significant disruption. 
4 
If more than 1/2 of the workforce is out, it would be difficult to maintain same level of logistic 
support.  Cross training should allow for absence of up to 50% of staff, at least for a few wks. 
5 They would most likely be severely impacted or stopped or switched to alternative locations.   
6 N/A. 
7 Same as in 1918. Limited capability even among those that can or could work. 
8 Logistics (& eventually ops) would come to a standstill until unaffected units could assume 
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responsibility. Logistics is normally a local activity. 
9 
Field logistics would not be impacted by loss of HQ or HQ area units...  as an example, the 




BROKEN MILITARY VS CIVILIAN MEMBERS. IN ABILITY TO EXECUTE FUNDS. LACK OF 
SYSTEM AUTHORIZATION TO APPROVE, CREATE DOCUMENTS, CONTRACT AND 
TRANSFER FUNDS. 
12 
Depending upon the season (transfer), holiday, and leave, it would be impossible to go for 
extended periods without augmentation. 
13 
Our office could work remotely through intranet access very easily under a quarantine 
environment.  TISCOM would need to be able to plug in many users through remote access 
and passwords over the phone and by validation of the unit commanders.  
14 
we make due with what we have and go up our chain of command until someone provides 
help 
15 
I consider people the most vital resource.  In a scenario such as this, I would think this would 
significantly impact the ability to respond.  I am not privy to my command addressing a 
situation such as this.  
16 with the loss of key personnel, this will be significantly impacted. 
17 
We'd probably be ok.  Less people, less work logistically. 
Operationally we'd probably have a greater need w/ship movements & additional 
requirements...unless there was a restriction of the ship movements... 
18 
Logistic could come to a hold if the proper personnel are not in place either from the unit or 
from a remote site. 
19 
As a training center, it doesn't impact us as much as operational units.  However, I think we 
could adequately support our unit with only a few Storekeepers (ie. credit card holders) if need 
be for a temporary period of time. 
20 Lack of subject matter experts resulting in time delayed response. 
21 It depends on which people would be absent. 
22 unknown 
23 
Not much if the missing folks had the ability to work remotely. If they do not, then everything 
will stop. 
24 I don't believe we've planned adequately for this eventuality. 
25  
 
b. How would the procurement and contracting procedures be affected by 
absences of people for extended periods of time?    
 
1 
Could have a serious impact.  What if our KO and Credit card holders are out?  I suppose you 
could ignore the rules and order stuff anyway, but we could easily have a back fill plan in 
place.  Why don't we? 
2 As long as we have strong support from MLC we could manage. 
3 Minimal disruption, b/c some of this can be done from home w/RAS tokens & phone. 
4 Procurements would likely need to be prioritized to ensure minimal impact on operations. 
5 Increased use of credit cards and violations of policy in order to meet operational needs.  
6 
We're a centralized HQ unit.  We could RAS in and process/approve procurements through 
FPD, but it's not clear if our serving KO's would be in position to continue the processing -- we 
assume they have a plan.  We probably should engage them and test that plan... 
7  
8 
Less impact but still significant.  MLC & ISCs should be experienced in providing procurement 
support remotely, ie, by phone, email etc. 
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9 
two very large contracting shops are located in the DC area, CG-912 and NPFC.  these shops 
are critical to executing multiple $100s of millions in contracts annually.  loss of these staffs 
would severely hamper operational and administrative functions of the CG. 
10 ukn 
11 COME TO ALL STOP  
12 Same as question 13a. 
13 
Using emergency procedures, procurement can be streamlined but and procurement could 
work remotely through intranet access very easily under a quarantine environment.  TISCOM 
would need to be able to plug in many users through remote access and passwords over the 
phone and by validation of the unit commanders.  
14 another office would have to process orders and it would be a mess 
15 
Procurement would be greatly affected.  It would take having multiple sites responding with 
their available resources and I would consider this would further enhance the level of 
confusion. 
16 
This would have a severe impact since all the large contracts are issued from MLCA.  With 
the modernization of the Coast Guard and the loss of both complementing MLC’s, this will be 
extremely difficult in the future. 
17 Again, probably ok.  We could reach out to others out of the area for help. 
18 
In the event of an emergency procurement actions can take place from remote sites, if 
necessary as long as the individuals have the proper procurement authority.  
19 
It would affect the operation of Training Center Yorktown, but I know we work around it with a 
few highly skilled Storekeepers. 
20 Lack of authorized authority.  Delays in obtaining operational support and or services. 
21 
Again depends on which people, but if the wrong people were absent certain aspects would 
cease to function. 
22 this would be an issue...limited KOs, etc 
23 Same as above. 
24 
If procurement/contracting personnel were gone for extended periods of time, we may not be 
able to execute all of our operations funds; resulting in spend down not being met and more 
importantly, operational requirements could suffer. 
25  
 
c. How would the financial management procedures be affected by absences 
of people for extended periods of time?    
 
1 Could be messy, again, it would be easy enough to have a plan in place. 
2 Same as above. 
3 Minimal disruption, b/c some of this can be done from home w/RAS tokens. 
4 
Additional funds managers would need to be identified so that that funds certification wouldn't 
be the bottleneck for procurements. 
5 Spend/Burn rates would be inaccurate until personnel returned to work to resolve and update. 
6 
From the pollution side, we've demonstrated we can manage that pretty well.  Worst case is 
we correct the accounting lines that were used to reflect the appropriate accounting line as the 
dust settles.  Again, after Katrina, paperwork piled up until support staffs in MLC could start 
entering it all into the system.  Technically, the officially accounting records we not current, 
and that would likely be the case in any COOP situation. 
7 
Huge effect. It would be across the board. In addition, there is not widespread practice of 
reliable remote access to systems in order to conduct business from anywhere (including 
home)  
8 
It would be a huge impact w/ serious impact to operations if it affected both MLCs. Otherwise, 
one MLC could absorb work of the other.  This will change when the MLCs are consolidated 
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into 1 location in the CG's modernization plan. 
9 
At my level, CG-8, if we were out, the CG line units would function... centrallized cost 
accounting and liaison with FEMA and other agencies would be lost.  However, the void could 
possibly be filled by any of the area staffs. 
10 ukn 
11 NO ACCESS TO KEEP CONTROL OF FUNDS SPENT. TRACKING OF EXPENDITURES  
12 There would we a serious degradation after one week, due to lack of a fully trained staff. 
13 
Financial management could also be accomplished in a virtual environment with some 
process changes.  
14 
easy, the paperwork would not be done and the vendors would not get paid and we would not 
track expenses until after the event when it is too late 
15 Same 
16 Probably the easiest to over come as long as there is clear guidance from HQ. 
17 
would have to figure out new chain of approval processes for all the on-line/databases we 
use...ensure someone is available at all times to approve items. 
18 It would be difficult to properly track costs with lack of personnel. 
19 
Yorktown has a limited budget, however, we could function adequately for a short duration 
with absent personnel.  Most are training to fill the role of others if needed. 
20 Lack of accountability, poor to non existent accountability of funding. 
21 
This function is spread out enough that it would be OK, but some specific functions would fail 
if the wrong people were absent. 
22 depending on the people...this could also be affected 
23 
Most likely, cost documentation would not occur. Not sever and can be corrected later but at 
the expense of man hours. 
24 
Budgeting, accounting, reconciling being done wrong or not at all could have an adverse 
effect on the CFO audit and could ultimately result in budget cuts if we aren't able to 
demonstrate sound financial management policies. 
25  
 
d. What practices could be put in place to counter the danger of a contagious 
viral attack (e.g., remote access systems, digital signatures to documents, 
voice over internet and phone conferencing, etc.)?   
 
1  
2 Not sure ...  
3 All of the above. 
4 
A shift towards allowing more telecommuting would be a strong benefit in this regard.  Even 
some people who were ill could contribute somewhat. 
5 Work off line with updates via a more secure network. 
6 
We really need to invest in the ability for all CG employees to work from home, and make that 
an expectation of employment -- not just something for the "type A" personalities, or the tech 
geeks.  That would be expensive.  Additionally, the IT folks will need to establish policies and 
procedures that ensure firewalls, PII, and other "security" issues don't hamstring the 
employees success. 
7 
All of the above. Use the US Army AKO system as an example. It works and business can be 
conducted.  
8 
Cross training between MLCs.  Consistent policies & SOP between ISCs, Sectors & MLC.  
Train & exercise across the CG. National BOAs & standing MOUs w/ other agencies for 
national contracts. Identify means to execute procurement without access to FPD & CGDN. 
9 





SEPARATE LOGISTICS SYSTEM OR A DUAL EMERGENCY ONLY SYSTEM TO 
PROCURE, CONTRACT AND TRACK FUNDS 
12 
Remote Access systems is a great start.  The CG needs to advance into the 21st century with 
regards to leveraging of technology. 
13 
Our office could work remotely through intranet access very easily under a quarantine 
environment.  TISCOM would need to be able to plug in many users through remote access 
and passwords over the phone and by validation of the unit commanders.  
14 
Logistics can be provided from anywhere it is just getting the field and operators to work with 
them.   
15 All identified in the question. 
16 All those listed above.  We currently have some folks with RAS tokens but not all have them. 
17 
Make telecommuting easier.  Not everyone has ras capabilities and only so much can be 
done via treo.  Get the CG onboard w/online systems we can remotely log onto.  For instance, 
schools and businesses can log onto outlook via the internet. 
18  
19 
Would prove extremely difficult - I would stage my staff in a remote location (ie. another CG 
unit).  
20 Not sure I understand this question. 
21 
A lot of these options are already in existence but not many people take advantage of them, 
nor do people have the training and equipment to do so if needed. 
22 unknown...some kind of technical (yet transparent) solution 
23 
Remote access would have to be expanded.  System is very slow now under normal 
circumstances. acceptance of digital signatures would speed up the processes. 
24 Unk. 
25 Telecommute from home. 
 
14. What other individuals who may be interested in logistical and contingency 
preparedness would you recommend to be contacted as part of this research?  ) 
 
 The responses for this question have been withheld for privacy reasons.  
Requests can be made to provide information through contacting LCDR Benjamin 
Berg via e-mail at Benjamin.D.Berg@uscg.mil.   
 
15. Would you be willing to discuss your answers more fully in person, on the phone 
or during a focus group?   (YES or NO) 
 
The responses for this question have been withheld for privacy reasons.  
Requests can be made to provide information through contacting LCDR Benjamin 
Berg via e-mail at Benjamin.D.Berg@uscg.mil.
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APPENDIX B. CONTINGENCY COST CENTER TABLE 
The following table provides an example of how cost centers can be pre-
established to cover a wide range of contingencies at various location, while still 
providing a range of cost centers to cover simultaneous or multiple events. 
Table 3.   Sample of Pre-Designated Cost Centers for Contingency Events 
 
INCIDENT LOCATION/ATU COST CENTER RANGE 
Nuclear Detonation USCG HQ Org 50000 through 50009 
Nuclear Detonation USCG HQ Units 50010 through 50019 
Nuclear Detonation Atlantic Area 50020 through 50029 
Nuclear Detonation Pacific Area 50030 through 50039 
Nuclear Detonation 1st District 50040 through 50049 
Nuclear Detonation 5th District 50050 through 50059 
Nuclear Detonation 7th District 50060 through 50069 
Nuclear Detonation 8th District 50070 through 50079 
Nuclear Detonation 9th District 50080 through 50089 
Nuclear Detonation 11th District 50090 through 50099 
Nuclear Detonation 13th District 50100 through 50109 
Nuclear Detonation 14th District 50110 through 50119 
Nuclear Detonation 17th District 50120 through 50129 
Nuclear Detonation MLC Atlantic 50130 through 50139 
Nuclear Detonation MLC Pacific 50140 through 50149 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax USCG HQ Org 50150 through 50159 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax USCG HQ Units 50160 through 50169 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax Atlantic Area 50170 through 50179 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax Pacific Area 50180 through 50189 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 1st District 50190 through 50199 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 5th District 50200 through 50209 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 7th District 50210 through 50219 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 8th District 50220 through 50229 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 9th District 50230 through 50239 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 11th District 50240 through 50249 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 13th District 50250 through 50259 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 14th District 50260 through 50269 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 17th District 50270 through 50279 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax MLC Atlantic 50280 through 50289 
Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax MLC Pacific 50290 through 50299 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza USCG HQ Org 50300 through 50309 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza USCG HQ Units 50310 through 50319 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza Atlantic Area 50320 through 50329 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza Pacific Area 50330 through 50339 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 1st District 50340 through 50349 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 5th District 50350 through 50359 
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Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 7th District 50360 through 50369 
INCIDENT LOCATION/ATU COST CENTER RANGE 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 8th District 50370 through 50379 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 9th District 50380 through 50389 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 11th District 50390 through 50399 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 13th District 50400 through 50409 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 14th District 50410 through 50419 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 17th District 50420 through 50429 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza MLC Atlantic 50430 through 50439 
Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza MLC Pacific 50440 through 50449 
Biological Attack - Plague USCG HQ Org 50450 through 50459 
Biological Attack - Plague USCG HQ Units 50460 through 50469 
Biological Attack - Plague Atlantic Area 50470 through 50479 
Biological Attack - Plague Pacific Area 50480 through 50489 
Biological Attack - Plague 1st District 50490 through 50499 
Biological Attack - Plague 5th District 50500 through 50509 
Biological Attack - Plague 7th District 50510 through 50519 
Biological Attack - Plague 8th District 50520 through 50529 
Biological Attack - Plague 9th District 50530 through 50539 
Biological Attack - Plague 11th District 50540 through 50549 
Biological Attack - Plague 13th District 50550 through 50559 
Biological Attack - Plague 14th District 50560 through 50569 
Biological Attack - Plague 17th District 50570 through 50579 
Biological Attack - Plague MLC Atlantic 50580 through 50589 
Biological Attack - Plague MLC Pacific 50590 through 50599 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent USCG HQ Org 50600 through 50609 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent USCG HQ Units 50610 through 50619 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent Atlantic Area 50620 through 50629 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent Pacific Area 50630 through 50639 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 1st District 50640 through 50649 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 5th District 50650 through 50659 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 7th District 50660 through 50669 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 8th District 50670 through 50679 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 9th District 50680 through 50689 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 11th District 50690 through 50699 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 13th District 50700 through 50709 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 14th District 50710 through 50719 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 17th District 50720 through 50729 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent MLC Atlantic 50730 through 50739 
Chemical Attack - Blister Agent MLC Pacific 50740 through 50749 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals USCG HQ Org 50750 through 50759 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals USCG HQ Units 50760 through 50769 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals Atlantic Area 50770 through 50779 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals Pacific Area 50780 through 50789 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 1st District 50790 through 50799 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 5th District 50800 through 50809 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 7th District 50810 through 50819 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 8th District 50820 through 50829 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 9th District 50830 through 50839 
 155
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 11th District 50840 through 50849 
INCIDENT LOCATION/ATU COST CENTER RANGE 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 13th District 50850 through 50859 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 14th District 50860 through 50869 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 17th District 50870 through 50879 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals MLC Atlantic 50880 through 50889 
Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals MLC Pacific 50890 through 50899 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent USCG HQ Org 50900 through 50909 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent USCG HQ Units 50910 through 50919 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent Atlantic Area 50920 through 50929 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent Pacific Area 50930 through 50939 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 1st District 50940 through 50949 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 5th District 50950 through 50959 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 7th District 50960 through 50969 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 8th District 50970 through 50979 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 9th District 50980 through 50989 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 11th District 50990 through 50999 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 13th District 51000 through 51009 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 14th District 51010 through 51019 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 17th District 51020 through 51029 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent MLC Atlantic 51030 through 51039 
Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent MLC Pacific 51040 through 51049 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion USCG HQ Org 51050 through 51059 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion USCG HQ Units 51060 through 51069 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion Atlantic Area 51070 through 51079 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion Pacific Area 51080 through 51089 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 1st District 51090 through 51099 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 5th District 51100 through 51109 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 7th District 51110 through 51119 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 8th District 51120 through 51129 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 9th District 51130 through 51139 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 11th District 51140 through 51149 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 13th District 51150 through 51159 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 14th District 51160 through 51169 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 17th District 51170 through 51179 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion MLC Atlantic 51180 through 51189 
Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion MLC Pacific 51190 through 51199 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake USCG HQ Org 51200 through 51209 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake USCG HQ Units 51210 through 51219 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake Atlantic Area 51220 through 51229 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake Pacific Area 51230 through 51239 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 1st District 51240 through 51249 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 5th District 51250 through 51259 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 7th District 51260 through 51269 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 8th District 51270 through 51279 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 9th District 51280 through 51289 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 11th District 51290 through 51299 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 13th District 51300 through 51309 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 14th District 51310 through 51319 
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Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 17th District 51320 through 51329 
INCIDENT LOCATION/ATU COST CENTER RANGE 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake MLC Atlantic 51330 through 51339 
Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake MLC Pacific 51340 through 51349 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane USCG HQ Org 51350 through 51359 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane USCG HQ Units 51360 through 51369 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane Atlantic Area 51370 through 51379 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane Pacific Area 51380 through 51389 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 1st District 51390 through 51399 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 5th District 51400 through 51409 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 7th District 51410 through 51419 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 8th District 51420 through 51429 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 9th District 51430 through 51439 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 11th District 51440 through 51449 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 13th District 51450 through 51459 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 14th District 51460 through 51469 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 17th District 51470 through 51479 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane MLC Atlantic 51480 through 51489 
Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane MLC Pacific 51490 through 51499 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices USCG HQ Org 51500 through 51509 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices USCG HQ Units 51510 through 51519 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices Atlantic Area 51520 through 51529 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices Pacific Area 51530 through 51539 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 1st District 51540 through 51549 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 5th District 51550 through 51559 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 7th District 51560 through 51569 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 8th District 51570 through 51579 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 9th District 51580 through 51589 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 11th District 51590 through 51599 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 13th District 51600 through 51609 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 14th District 51610 through 51619 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices 17th District 51620 through 51629 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices MLC Atlantic 51630 through 51639 
Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Devices MLC Pacific 51640 through 51649 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices USCG HQ Org 51650 through 51659 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices USCG HQ Units 51660 through 51669 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices Atlantic Area 51670 through 51679 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices Pacific Area 51680 through 51689 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 1st District 51690 through 51699 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 5th District 51700 through 51709 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 7th District 51710 through 51719 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 8th District 51720 through 51729 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 9th District 51730 through 51739 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 11th District 51740 through 51749 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 13th District 51750 through 51759 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 14th District 51760 through 51769 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices 17th District 51770 through 51779 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices MLC Atlantic 51780 through 51789 
Explosives Attack - Bombing w / Impr. Explosive Devices MLC Pacific 51790 through 51799 
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Biological Attack - Food Contamination USCG HQ Org 51800 through 51809 
INCIDENT LOCATION/ATU COST CENTER RANGE 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination USCG HQ Units 51810 through 51819 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination Atlantic Area 51820 through 51829 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination Pacific Area 51830 through 51839 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 1st District 51840 through 51849 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 5th District 51850 through 51859 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 7th District 51860 through 51869 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 8th District 51870 through 51879 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 9th District 51880 through 51889 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 11th District 51890 through 51899 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 13th District 51900 through 51909 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 14th District 51910 through 51919 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination 17th District 51920 through 51929 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination MLC Atlantic 51930 through 51939 
Biological Attack - Food Contamination MLC Pacific 51940 through 51949 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease USCG HQ Org 51950 through 51959 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease USCG HQ Units 51960 through 51969 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease Atlantic Area 51970 through 51979 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease Pacific Area 51980 through 51989 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 1st District 51990 through 51999 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 5th District 52000 through 52009 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 7th District 52010 through 52019 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 8th District 52020 through 52029 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 9th District 52030 through 52039 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 11th District 52040 through 52049 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 13th District 52050 through 52059 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 14th District 52060 through 52069 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease 17th District 52070 through 52079 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease MLC Atlantic 52080 through 52089 
Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease MLC Pacific 52090 through 52099 
Cyber Attack USCG HQ Org 52100 through 52109 
Cyber Attack USCG HQ Units 52110 through 52119 
Cyber Attack Atlantic Area 52120 through 52129 
Cyber Attack Pacific Area 52130 through 52139 
Cyber Attack 1st District 52140 through 52149 
Cyber Attack 5th District 52150 through 52159 
Cyber Attack 7th District 52160 through 52169 
Cyber Attack 8th District 52170 through 52179 
Cyber Attack 9th District 52180 through 52189 
Cyber Attack 11th District 52190 through 52199 
Cyber Attack 13th District 52200 through 52209 
Cyber Attack 14th District 52210 through 52219 
Cyber Attack 17th District 52220 through 52229 
Cyber Attack MLC Atlantic 52230 through 52239 
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